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INTRODUCTION
Congress is more ideologically polarized now than at any time in the
modern regulatory era,1 which makes legislation ever harder to pass.2 One of
the consequences of this congressional dysfunction is a reduced probability
that Congress will update regulatory legislation in response to significant
new economic, scientific, or technological developments. This predicament,
we argue here, has important implications for the federal agencies charged

1 By “the modern regulatory era,” we mean the period from the 1960s to the present; the data
on polarization, however, show that Congress is more polarized now than at any time since well
before World War II. For evidentiary support for this claim, see infra Part II.
2 See Chris Cillizza, The Least Productive Congress Ever, WASH. POST ( July 17, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/07/17/the-least-productive-congress-ever/,
archived at http://perma.cc/J2XV-EJRH (noting that the 112th Congress passed fewer bills than
any Congress “since they began keeping these stats way back in 1947” and ascribing the problem in
part to “factionalism”).
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with implementing statutes over time and for courts adjudicating challenges
to agency statutory implementation.3
We explain how federal agencies coping with new regulatory challenges
often encounter problems of “fit” with older statutes, which require them to
make delicate legal and political judgments in the face of congressional
silence. And we show how, following the Goldilocks principle, agencies seek
to get this process just right by balancing the perceived need for regulatory
innovation with a concern about potential overreach.
Agencies, we claim, do not simply “go for broke” when wrestling with
problems of fit. Instead they proceed strategically, cognizant of the preferences of their political overseers and the risk of being overturned in the
courts. Sometimes agencies interpret their enabling legislation so as to
expand their jurisdiction; other times, agencies manage problems of fit by
intentionally shrinking their jurisdiction, proceeding incrementally, and
engaging in deliberate restraint.4 Our examples show that agencies can be
persistent, flexible, bold, cautious, expert, political, and, above all, strategic.
The examples also suggest that even—and perhaps especially—when
adapting old statutes to new problems, agencies are surprisingly accountable,
not just to the President, but also to Congress, the courts, and the public.
There is a significant literature on statutory “obsolescence,” dating to the
1920s, on which we hope to build, in which prominent jurists, such as
Roscoe Pound, Justice Cardozo, and Judge Calabresi, lamented “static law”
and expounded on the need to update regularly both common law and
statutes.5 This literature has historically focused on the role of the judge in
statutory interpretation; the central debate has been over the extent to
which judges should feel free to declare law obsolete and fill in the gaps
themselves. Judge Calabresi’s seminal work on outdated statutes, which

3 These new developments might stem from changing economic or social circumstances
beyond those anticipated or fully addressed by the statute, technological innovation or evolving
scientific understandings that change the circumstances on the ground, or new information about
the costs and benefits of different regulatory strategies based on experience with them over time.
4 For an article describing agency techniques of strategic restraint, inaction, and delay as
salutary rather than evidence of shirking, see Sharon Jacobs, The Administrative State’s Passive
Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
5 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 33 (1982);
Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 114 (1921) (“Legislature and
courts move on in proud and silent isolation.”); Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking—Judges
Who Can’t and Legislators Who Won’t, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 792 (1963) (“What I do lament is
that the legislator has diminished the role of the judge by occupying vast fields and then has failed
to keep them ploughed.”); Roscoe Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 142,
144 (1920) (describing “institutions, doctrines, and rules which have survived the original reasons
of their contrivance . . . , but now impede effective administration of justice”).
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spawned considerable commentary,6 was unambiguously negative about the
prospect of agencies filling those gaps; he was skeptical that agency officials
are adequately trained or sufficiently independent to assess legal principles
and make accurate findings of obsolescence. More recently, however, legal
scholars have recognized that the agencies entrusted by Congress with
statutory implementation may in fact be the most appropriate “statutory
updaters” in our separation of powers system, because they are more nimble
than Congress, more accountable than courts, and more expert than both in
responding to changing conditions.7 The discussion about statutory obsolescence overlaps naturally with the vast literature on statutory interpretation;
both lead inexorably to debates over the merits of different interpretive
methodologies and the normative justification for more or less deferential
judicial review.
Yet while this literature has identified the problem of static statutes, it
has not fully explored the implications for agencies and courts in an era of
unprecedented congressional paralysis. Indeed, because of its historical
origins and the limitations of available institutional reforms, congressional
paralysis is likely to be enduring.8 The challenge of managing statutes over
time is profoundly important in a period of rapid change and limited
congressional productivity. When agencies charged with a regulatory
6 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) (arguing
against roving authority to engage in judicial common law revision of statutes); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1481 n.7, 1530-34 (1987)
(advocating for judges to engage in dynamic statutory interpretation to counteract the effect of
legislative inattention to general public interests, claiming that judges are more trustworthy than
agencies because they are less influenced by regulated groups, and expressing the view that his
proposal “stops far short” of Calabresi’s proposal); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 197
(1986) (criticizing Calabresi’s proposal on grounds that the concept of “statutory obsolescence” is
too vague to constrain judicial behavior, among other reasons); Abner J. Mikva, The Shifting Sands
of Legal Topography, 96 HARV. L. REV. 534, 540-43 (1982) (reviewing CALABRESI, supra note 5)
(proposing an alternative solution to the problem of obsolescence, namely that lawmakers make
“specific and limited delegations” of updating power to courts).
7 See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Shuren, Essay, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to
Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 292 (2001) (“[O]ne of the primary reasons for
granting agencies broad judicial deference in the implementation of statutory mandates is that
agencies are the governmental entities best equipped to respond to changing circumstances.”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2102-03 (1990)
(concluding that agencies “are far better situated than courts to soften statutory rigidities or to
adapt their terms to unanticipated conditions” due to their “fact-finding capacities, electoral
accountability, and continuing attention to changed circumstances”).
8 See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy
in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 275-76 (2011) (arguing that polarization cannot be addressed
effectively by various institutional solutions, is caused by long-term historical processes, and is
likely to be enduring).
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mission fail to address new policy problems that arguably fall within their
core domain, society might be deprived of important gains—public health,
safety, environmental benefits, consumer protection, and market efficiencies—which may be hard to recapture later. Yet if agencies exceed their legal
authority when addressing new problems, they realize our worst fears about
bureaucracy run amok.9
This is of course the central challenge posed by the modern administrative
state: how to balance the pragmatic need for administrative flexibility with
respect for the rule of law and democratic values. Our point is simply that
typical statutory obsolescence made worse by atypical congressional dysfunction puts tremendous pressure on agencies to do something to address new
problems, making that central challenge all the more acute.
We focus on examples from environmental law and energy law, the regulatory domains we know best. Congress has not passed a major environmental
statute in nearly a quarter-century, nor has it produced more than incremental
reforms to federal energy legislation during that time, despite dramatic
technological, economic, and social changes in these fields that would seem
to demand a legislative response. There are notable instances in other fields,
such as telecommunications10 and food and drug regulation,11 where agencies

9

As Chief Justice Roberts wrote in City of Arlington,
[t]he administrative state “wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily
life.” The Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s “vast and varied federal bureaucracy” and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our economic,
social, and political activities. . . . It would be a bit much to describe the result as
“the very definition of tyranny,” but the danger posed by the growing power of the
administrative state cannot be dismissed.

City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878-79 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). But cf. Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1368 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (Roberts, J.) (adopting an expansive view of FERC’s authority under the Federal Power Act
to spread the costs of new transmission investment).
10 The Communications Act is arguably again out of date, as the FCC continues to strain to
adapt it to emerging technologies. See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(rejecting the FCC’s attempt to adopt “net neutrality” rules requiring broadband providers to
adhere to open-access network requirements given that only common carriers are subject to such
requirements and the FCC did not classify broadband providers as such).
11 The FDA’s governing statute has been amended in numerous small ways over the years,
but there have also been long periods during which the FDA struggled to implement the statute
under the supervision of the courts. See Richard A. Merrill, FDA’s Implementation of the Delaney
Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 3-13 (1988) (recounting the FDA’s struggle to adapt the language of the “Delaney Clause,”
which prohibited FDA approval of food additives that “induce cancer,” when post-enactment
advances in science revealed a multitude of popular food additives pose at least a minimal risk of
cancer). The food safety regime under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) was not
significantly updated until 2011. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124

6

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 1

have been left for relatively long periods to adapt existing law to new
challenges, leading to problems of fit between an older statute and contemporary reality.12 The same might be said for financial regulation, which has
failed to keep pace with market innovation, leaving the responsible regulatory
agencies scrambling to adapt old tools to new problems.13 Thus, the lessons
learned about the consequences of congressional dysfunction in the environment and energy domains may apply more generally to policymaking in
other fast-moving fields where Congress fails to “modernize” statutes on a
regular basis.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we describe how Congress’s
capacity to enact legislation has diminished over time. Drawing on theoretical
and empirical work by political scientists, we illustrate why congressional
gridlock has reached levels unseen in the last fifty years. Briefly stated,
Congress’s ability to cobble together legislative majorities has traditionally
been a function of its ideological heterogeneity. For the last two decades,
parties have been at once more ideologically homogenous and farther apart
ideologically than at any time in the modern regulatory era, making legislative
action more difficult and leaving agencies to deal with new policy problems
using old and aging statutory mandates.
In Part III, we provide two detailed examples of how federal agencies
have responded to problems of bad fit by adapting existing laws to new
challenges: the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) implementation

Stat. 3885 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2012)); see
also infra note 51 and accompanying text.
12 In the mid-twentieth century, Congress repeatedly failed to amend the Federal Communications Act in the face of sweeping technological and economic innovations, despite numerous
pleas from both the FCC and commentators. As a result, the FCC struggled to apply its dated
statute to modern radio, television, and cable, and the D.C. Circuit often overruled its efforts. See
John C. Roberts, The Sources of Statutory Meaning: An Archaeological Case Study of the 1996
Telecommunications Act, 53 SMU L. REV. 143, 146-47 (2000) (describing a fifty-year period during
which Congress repeatedly rebuffed FCC appeals to modernize the Communications Act to
address new technologies, leaving the FCC to “stagger blindly” on its own); see also Jessica Litman,
Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 342-54 (1989) (noting that new
communications media and increased private use outpaced the inflexible statutory provisions in
the Copyright Act of 1976).
13 See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role
of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 673-74 (1987). Only after the
financial crisis of 2008–2009 did Congress adopt a variety of reforms intended to curb the risks of
new financial products (such as mortgage-backed securities) and new market practices (such as
proprietary trading by banks) that had produced extremely high systemic risk. See Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)
(codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 44 U.S.C. (2012)).
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of the Clean Air Act (CAA)14 to address climate change and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) implementation of the Federal
Power Act (FPA)15 to modernize electricity policy. The two examples are
not identical. EPA’s authority under the CAA has remained literally
unchanged for over twenty years, while Congress has modified FERC’s
authority over electric power in targeted ways over that time. Still, they
illustrate a common problem. In both policy domains, the responsible
federal agencies have had to wrestle with the rise of important new problems
requiring attention, but in neither domain has Congress spoken decisively
and comprehensively about the central pressing issues.
In Part IV, we discuss the implications of this dynamic for the institutions
in our separation of powers scheme: the President, Congress, the courts,
and the agencies. It stands to reason that if Congress is unable to speak via
legislation, agencies face a reduced likelihood that their decisions will be
overridden. To the extent that agencies do the President’s bidding, congressional weakness can also enhance presidential influence over policy. Of
course, the courts become relatively more important too, since they will
decide whether an agency may follow the course it has chosen.
Put most plainly, congressional dysfunction invites agencies and courts
to do the work of updating statutes. We argue that agencies are better suited
than courts to do that updating work and that the case for deferring to
agencies in that task is stronger than ever with Congress largely absent from
the policymaking process. Indeed, because the agency is the legally designated custodian of the statute (so designated by the enacting Congress), the
agency has the superior claim to interpret the statute’s application to new
problems during periods of congressional quiescence. Persistent congressional gridlock also means that agency policy initiatives that do survive
judicial review could prove to be quite durable. Once an agency charts a
new policy course, and the regulated community begins to respond, it may
be difficult to reverse the consequences. In this way, an agency’s adaptive
strategy is not merely a stopgap; it meaningfully changes the policy status
quo, reconfiguring the options for Congress should it ultimately choose to
act.

14 Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401–7671q (2012)).
15 Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–
828c (2012)).
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I. CONGRESSIONAL “DYSFUNCTION”
A central premise of our argument is that Congress’s capacity to react to
changed circumstances by lawmaking has diminished sharply over time,
particularly its ability to respond to new developments that arise at the
intersection of environmental and energy policy. We are not the first to
recognize the lack of congressional action in these fields. Others have
lamented the failure of Congress to pass major environmental legislation
over the past two decades, particularly legislation addressing climate change,
but also legislation to update environmental statutes last amended in the
1970s and 1980s.16 Congress has produced a few pieces of significant energy
legislation over that same time period,17 but in both the energy policy and
environmental policy realms, Congress appears to have lost the capacity to
react to new policy challenges as efficiently or effectively as it did in the
past.
A. Congressional (Un)Responsiveness
The twentieth century is replete with examples of Congress responding
to emerging energy and environmental policy exigencies with legislation.
For example, New Deal energy legislation like the FPA and the Natural Gas
Act of 1938 (NGA)18 responded to concerns about state regulation of energy
in interstate commerce,19 market power of public utilities,20 and the need for
federal coordination of rapidly changing energy technologies, such as

16 See Jonathan H. Adler, Conservative Principles for Environmental Reform, 23 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 253, 253-54 (2013) (claiming that “[m]ajor environmental policy reform is long
overdue” and lamenting the application of twentieth century regulatory measures to twenty-first
century problems); Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for
the New Congress and Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2008) (“For almost 20 years,
political polarization and a lack of leadership have left environmental protection in the United
States burdened with obsolescent statutes and regulatory strategies.”).
17 See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
18 Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z
(2012)).
19 The Federal Power Act, in particular, was partly a response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83, 8990 (1927) (striking down state regulation of cross-border electricity sales on Commerce Clause
grounds); see also Natural Gas: Hearing on H.R. 11662 Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong. 13 (1936) (statement of Dozier A. DeVane, Solicitor,
Fed. Power Comm’n) (discussing Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause).
20 The Supreme Court has said that the primary aim of the NGA was “to protect consumers
against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies.” Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610-11 (1944).
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natural gas pipelines.21 Likewise, the CAA of 1970, the Clean Water Act of
1972 (CWA),22 and the spate of environmental legislation of the 1970s23
embody Congress’s response to newly understood threats to health and the
environment posed by pollution.24 These examples were more than legislative tinkering; they were legislative responses to important new problems.
Moreover, until the mid-1990s, Congress showed the willingness and
ability to modify these existing regulatory regimes in substantive ways as
necessary to adapt to new and changing understandings of the policy
environment. For example, Congress amended the CAA a mere seven years
after its passage to fill gaps it had identified in the statute.25 Congress
amended the statute again in 1990 in response to a newly understood air
pollution problem (acid rain) and to dissatisfaction with aspects of EPA’s
regulation of toxic air emissions under the law.26 Similarly, Congress
responded to the energy crises of the late 1970s by passing the Natural Gas

21 In section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, Congress delegated to FERC the power to site interstate
natural gas pipelines, in part because natural gas (unlike electricity) could not be produced
everywhere it was needed, therefore necessitating transmission of natural gas across state lines. See
15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (2012). A variety of other New Deal-era statutes addressed energy needs. See,
e.g., Rural Electrification Act of 1936, ch. 432, 49 Stat. 1363 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 901–918c (2012)) (seeking to promote electricity service in rural areas not served by investorowned utilities); National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 701–712 (1934)) (seeking to relieve boom-bust cycles and price volatility in the
domestic oil production industry), invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (overturning the law on nondelegation grounds).
22 Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)).
23 The period from 1969 through 1980 is sometimes referred to as “the environmental decade.”
See generally LETTIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT 1, 15-19 (1982)
(chronicling the proliferation of environmental laws in the decade following the passage of the
National Environmental Policy Act in 1969).
24 Several other foundational environmental laws were enacted during this period, including
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012)), the Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003
(1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2012)), the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901–6987 (2012)), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012)), better known as “Superfund.”
25 Among other things, the 1977 amendments codified the “prevention of significant deterioration” (PSD) permit program, which imposed emissions limits on sources of air pollution in
attainment areas—that is, areas in compliance with national ambient air quality standards. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 7470–7492 (2012).
26 The 1990 amendments established the acid rain program for coal-fired power plants, see 42
U.S.C. §§ 7651–76510 (2012), and strengthened the regulation of toxic emissions by listing 189
specific toxics and substituting technology-based standards for health-based ones, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412 (2012).
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Policy Act of 197827 and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(PURPA)28 to promote the development of domestic energy sources and
new, cleaner sources of electricity. All of this legislative activity helped guide
the agencies to which Congress had delegated regulatory responsibility over
these problems—EPA and FERC—as they tackled these new environmental
and energy challenges, respectively.
Since the mid-1990s, EPA and FERC have continued to confront new
and important environmental and energy challenges, but Congress has been
largely absent from the policy response. During this time, we have come to
new and better understandings of the ways in which our use of energy poses
significant threats to our environment, health, and security. Just as a scientific
consensus coalesced in the 1980s around the conclusions that acid rain was a
real problem caused by emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides29
and that a variety of common aerosol products were eroding the stratospheric
ozone layer,30 a new scientific consensus coalesced in the first few years of the
twenty-first century around the conclusion that greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, largely from burning fossil fuels for energy consumption, are
driving climate change.31 Unlike the cases of acid rain and ozone depletion,

27 The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3432 (2012)), was a response to the natural gas price spikes and shortages of
the 1970s, which were themselves, by most accounts, the product of regulatory dysfunction caused
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954). See
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., State Regulation of Natural Gas in a Federally Deregulated Market: The Tragedy of
the Commons Revisited, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 15, 18 (1987) (noting that in 1954, “the federal
government began regulating the price of all producer sales of gas for resale in interstate
commerce under the Natural Gas Act”).
28 The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and
43 U.S.C. (2012)), established incentives for the construction of non-utility-owned electric
generating facilities using renewable resources or more efficient technologies.
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2012) (finding that “acidic compounds . . . in the atmosphere . . . represent[] a threat to natural resources, ecosystems, materials, visibility, and public
health” and that “the principal sources of the acidic compounds and their precursors in the atmosphere are emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides from the combustion of fossil fuels”).
30 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671a–7671q (2012) (authorizing EPA to phase out production and import
of ozone depleting substances); Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
31 See LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 30, 37 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (stating that warming of the climate system is “unequivocal” and reporting with “very high confidence” that the net effect of human activities since 1750,
primarily fossil fuel use, has been one of warming); see also CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 17 (Thomas F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013), available at http://
www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf (reporting that human
activities are the dominant cause of observed warming since the twentieth century).
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however, the identification of the problem has not been followed by a
congressional policy response.
Over the same period of time, technology and competition transformed
electricity markets. A drastic increase in the number and distance of bulk
power sales now strain an aging transmission system; meanwhile, revolutionary technological innovations known collectively as the “smart grid,” and
a sea change in thinking about the role of competition and market pricing in
those markets, has transformed them in other ways.32 Congress’s responses
to these developments have stopped short of giving FERC the clear guidance
it needs to adapt to these changing circumstances. As the agencies charged
with primary responsibility for managing this new policy environment,
EPA and FERC have tried to discharge what they see as their statutory
responsibilities nonetheless, prompting concern that they may be stretching
their statutes too far.
B. Legislative Action and Gridlock
Of course, the policymaking process has always been characterized by
principal–agent problems that can grow more pronounced as time passes.
Congress routinely delegates regulatory authority and policy discretion to
agencies, and statutes perpetually age, raising questions about how well they
“fit” the new circumstances.33 Yet we contend that these fit problems are more
severe now than at any time in the modern regulatory era. Understanding the
basis for this claim requires an explanation of the determinants of legislative
action—the conditions under which legislation is more or less likely to pass
and how those conditions have changed over time.
Political scientists offer competing explanations of why regulatory legislation passes or fails to pass at any given point in time. Rational choice
models (and other approaches based on purposive behavior) conceive of the
legislative process as the product of pressure exerted by interest groups on
legislators concerned with reelection. This family of explanations, which
32
33

See infra Section II.B.
Over time, circumstances change, and the preferences of voters, regulatory agencies, and
successive congresses may diverge from those of the enacting Congress, while agencies continue to
operate under the legislative mandate established by the enacting Congress. Some scholars call this
“legislative drift” or “coalitional drift.” See Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on
“Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and
Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 503-07 (1989)
(noting the “multifaceted nature of ‘drift’” and the inseparability of bureaucratic and legislative
drift); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative
Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 94-99 (1992) (critiquing the use of procedural rules to address
bureaucratic drift).
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includes both traditional interest group theory and public choice models,34
emphasizes the advantages that smaller, more tightly organized groups (like
business interests) have in the contest to influence legislative decisions.35
Such groups may be able to use their advantages to kill or forestall regulatory
legislation. By contrast, organization theorists conceive of the policy process
as far more anarchic—the product of inertia, luck, and other forces.36 For
example, the “garbage can model” of politics posits the existence of
“streams” of problems, politics, and policies that must intersect in particular
ways in order to produce legislative decisions.37 Only rarely, say organization
theorists, do these conditions exist.
Despite their differences, however, both sets of models explain the passage
of major regulatory legislation as the product of interaction between public
pressure and a partisan environment in Congress that is conducive to
building a majority. In group pressure and rational choice models, the
advantages enjoyed by business interests can be overcome when siding with
business interests exposes legislators to electoral risk.38 This can happen
when an issue becomes particularly salient and important to the general
public. Public pressure, however, is necessary but not sufficient to produce

34 For a summary of the enormous public choice literature on delegation to agencies, see
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97,
102-06 (2000).
35 Mancur Olson’s analysis of group formation implied that policy processes would systematically undervalue the preferences of large diffuse groups compared with those of small cohesive
groups. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 128 (1965). For a good
summary of economic analysis of interest groups following Olson, see RUSSELL HARDIN,
COLLECTIVE ACTION 38-49 (1982), which offers a discussion Olson’s work on the relationship
between group size and group success, and TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY
AND APPLICATIONS 63-94 (1992), for information on developments in collective action theory.
36 JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 124-31 (2d ed.
2003); Michael D. Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1,
2 (1972) (“[O]ne can view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into which various kinds of
problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated.”); Charles E. Lindblom,
The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 81-83 (1959) (describing the method
of successive limited comparisons and its role in policy formulation); Herbert A. Simon, The
Proverbs of Administration, 6 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 53, 62-67 (1946) (addressing criticisms of the
administrative theory and proposing broader solutions).
37 KINGDON, supra note 36, at 87. For a critique of Kingdon’s model, see Gary Mucciaroni,
The Garbage Can Model & the Study of Policy Making: A Critique, 24 POLITY 459, 466-67, 473-74
(1992), where Mucciaroni criticizes the model’s indeterminacy and questions its usefulness.
38 Scholars sometimes call these groundswells of public interest “republican moments.” This
idea comes from James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the
American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 310-13 (1990). Dan Farber adapted it to
environmental politics in Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 59, 66-67 (1992).
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legislative action. Public concern must actually produce electoral risk for a
sufficient number of otherwise reluctant legislators to produce legislation.
Garbage can models describe this same phenomenon as the product of
policy cycles.39 In other words, legislation (rather than inaction) is the likely
outcome when (i) people perceive the problem as important, (ii) the policy
community has identified the apparent solution, and (iii) the partisan political
environment is conducive to the formation of a legislative majority.40
These explanations imply that regulatory change is possible given the
right combinations of public pressure and partisan conductivity: that is, when
the partisan environment in Congress is particularly conducive to regulatory
change, less public pressure is required; when the partisan environment is
particularly resistant, it takes more public pressure to produce that change.
This theory easily explains the environmental and energy legislation of the
1970s. In the early 1970s, high-profile pollution problems led voters to
perceive air and water pollution problems as serious, leading to the passage
of the CAA, CWA, and other environmental laws.41 Likewise, when energy
supply and security issues became salient to voters in the late 1970s, Congress
responded by passing the energy legislation of the Carter administration.42
These laws were passed in large part because politicians responded to
bottom-up electoral pressure and cobbled together legislative majorities that
crossed party lines.

39 KINGDON, supra note 36, at 93. Economist Anthony Downs, a rational choice political
theorist, also conceived of republican moments as cyclical. See Anthony Downs, Up and Down with
Ecology—The “Issue-Attention Cycle,” 28 PUB. INT. 38, 38-43 (1972) (noting that only during times
of intense public pressure for action is it possible to overcome the usual legislative inertia and
produce major regulatory legislation).
40 Cf. supra note 39.
41 See Farber, supra note 38, at 67-69. Cf. E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C.
Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 313, 326-334 (1985) (noting that public pressure to fix pollution problems led to
stringent environmental legislation).
42 Carter-era energy legislation included major regulatory initiatives like the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301–
3432 (2012)), which deregulated wellhead prices of natural gas, the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel
Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8484
(2012)), which restricts uses of natural gas, and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16
U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 43 U.S.C. (2012)), which established incentives for alternative
energy projects. Earlier in the decade, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
(2012), 42 U.S.C. (2012), and 50 U.S.C. App. (2006)), creating national fuel economy standards for
automobiles (commonly known as “CAFE standards”) and establishing the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve.
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Today the political environment in Congress is far less conducive to legislation than it was in the 1970s or than it was even two decades ago. This is
because Congress is more likely to produce legislation, all else equal, when
the ideological middle in Congress is strong—that is, when legislators’
preferences are not ideologically polarized. Today, however, the ideological
middle is unprecedentedly weak and growing weaker.
As illustrated in the Appendix, spatial modeling and data on congressional ideology, drawn from a burgeoning literature in political science, can
demonstrate more precisely why this is true.43 To summarize the key
insight, imagine a legislative chamber in which the preferences of legislators
are distributed normally (as a bell curve) along an ideological dimension
from left to right, with some members of the left-leaning party lying to the
right of some members of the right-leaning party. Now imagine a second
legislative chamber in which the distribution of preferences is bimodal, with
all the members of one party clustered near the left pole and all the members
of the other party clustered near the right pole. Assume that in both
legislatures there is a majority party that controls the legislative agenda and
that the minority may prevent legislative action by a filibuster that can be
overcome only by supermajority vote.
It is not difficult to intuit why, at any given level of public or interestgroup pressure to change the status quo policy, passing legislation to do so
will be more difficult in the second chamber than in the first. In the second
chamber, each party’s preferences lie far from the middle, making any
proposal to move the policy closer to the middle that much more unappealing
to party members. In such a situation, the majority party is more likely to
use its agenda-setting power to prevent consideration of, or the minority
party is more likely to filibuster, any such proposals. Political scientists refer
to this domain of policies that cannot be moved toward the center as the
“gridlock interval.”44
By any of several measures, Congress is more ideologically polarized
(and the gridlock interval larger) than ever before in the modern regulatory
era. The parties have grown steadily farther apart ideologically since the
1970s, making bipartisan action to address important problems significantly
more difficult. A large and growing academic literature has documented this

43
44

See Appendix.
For an overview of the literature from which this notion is derived, and for a fuller and
more precise explanation of this intuition, see id.
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growing polarization.45 Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal’s DWNOMINATE dataset places members of Congress on an ideological
spectrum based upon members’ voting behavior,46 and Poole and Rosenthal
conclude from their data that polarization in Congress is at its highest level
since the end of Reconstruction.47
This situation stands in stark contrast with the 1970s, when a Republican
(Richard Nixon) created EPA and a Democrat (Jimmy Carter) signed
legislation to deregulate portions of the natural gas industry. As late as the
early 1990s, the Republican George H.W. Bush signed major CAA amendments and ran for office claiming to be “the environmental president.”48
Today, not only are the parties’ ideologies farther apart, there are also fewer
moderates of either party in Congress. Based on the Poole and Rosenthal
data, it appears that moderates in the House and Senate have fallen from
more than thirty percent in both chambers in 1970 to less than ten percent
in both chambers today.49
This is not to say that Congress is incapable of enacting regulatory legislation. Rather, the current partisan and ideological makeup of Congress
45 For an overview of the data on and theories of congressional polarization, and for an application of some of those data to the theories, see JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE
ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 82-96 (1995); KEITH T.
POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, IDEOLOGY & CONGRESS 301-05 (2d rev. ed. 2007); SEAN M.
THERAIULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 11-42 (2008); Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J.
Abrams, Political Polarization in the American Public, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 563 (2008) (highlighting
a divergence between elite polarization and mass polarization); Morris P. Fiorina, Whatever
Happened to the Median Voter? (Oct. 2, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://web.stanford.edu/~mfiorina/Fiorina%20Web%20Files/MedianVoterPaper.pdf (discussing possible
explanations for increasing polarization between candidates).
46 For a thorough explanation of these data and how they document increasing polarization
in American politics, see NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL,
POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 15-70 (2006). For a
striking visual illustration of polarization in Congress, see Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole &
Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, VOTEVIEW.COM,
http://voteview.com/polarizedamerica.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/
9X5B-8XY4.
47 See MCCARTY, POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 46, at 23-28.
48 Lynda Lee Kaid et al., An Analysis of George Bush’s 1988 and 1992 Campaign Advertising:
Revisiting the Definition of a Presidential Candidate, in HONOR AND LOYALTY: INSIDE THE
POLITICS OF THE GEORGE H. W. BUSH WHITE HOUSE 8 (Leslie D. Feldman & Rosanna
Perotti eds., 2002).
49 See Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, The Polarization of the Congressional Parties,
VOTEVIEW.COM, http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp (last updated Jan. 19, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/CA74-8R6E. There are a number of competing explanations for why ideological polarization has intensified, including safer and more homogenous legislative districts and
institutional changes in Congress that strengthen veto points in the policy process, leading
members to behave in more partisan and retributive ways and making them less willing to share
credit and compromise to enact legislation. See generally supra note 45.
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renders such action much less likely, all else equal, than at any time in the
modern regulatory era. Certainly, highly salient emergencies can create the
kind of electoral risk that motivates members of Congress to reach agreement, or (in the language of garbage can models) causes the streams of
problems, politics, and policies to intersect in ways that produce significant
legislation. The Dodd–Frank Act, for example, which responded to the
financial crisis of 2008–2009, seems to have been the result of this dynamic,50
and there are other examples as well.51 Many of the agency policy choices we
examine in this Article, however, arise at the intersection of the environment
and energy (GHG regulation, renewable energy, conservation), where the
partisan divide seems especially wide and strong and where debates over
fundamental issues, such as the scientific basis for regulatory action, are
particularly intense.52 This suggests that an especially significant and salient
50 See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 44 U.S.C. (2012)). The financial crisis of 2008–2009
mobilized public support for additional regulation of the financial services industry, and the support
was sufficiently strong to overcome prior partisan divisions on the issue. Cf., e.g., Karlyn Bowman &
Andrew Rugg, 5 Years After the Crash, What Do Americans Think of Wall Street, Banks, and Free
Enterprise?, AMERICAN (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.american.com/archive/2013/september/five-yearsafter-the-crash-what-do-americans-think-of-wall-street-banks-and-free-enterprise, archived at http://
perma.cc/ZZ3R-ZT84 (summarizing public opinion toward Wall Street before and after the financial
crisis).
51 Congress finally updated the FDCA in the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., and 42
U.S.C. (2012)). The 2011 reforms shifted the FDA’s focus from reactive to preventive, expanded
FDA powers to inspect and recall, established risk-based priorities, and addressed major weaknesses in import safety assurances. These changes were in part a response to a number of crises
involving contamination, but also were prompted by developments such as greater consumption of
imported and unprocessed foods, new technologies like genetically modified organisms, and an
evolution in regulatory thinking about the benefits of risk analysis and cost–benefit analysis.
52 For example, Republican leaders in Congress continue to express skepticism about climate
science and oppose GHG regulation on that basis, despite an overwhelming scientific consensus that
the climate is warming largely as result of human fossil fuel consumption. See, e.g., Ned Resnikoff,
Senate Committee Again Debates Existence of Climate Change, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/
all/senate-republicans-what-climate-change (last updated Jan. 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/
C25R-6YCN (highlighting Senator Jim Inhofe’s view that climate change science is a hoax); see also
BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 31 (summarizing the scientific consensus); NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT & DEV. ADVISORY COMM., NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT REPORT: DRAFT FOR
PUBLIC COMMENT 25, 27 (2013), available at http://www.globalchange.gov/sites/globalchange/files/
NCAJan11-2013-publicreviewdraft-chap2-climate.pdf (stating that “[g]lobal climate is changing now”
and the “primary drivers of [climate] change are human in origin”). Poole and Rosenthal describe the
ideological divide captured by their data as one centered on the role of government intervention in
the economy. See Royce Carroll et al., DW-NOMINATE Scores with Bootstrapped Standard Errors,
VOTEVIEW.COM, http://voteview.com/dwnominate.asp (last updated Feb. 17, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/95KT-5MZN (“[T]he first dimension can be interpreted in most periods as
government intervention in the economy or liberal-conservative in the modern era.”). Because
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crisis would be required to produce congressional action in these policy
domains.
II. POLICYMAKING IN THE ABSENCE OF CONGRESS
The obsolescence of numerous federal environmental statutes initially
passed in the 1970s has already prompted significant academic commentary
and spurred a number of reform proposals.53 Time, science, and experience
have revealed many deficiencies in this suite of laws, some of which can be
addressed administratively, but many of which require congressional action.
Commentators have noted, for example, that the CWA would benefit from
a substantial update to address modern challenges.54 The CAA too, which
has produced both the most beneficial and the most costly federal regulations,55 has not been amended since 1990 and could use an overhaul to fix
flawed programs and address new problems.56 The Endangered Species Act
regulation of the energy industry provides a diffuse public benefit while ostensibly imposing
concentrated costs on firms, it seems like a quintessential example of a policy domain in which the
divide is growing wider.
53 See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., BREAKING THE LOGJAM: ENVIRONMENTAL
REFORM FOR THE NEW CONGRESS AND ADMINISTRATION (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Breaking
the Logjam Project ed., 2009), available at http://www.breakingthelogjam.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/23/2014/06/BreakingLogjamReportfinal.pdf (proposing specific reforms targeted at
improving the efficiency and efficacy of environmental regulations). For a comprehensive set of
recommendations on these topics and many others (not exclusively aimed at Congress but
including many recommendations for federal legislation), see BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., AMERICA’S
ENERGY RESURGENCE: SUSTAINING SUCCESS, CONFRONTING CHALLENGES (2013), available at
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/BPC%20SEPI%20Energy%20Report%202013.pdf.
54 For example, recent science has suggested that the CWA’s assumption that waters could be
returned to their full state of integrity was an unrealistic one. See Adler, supra note 16, at 260-61.
Scholars have also pointed out that Congress did not fully recognize the dynamic nature of aquatic
ecosystems in enacting the CWA, and misguidedly focused on concepts of stability and equilibrium
rather than resilience. While the CWA was written primarily to address industrial water pollution,
urban sprawl is currently the more pressing challenge to protection of waterways. The CWA is
also faulted for failing to protect marine ecosystems adequately, see Robin Kundis Craig, Climate
Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 825, 914 (2008), and for
not taking climate change explicitly into account, see H. M. Zamudio, Note, Predicting the Future
and Acting Now: Climate Change, the Clean Water Act, and the Lake Champlain Phosphorus TMDL, 35
VT. L. REV. 975, 994-95 (2011).
55 See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2011
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 16 (2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2011_cb/2011_cba_report.pdf (concluding
that rules from EPA produced sixty-two to eighty-four percent of the total monetized benefits and
forty-six to fifty-three percent of the total monetized costs of all federal regulations—with most of
the benefits and costs stemming from air quality rules).
56 Among other things, scholars have argued that Congress should revise the New Source Review
program—which requires sources to control their emissions as they “modify” their facilities—and the
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(ESA), last amended in 1988, seems ripe for reconsideration as well, given
that some of its core assumptions have been called into serious question.57
So too with the National Environmental Policy Act (passed in 1970 and
never substantively amended), which governs federal agency environmental
impact assessment,58 and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), which
sought to address risks to the public and the environment posed by the
manufacture and sale of chemicals.59 These are just a few examples of
statutes widely believed to be in need of makeovers.
While Congress more frequently revisits energy legislation than it does
environmental statutes, it has nevertheless let languish a host of energy-related
policy questions in recent decades. Commentators have called for significant
reforms to meet an array of new challenges in the energy domain. These
include proposals to, among other things, amend the federal regulatory
process for both onshore and offshore oil and gas drilling to respond to
dramatic technological advances and new risks;60 address the economic and

regime for addressing interstate pollution, both of which have been highly controversial, heavily
litigated, and minimally effective. See SCHOENBROD ET AL., supra note 53, at 10-13.
57 These assumptions include the belief that there are a limited number of species at risk of
extinction and that recovery programs are most effective when targeted to listed species. See
Katrina Miriam Wyman, Rethinking the ESA to Reflect Human Dominion Over Nature, 17 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 490, 492-99 (2008) (noting the failings of the statute’s listing process for at-risk
species); see also Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic World, 32
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 182-83 (2010) (criticizing the ESA as implemented for its inflexibility). For reform proposals, see John Charles Kunich, The Fallacy of Deathbed Conservation Under the
Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 501, 572-73 (1994), where the author suggests a shift from
focusing on endangered species to endangered ecosystems.
58 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012)); see also Paul S. Weiland, Amending the National Environmental Policy Act: Federal Environmental Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 12 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 275, 290-93 (1997).
59 TSCA’s central provisions have not been reformed since the law was first passed in 1976.
Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2012)).
60 Congress has not updated the regulatory and liability schemes governing oil and gas extraction offshore, despite technological change that has enabled offshore drilling in environments and
at depths previously unimaginable. To offer an illustration of the difference between past
congresses and more recent ones, compare Congress’s response following the 1989 Exxon Valdez
oil spill in Alaska, with Congress’s reaction to the 2010 blowout in the Gulf of Mexico. After the
Exxon Valdez spill, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which required new regulations for oil tankers traveling in U.S. waters, adopted a liability regime for recovering damages,
and created a national incident response system for coordinating the government’s response to oil
spills. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 14 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 23 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C., 46 U.S.C.,
and 46 U.S.C. App. (2012)). Yet in the wake of the 2010 Macondo well blowout—the worst oil
spill in U.S. history—Congress took no steps to reform the existing regulatory and liability
system, notwithstanding numerous reports, including one from a bipartisan commission created by
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reliability implications of natural gas displacement of coal in the electric
power sector; promote efficiency and conservation in state-level utility rate
setting; and revise the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to address the festering
problem of long-term storage of nuclear waste.61
Each of these examples could merit its own article because each has
created monumental challenges for the agencies charged with implementing
outdated statutory provisions. Our focus here, though, is on two dramatic
examples of agency adaptation in an era of congressional dysfunction: EPA’s
deployment of the CAA to address climate change and FERC’s use of the
FPA to modernize electricity policy. These examples illustrate the predicament
in which agencies find themselves as they grapple with problems of fit and
obsolescence. They show how agencies approach this task deliberately and
strategically and suggest they are anything but out-of-control. The stories
also highlight the crucial dialectic between agencies and courts, which
determines policy during periods of congressional inaction.

the President, indicating that the system had become inadequate and outdated. See NAT. COMM’N
ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE
GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING—REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 55-127, 249-87 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPOOILCOMMIS
SION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf (finding that numerous regulatory failures contributed
to the spill and recommending legislation to address them). Nor has Congress responded to
concerns that onshore drilling requires additional oversight given technological advances, such as
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, which have introduced new risks at a large scale. In
fact, so-called “fracking” is exempt from federal regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1860 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-9
(2012)), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (2012)), and the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2012)), and is regulated primarily by the states. See David B. Spence,
Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 44752 (2013) (describing the federal regulatory regime governing fracking); Jody Freeman & David
Spence, Should the Federal Government Regulate Fracking?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323495104578314302738867078, archived at
http://perma.cc/PW8W-TRVZ (debating the merits of federal versus state regulation).
61 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2012)). The Nuclear Waste Policy Act set a deadline of
1998 for the federal government to take possession of the nation’s nuclear waste, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 10222 (2012), and the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 created a process for
establishing a permanent repository for high-level nuclear waste, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 10172–10175
(2012). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) and Department of Energy’s (DOE)
attempts to discharge their responsibilities under these laws have been fraught with legal and
political conflict over the Yucca Mountain site. Most recently, litigation has ensued over whether
DOE has discretion to withdraw its license application for approval of Yucca as a repository. See In
re Aiken County, 645 F.3d 428, 437-38 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining that the NRC is required by
statute to review DOE’s license application to use Yucca Mountain as a repository). Congress has
remained silent on these questions throughout this decades-long ordeal.

20

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 1

A. EPA’s Application of the Clean Air Act to Climate Change
Perhaps the most prominent recent example of an agency wrestling with
problems of “fit” is EPA’s application of the CAA to address climate change.
EPA undertook this task in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the Court held that GHGs are “pollutants”
subject to regulation under the CAA.62 The Court also deemed unlawful
EPA’s policy reasons for failing to determine whether GHG emissions from
new cars and trucks endanger public health or welfare, a threshold finding
necessary to trigger standard-setting, and remanded the decision to EPA.63
Following this decision, it was widely anticipated that Congress would
amend the CAA, either to add a specific regulatory program designed to
reduce GHGs cost-effectively or to clarify that EPA lacked the authority to
address climate change under the existing law. Such action was believed to
be necessary because, while it is possible to regulate GHG emissions under
several of the CAA’s programs, and while Congress may have intended to
provide EPA with the flexibility to address such new risks, the statute as
written is not especially well designed for controlling GHG pollution.64
The general consensus among economists is that an economy-wide cap-andtrade regime, or a carbon tax, would reduce GHG emissions more costeffectively than deploying the CAA as-is.65
Yet while the House of Representatives passed the American Clean
Energy and Security Act of 2009,66 which would have established an

62
63

549 U.S. 497, 528-32 (2007).
Id. at 532-35; see also Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,516 (Dec. 15, 2009)
(finding that “elevated concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger the public health and to endanger the public welfare of current and future
generations”).
64 The statute arguably reflects a conception of air pollutants as substances that do harm
when inhaled or ingested since it focuses on establishing both safe concentrations of so-called
“criteria” pollutants in the ambient air (national ambient air quality standards) and emissions
limits for both toxic and criteria pollutants. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–7412 (2012). These programs
are not well suited for GHG regulation. The CAA’s other significant programs, however, which
establish performance standards for both mobile and stationary sources of air pollution, may have
the flexibility to address GHG emissions effectively. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012) (establishing the
New Source Performance Standards program); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7492 (2012) (formalizing the
Prevention of Significant Deterioration program); 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012) (addressing mobile
sources of air pollution). Still, as we explain below, they must be adapted to do so.
65 This consensus, however, may overstate the CAA’s inflexibility. See Nathan Richardson &
Arthur G. Fraas, Comparing the Clean Air Act and a Carbon Price 12-15 (Res. for the Future,
Discussion Paper 13-13) (2013) (arguing that the CAA may not be as inflexible as economists
suppose and might allow cost-effective GHG reductions, at least in the short term).
66 H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
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economy-wide cap-and-trade system to reduce GHGs, the bill foundered in
the Senate.67 Numerous other proposals to adopt a modified national capand-trade scheme,68 a more limited utility sector-based approach,69 a
national clean energy standard,70 or a carbon tax71 also failed, as did efforts
to override Massachusetts v. EPA and strip EPA of its authority to regulate
GHGs.72 All such policies, it seems, fell within the gridlock interval.
Without clear congressional direction then, EPA has been left to manage
climate change with the 1990 Clean Air Act—a statute written before the
scientific consensus on the nature and causes of climate change and its
attendant risks had crystallized. As a result, the agency has been forced to
engage in interpretive jujitsu to wrest a GHG control program from a
statute not principally designed for that purpose. Part of EPA’s strategy to
do so has been quite prosaic. For example, the agency has issued rules aimed
at reducing conventional and toxic pollution but which would also deliver

67 See id. Following passage of the House bill, the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works reported the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong.
(2010), which would have reduced GHG emissions twenty percent below 2005 levels by 2020.
Republican committee members boycotted the markup, and the bill was not taken seriously by
Senate leadership. See Lisa Lerer, Senators Look Past Boxer Bill, POLITICO, Nov. 6, 2009, at 1
(describing opposition from both parties towards climate change legislation). Senators John Kerry
(D-Mass.), Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) began working on a new
piece of climate legislation, but failed to secure a floor vote in Congress. See id.; see also Darren
Samuelsohn, Closed-Door Talks Might Not Save Climate Bill, POLITICO, July 22, 2010, at 1 (discussing the decision to abandon a proposed climate change bill in 2010).
68 For example, Senators Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.) and Susan Collins (R-Me.) argued for a
“cap-and-dividend” proposal, under which proceeds from the purchase of carbon credits would be
returned to U.S. taxpayers in the form of an annual dividend. Maria Cantwell & Susan Collins,
An Energy Bill That Pays Dividends, WASH. POST, June 18, 2010, at A27.
69 For example, Senator Tom Carper (D-Del.) proposed a multi-pollutant trading scheme.
See Clean Air Act Amendments of 2010, S. 2995, 111th Cong. (2010).
70 Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) introduced legislation calling for a clean energy standard of thirteen percent for 2013–2014 to increase incrementally to fifty percent in 2050. See Clean
Energy Standard Act of 2010, S. 80, 111th Cong. § 3(b)(1)(B) (2010). An alternative proposal by
Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.), based on carbon intensity, would begin at twenty-four percent
in 2015, ramping up to eighty-four percent by 2035. See Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012, S.
2146, 112th Cong. § 2(c)(2) (2012).
71 Carbon taxes were introduced in Congress but failed to gain traction. For example, the
Save Our Climate Act of 2009, H.R. 594, 111th Cong. (2009), sponsored by Representative Pete
Stark (D-Cal.-13) and three others, proposed a ten dollar per ton fee on carbon dioxide, increasing
each year by ten dollars until climate objectives were met; America’s Energy Security Trust Fund
Act of 2009, H.R. 1337, 111th Cong. (2009), sponsored by Representative John Larson (D-Conn.-1)
and twelve others, proposed a tax of fifteen dollars per ton, increasing by ten dollars each year; and
the Raise Wages, Cut Carbon Act of 2009, H.R. 2380, 111th Cong. (2009), sponsored by Representatives Bob Inglis (R-S.C.-4), Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.-6), and Dan Lipinski (D-Ill.-3), proposed a
fifteen-dollar per ton tax, increasing incrementally. None of the bills passed.
72 See Stop the War on Coal Act, H.R. 3409, 112th Cong. (2012).
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important GHG reduction “co-benefits.”73 Yet other aspects of EPA’s plan
have required notable legal and technical ingenuity. And EPA has
approached this challenge in a considered stepwise fashion.
1. The “Tailpipe Rule”
In response to Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA made a formal endangerment
finding, issuing a rule stating that GHGs from new cars and trucks endanger
health or welfare.74 This finding automatically triggered a non-discretionary
duty under the CAA to set emission standards for these sources,75 which EPA
promulgated in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Transportation,
setting both fuel efficiency and GHG standards in the so-called “Tailpipe
Rule.”76 This first rule regulating GHGs under the CAA was novel, taking
the form of a joint rulemaking that harmonized the two agencies’ standards
and created a uniform compliance program. The rule was especially notable
because it garnered the support of the entire auto industry, which pledged
not to challenge it if the final version substantially conformed to the
agencies’ initial proposal.77 Importantly, the new rule rendered GHGs a
“regulated pollutant” under the CAA for the first time, which in turn
tripped another wire in the statute requiring the agency to set standards for
GHG emissions from stationary sources as well.78
73 For example, EPA has set national emission standards under section 112 of the CAA that
will reduce both toxic pollutants and GHG emissions. See National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and
Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-CommercialInstitutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed.
Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63); see also Oil and Natural Gas
Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490, 49,539 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
60, 63) (limiting emissions of volatile organic compounds, but in the process, requiring capture of
methane, a potent GHG).
74 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,516 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. ch. 1).
75 See Clean Air Act § 202(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
76 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 85, 86, and 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537, and 538).
77 That proposal reflected the pains the two agencies took to ensure that every auto manufacturer, regardless of its product mix, could meet the stringent new requirements. See Jody Freeman,
The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the “Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 343 346-58 (2011) (describing the unique rulemaking process and the variety of compliance
flexibilities made available by the government).
78 For an explanation of the trigger, see id. at 351-53. The Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program in the CAA requires all new and modified sources to obtain permits and apply
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The immediate consequence of the Tailpipe Rule was to trigger a
permitting requirement for stationary sources of pollution under the law’s
“prevention of significant deterioration” (PSD) program, which is aimed
chiefly at ensuring that good quality air does not get worse because of new
construction that brings additional air pollution. Under the PSD program,
it is unlawful to construct or modify a “major” stationary source in certain
areas of the country (those designated as “in attainment” with at least one
national air pollution standard) without first obtaining a permit79 and meeting
emission standards that reflect the “best available control technology”
(BACT) for “each pollutant subject to regulation under” the CAA.80 For
this program, the CAA defines “major” facilities as having the potential to
emit (depending on the type of source) either 100 or 250 tons per year
(TPY) of “any air pollutant.”81
Once EPA set a standard for GHGs under any part of the statute (as it
had done for new cars and trucks), the agency considered them to be
regulated pollutants to which the PSD requirements would apply. Because
GHGs tend to be emitted in amounts that are orders of magnitude greater
than conventional pollutants, however, many thousands of small sources that
had never been regulated under the CAA would be swept into the PSD
program and made subject to onerous permitting requirements with the
100/250-TPY threshold.82
In addition, the Tailpipe Rule triggered another permitting program for
stationary sources. Under Title V of the CAA, all major sources, defined as
those emitting over 100 TPY of “any air pollutant,” must obtain a general
operating permit.83 Applying for a Title V permit can be time-consuming
and expensive for sources, even if the operating permit itself does not
impose any regulatory requirements. Again, because of the low numerical
threshold to reach “major” source status, literally millions of small sources
of GHG pollution—including large residential complexes, farms of a
“best available control technology” for all pollutants “subject to regulation” under the CAA. Under
the statute and EPA regulations, once a standard for GHGs is set under the mobile source
provisions of the statute, the pollutant becomes “subject to regulation.” See id.
79 See Clean Air Act § 165(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (2012) (requiring preconstruction review);
see also id. at § 169(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012) (defining “major emitting facility”).
80 Id. at § 165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012).
81 Id. at § 169(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012).
82 For a discussion of the implications of this situation, see Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,533 ( June 3, 2010) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, and 71) (projecting the number of sources expected to
require permits under the PSD and Title V programs and proposing to tailor the program initially
to the largest sources).
83 Clean Air Act §§ 502–504, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a–7661c (2012).
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modest size, and municipal landfills—which had never before needed a
CAA permit for anything, would be required to obtain one for the first
time. How to manage these automatic triggers in the CAA thus raised
crucial strategic questions for EPA.
EPA’s plan to address emissions from stationary sources under these
programs required the agency to balance different kinds of risks. If the lowemission thresholds for triggering permit requirements applied, EPA would
need to approve permits for literally millions of small sources. This burden
would have overwhelmed the agency and the states, frustrated small businesses, and led to accusations that the Obama administration was overregulating while the economy was still recovering from an economic crisis.
Moreover, imposing permitting burdens on these sources would yield
relatively little in the way of meaningful reductions while imposing significant
costs. Yet to relieve these small sources from regulation would require risktaking of a different kind. The agency would either have to declare that the
PSD program could not be triggered by GHGs—reversing its thirty-yearold legal position that pollutants other than the six criteria pollutants could
trigger the program’s application—or ignore the specific numerical thresholds
Congress had written into the law.84
2. The “Tailoring Rule”
Of course, the obvious solution would be to ask Congress to fix this
feature of the statute by adjusting the thresholds upward for GHGs. In the
past, this kind of small fix might have been routine; it makes good economic
and political sense to limit the program to major emitters and ultimately
reduces a regulatory burden. But Congress was gridlocked over climate
policy. With little chance of congressional resolution, EPA issued a rule
“tailoring” the permitting requirements of both the PSD and Title V
programs by administratively raising the thresholds for “major” source
status to cover only the largest stationary sources—those producing over
100,000 TPY of GHGs.85 The agency justified this approach by relying on
84 See Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,550-31,551 (noting that since 1977, EPA has interpreted
the PSD program to apply to any air pollutant subject to regulation).
85 The Tailoring Rule also specified a lower threshold—75,000 TPY—for so-called “anyway”
sources: those sources required to obtain permits “anyway” because of their emission of conventional pollutants. See Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,540-31,541 (exempting smaller sources but
otherwise allowing the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration program to begin
to require “best available control technology” to control GHGs at new and modified sources); see
also EPA, OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, EPA-457/B-11-001, PSD AND
TITLE V PERMITTING GUIDANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 17-46 (2011) (describing how states
should determine “best available control technology” for new and modified sources).
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the little-used doctrines of absurd results and administrative necessity,
arguing that a temporary suspension of the statutory thresholds was necessary to deal with the volume of new permits.86 Applying the low thresholds
literally, EPA argued, would radically expand the program and render it
“unrecognizable” to the Congress that adopted it.87 Notably, in this instance,
EPA sought to narrow rather than enlarge its regulatory responsibilities and
to reduce the burdens imposed on industry, believing it to be the more
rational, cost-effective, and politically palatable approach.
Industry groups and a number of states challenged the rule.88 The petitioners made three main arguments.89 First, the PSD program should not
be read to apply to GHGs at all, since the program was intended by Congress to prevent backsliding from the national ambient air quality standards.90 Second, and alternatively, sources that emit only GHGs should not
trigger the program’s permit requirements (even if sources covered by the
program anyway may need to control their GHGs along with their emissions
of other pollutants).91 Finally, claimed petitioners, EPA lacks the authority
to rewrite the numerical statutory thresholds in the CAA to make them four
hundred times higher due to an “administrative necessity” that the agency
itself created by interpreting the PSD program to apply to GHGs.92
The D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s view that the program applied to GHGs
on a plain reading of the statute.93 The court noted that the CAA mandates
pre-construction review and permitting under the PSD program whenever
“any pollutant” is emitted over the threshold amount and that in Massachusetts
v. EPA the Supreme Court had interpreted the word “pollutant” to include
86
87
88

See Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,541-31,549.
Id. at 31,555.
See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The
litigation challenged four rules that EPA promulgated under the CAA: (1) the Endangerment
Finding, (2) the Tailpipe Rule, (3) the Timing Rule, and (4) the Tailoring Rule. In upholding the
rules set forth by EPA, the court dismissed challenges to the endangerment finding and the
Tailpipe Rule on their merits and found that petitioners lacked standing to challenge the Timing
Rule and the Tailoring Rule. Id. at 113-114.
89 Petitioners’ Joint Opening Brief at 14-23, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA,
684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 09-1322).
90 On this view, Congress meant to exempt GHGs from the phrase “any air pollutant” in the
definition of major facility (for purposes of the program’s applicability) and to exclude them from
the requirement that BACT apply to “each pollutant subject to regulation” under the CAA (for
purposes of the program’s coverage). See Clean Air Act § 169(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012)
(defining “major emitting facility”); see also id. at § 165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012)
(requiring BACT for “each pollutant subject to regulation” under the CAA).
91 Petitioners’ Joint Opening Brief at 18, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684
F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 09-1322).
92 Id. at 22-23.
93 Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 136.
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GHGs.94 The court never reached EPA’s administrative necessity justification for temporarily raising the thresholds, finding that none of the petitioners could demonstrate the harm required for standing because the
agency’s rule had relieved them of a regulatory burden.95
The Supreme Court granted review on whether the PSD program
applied to GHGs—the interpretive question on which EPA had taken the
greatest legal risk.96 The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit, finding that the
definition of “any air pollutant” in the PSD program was ambiguous and that
EPA’s interpretation to include GHGs was, in these circumstances, unreasonable.97 EPA could not, in the Court’s view, reasonably adopt an interpretation that it had conceded would render the program unrecognizable to
Congress and then resort to rewriting the statutory thresholds out of a
claimed “administrative necessity.”98 The Court also struck down the
Tailoring Rule as an impermissible rewriting of clear statutory thresholds.99
At the same time, the Court upheld the agency’s view that it was required
to regulate GHGs from those stationary sources that trigger preconstruction

94
95

Id. at 134.
Id. at 146. The petition for rehearing en banc was denied by the D.C. Circuit over a strong
dissent by Judge Kavanaugh, who explained how EPA could have avoided the need for the
Tailoring Rule and saved itself from the overwhelming administrative burdens of which it was
complaining by simply interpreting the ambiguous phrase “any pollutant” to mean (at least in the
context of this one program) only conventional pollutants. See Order on Petitions for Rehearing
En Banc, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322, 2012 WL 6621785, at *14-16
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
96 See Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, No. 12-1146, slip op. at 2 (U.S. June 23, 2014) (noting
that the Court had been asked to “decide whether it was permissible for EPA to determine that its
motor-vehicle greenhouse-gas regulations automatically triggered permitting requirements under the
[CAA] for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases”); Jody Freeman, Symposium: Soft Landings
and Strategic Choices, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 5, 2014, 10:58 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/
symposium-soft-landings-and-strategic-choices/, archived at http://perma.cc/J66U-ZXWS (explaining
how EPA might have interpreted the program to exclude GHGs and apply only to NAAQS
pollutants without losing too much).
97 Utility Air Regulatory Grp., No. 12-1146, slip op. at 15-16 (“[T]here is no insuperable textual
barrier to EPA’s interpreting ‘any air pollutant’ in the permitting triggers of PSD and Title V to
encompass only pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be sensibly regulated at the
statutory thresholds, and to exclude those atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are
emitted in such vast quantities that their inclusion would radically transform those programs and
render them unworkable as written.”).
98 Id. at 20 (“[I]t would be patently unreasonable—not to say outrageous—for EPA to insist
on seizing expansive power that it admits the statute is not designed to grant.”).
99 Id. at 21 (“An agency has no power to ‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting unambiguous statutory terms. . . . It is hard to imagine a statutory term less ambiguous than the
precise numerical thresholds at which the [CAA] requires PSD and Title V permitting.”).

2014]

Old Statutes, New Problems

27

review “anyway” because they emit over the 100/250–TPY threshold for
conventional pollution.100
Practically, the decision amounts mostly to a victory for EPA, since
regulating these “anyway” sources (which tend to be the biggest emitters of
both conventional pollutants and GHGs) allows the agency to control the
overwhelming majority of the GHGs it would have otherwise regulated had
the agency’s Tailoring Rule been upheld.101 Indeed, the agency had signaled
in its brief that it could accept precisely the mixed result the Court delivered,102 and there is some reason to think that the agency even prefers it.103
Yet any loss in the Supreme Court—even a partial one—leaves a sting, and
the decision is replete with stern warnings about regulatory overreach that
could prove troublesome in future cases.104 Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia noted that when an agency’s interpretation will “bring about an
enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority
without clear congressional authorization . . . [and the] agency claims to
discover . . . an unheralded power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the
American economy,’” the Court will greet that interpretation with skepticism.105 Notably, the Court also appeared to retreat somewhat from its
100 Id. at 28 (“[A]pplying BACT to greenhouse gases is not so disastrously unworkable, and
need not result in such a dramatic expansion of agency authority, as to convince us that EPA’s
interpretation is unreasonable.”).
101 In announcing the Court’s decision from the bench, Justice Scalia reportedly said that,
“EPA is getting almost everything it wanted in this case. It sought to regulate sources that it said
were responsible for 86 percent of all the greenhouse gases emitted from stationary sources
nationwide. . . . EPA will be able to regulate sources responsible for 83 percent of those
emissions.” Robert Barnes, Justices: EPA Can Regulate Emissions, WASH. POST, June 24, 2014, at A1.
102 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 33-34, Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, No. 121146 (Jan. 21, 2014).
103 The agency had opted for the most ambitious reading of its authority, even where narrower alternatives were available that might not have cost the agency much, a risk that in
retrospect may not have been worthwhile. See Freeman, supra note 96 (explaining why losing on
the issue of PSD applicability is likely better for EPA as a practical matter).
104 Indeed, the Court remarked,

Were we to recognize the authority claimed by EPA in the Tailoring Rule, we
would deal a severe blow to the Constitution’s separation of powers. . . . The Power of executing the laws . . . does not include a power to revise clear statutory
terms that turn out not to work in practice. . . .
. . . EPA asserts newfound authority to regulate millions of small sources . . . and
to decide, on an ongoing basis and without regard for the thresholds prescribed by
Congress, how many of those sources to regulate. We are not willing to stand on the
dock and wave goodbye as EPA embarks on this multiyear voyage of discovery.
Utility Air Regulatory Grp., No. 12-1146, slip op. at 23; see also id. at 12 (“It takes some cheek for EPA
to insist that it cannot possibly give ‘air pollutant’ a reasonable, context-appropriate meaning in
the PSD and Title V contexts when it has been doing precisely that for decades.”).
105 Id. at 19.

28

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 1

decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, by rejecting the view that GHGs are
always “air pollutants” under the CAA and requiring the agency to justify
its regulation of GHGs program-by-program.106
The Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) case is the third case related to
climate change to have reached the Supreme Court since 2007.107 It is
unlikely to be the last. EPA had already announced additional GHG
regulations for the electricity sector when UARG was handed down.108 The
Court’s sharp rebuke of EPA, its skeptical tone, and its new gloss on
Massachusetts v. EPA can be interpreted as cautionary signals to EPA as it
continues to pursue GHG regulation under different CAA programs. Above
all, however, this back-and-forth dynamic between EPA and the courts
shows which two institutions are now driving U.S. climate policy—and
neither one of them is Congress.
3. Greenhouse Gas Standards for New Power Plants
In its New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) program, the CAA
requires EPA to set baseline pollution standards for all industrial source
categories that emit pollution found to endanger public health.109 The
general principle motivating the NSPS program is that as new sources come
online or are modified, they are expected to meet increasingly stringent
emission standards made possible by the best demonstrated system of
emission reduction, taking into account cost and other considerations.110
106 Id. at 14 (“Massachusetts does not strip EPA of authority to exclude greenhouse gases from
the class of regulable air pollutants under other parts of the [CAA] where their inclusion would be
inconsistent with the statutory scheme. . . . [It] does not foreclose the Agency’s use of statutory
context to infer that certain of the [CAA’s] provisions use “air pollutant” to denote not every
conceivable airborne substance, but only those that may sensibly be encompassed within the
particular regulatory program.”).
107 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131
S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
108 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
60); Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New Power Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430, 1462-1463 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, and 98).
109 Clean Air Act § 111(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012). President Obama announced that he
would direct EPA to establish a standard for new power plants and to set standards for existing
power plants. Michael O’Brien, Obama Aims to Sidestep Congress with New Initiatives to Reduce
Carbon Emissions, NBC NEWS ( June 25, 2013, 3:11 AM), http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/
2013/06/25/19119744-obama-aims-to-sidestep-congress-with-new-initiatives-to-reduce-carbonemissions?lite, archived at http://perma.cc/6QSJ-HMTY.
110 See Clean Air Act § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012) (defining “standard of performance”); Clean Air Act § 111(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (2012) (requiring the EPA Administrator to
set performance standards for categories of stationary sources).
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The program is meant to ratchet up standards as the potential for pollution
control increases over time due to new technology and expertise. Based on
EPA’s past practice and prior court precedent, “best demonstrated” systems
may be forward-looking and technology-forcing, and are not limited to
technology already in operation at the time standards are set.111
These NSPS standards differ from the PSD program described above in
two principal ways: NSPS standards are set by EPA, not the states, and
they apply uniformly to entire industrial categories as defined by EPA,
rather than to individual sources.112 The PSD program, which is implemented
by the states, is more of a gap-filling program meant to keep air quality
from backsliding during periods (typically eight years or longer) between
rounds of NSPS. As individual facilities propose to build or refurbish their
equipment in areas that already comply with one or more of the national air
quality standards, these sources must apply for state permits and apply “best
available control technology” (BACT), which must be at least as stringent
as NSPS.113 Thus, because it is federally driven, technology-forcing, national
in scope, and applicable to entire source categories, NSPS is the much more
significant driver of emissions reductions—for all pollutants, including
GHGs—than is the PSD program.114
In 2012, EPA proposed for the first time to set NSPS for carbon dioxide
from new power plants. These sources have long been subject to NSPS
regulation for other pollutants that endanger health or welfare,115 which they
emit in abundance along with carbon dioxide.116 In EPA’s view, GHGs from
111 See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430, 1463 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98) [hereinafter Second Proposed Power Plant Rule]
(discussing technical feasibility and citing Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
in support of EPA’s authority to set technology-forcing standards).
112 Compare Clean Air Act § 111(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (2012) (requiring standards for
source “categories”), with Clean Air Act § 169, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012) (defining individual
“major emitting facilities” subject to preconstruction review under section 165).
113 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2012). Note that as EPA sets new NSPS, EPA also establishes a new
floor for BACT.
114 Compared with the NSPS program, the PSD program is far less uniform. State administration allows for greater variation not just across states, but also across sources in the same
industrial category, since state regulators establish BACT on a case-by-case basis through plantlevel analysis. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(d) (2012) (describing the state permitting process). PSD is
also small in scope; the states generally entertain fewer than three hundred PSD permit applications each year. See RACT/BACT/LAER Clearinghouse, EPA, http://cfpub.epa.gov/rblc/ (last
visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/GC74-SBDN.
115 See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2013).
116 See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter First Proposed Power Plant Rule].
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these sources now qualify for regulation because they are “pollutants” that
have been found to pose an endangerment to health and welfare and are
emitted by power plants in large quantities.117 Setting a standard for new
sources is especially important from a policy perspective because the utility
industry is expected to invest billions of dollars in new electricity generation
in the coming years—infrastructure that will presumably be long-lived.118
The proposed rule went through two very controversial and highly visible
iterations. This in itself is not unusual; agencies propose and reconsider
rules all the time. Indeed, that is the point of notice-and-comment. Yet this
particular rule, freighted with significant policy and political implications,
illustrates the careful calibration process required when agencies adapt
statutes to new problems. EPA initially proposed to set a single standard for
both coal and natural gas–fired electricity-generating units, based on what
the most efficient natural gas plants can achieve and which coal-fired units
cannot achieve without applying carbon capture technology.119 The proposal
attracted a firestorm of comment.120 Industry stakeholders objected to the
unprecedented grouping of the two categories, arguing that it was a weakly
veiled effort to circumvent the statutory requirement that technology be
both demonstrated and available; that the agency never could have required
carbon capture as the best demonstrated technology standard for coal units
as a separate category, because the technology is not yet commercially
available.121
In response, EPA withdrew the 2012 proposal and issued a new one setting
separate targets for natural gas–fired and coal-fired units and easing stringency
117
118

Id.
See Ralph Cavanagh, Reinventing Competitive Procurement of Electricity Resources, ELECTRICITYPOLICY.COM, http://electricitypolicy.com/cavanagh-10-2-10-correct.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/4DV2-CLL3 (explaining that U.S. utilities have announced the intention
to invest up to $2 trillion in “resource procurement and integration” over the next two decades).
119 First Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 116, at 22,395 (classifying different electric
generating units as a single source category); id. at 22,396-22,398 (proposing to require that all
new fossil fuel–fired EGUs emit no more than 1000 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour
on an average annual basis—a target which is based on the carbon dioxide emissions from an
efficient, natural gas combined cycle facility).
120 EPA received 2.5 million comments. See Second Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note
111, at 1445.
121 See, e.g., Comments Submitted by the American Public Power Association, on Standards
of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units ( June 25, 2012) (on file at Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660-10039; Comments Submitted by The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, on Standards of Performance for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (June 25,
2012) (on file at Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660-9916.
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somewhat for the latter.122 While EPA claims that it has always enjoyed
considerable flexibility to define industrial categories under the NSPS
program,123 in this instance it chose to rethink its decision to conflate the
different types of electricity generating units—presumably to reduce the
rule’s legal vulnerability. Yet the new proposal does not eliminate legal risk
entirely. It relaxes the limits applicable to coal-fired generators only slightly,
from 1000 to 1100 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour, such that
“partial” carbon capture will be necessary for new coal-fired power plants to
comply.124
As a result, the new proposal still raises a difficult legal question: whether
carbon capture and storage is “demonstrated” and “available” technology
within the meaning of the CAA. The D.C. Circuit has held that NSPS
standards may be technology-forcing125; the question is how much so. EPA
relied in its proposal on the fact that four power plants with carbon capture
and storage are currently either under construction and expected to be
operational within a few years, or under active development.126 But a
reviewing court may nevertheless determine that it is arbitrary or capricious
to base a standard on technology that has yet to be deployed at commercial
scale for power plants and which remains extremely expensive.127
122 See Second Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 111, at 1433 (proposing to allow coalfired units to emit 1100 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour).
123 See id. at 1465-67.
124 See id. at 1436. EPA also offered an alternative compliance option that would permit averaging over seven years to allow units to emit more in early years and less in later years through
application of carbon capture and storage. Id. at 1482. EPA’s stated intent in designing the rule was
to ensure a viable pathway for coal to continue to be a part of the nation’s energy mix, even in a
carbon-constrained world. Id. at 1468-69. At the time the rule was proposed, the Energy
Information Administration was already predicting that few if any new coal plants would be built
by 2025, due largely to low natural gas prices. The new standard is essentially a regulatory hedge;
in the event that natural gas prices rise, or electricity consumption spikes, new coal plants cannot
be built without being carbon capture–ready. Indeed, EPA explicitly justified the rule as necessary
to “lock in” the market-driven dynamic. Id. at 1433-34.
125 See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Section 111(a) requires EPA
to set reductions based on what is “achievable” using the “best system of emission reduction” that
the Administrator determines to be “adequately demonstrated.” The D.C. Circuit has interpreted
the “achievable” standard for “best system of emission reduction” as technology that is “available”
to new plants. See Second Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 111, at 1434, 1463.
126 The four plants are Southern Company’s Kemper County Energy Facility, which was
seventy-five percent complete in 2013, SaskPower’s Boundary Dam project, which was expected to
be operational in 2014, Summit Power’s Texas Clean Energy Project, which was under development, and the Hydrogen Energy California Project, which was also under development. Second
Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 111, at 1434.
127 Industry argues that this standard is a major obstacle to the construction and development
of any new coal-fired generation capacity because, as EPA concedes, the limits cannot be achieved
by a new coal-fired EGU using presently available technology. See The American Energy Initiative,
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The fate of this first power plant standard is important for three reasons.
First, a restrictive interpretation of “demonstrated” and “available” could rule
out carbon capture and storage as a basis for these standards, and in the
longer term, by setting a precedent, limit EPA’s ability to promote technological innovation. Second, the carbon standard for new power plants is the
first of many anticipated standards EPA expects to set, sector-by-sector, for
categories of stationary sources that produce the largest share of the nation’s
GHGs.128 Reversal by the D.C. Circuit would delay implementation of
these regulations for new and modified sources, at a minimum. Third,
losing a legal challenge to the new source standard under section 111(b)
would delay EPA’s plan to set standards for existing power plants under
section 111(d), which, as discussed below, are a much more important
regulatory target than new facilities.
4. Greenhouse Gas Standards for Existing Power Plants
While carbon standards for new power plants may be necessary as a
backstop measure to prevent a new generation of coal-fired plants from
being built should natural gas prices once again rise and make coal-fired
generation more competitive, these standards arguably are most important as
a legal predicate to regulating emissions from the existing fleet—the nation’s
oldest and dirtiest power plants, which produce nearly forty percent of the
nation’s carbon dioxide emissions.129 Congress largely immunized the
existing fleet from many of the CAA’s regulatory requirements130 as a political

Part 25: EPA’s Proposed Greenhouse Gas New Source Performance Standards for Utilities and the Impact
this Regulation Will Have on Jobs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Power of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 16 (2012) (statement of Thomas F. Farrell II, Chairman,
President, and CEO, Dominion Resources, Inc.) (contending that “performance standards will not
succeed at forcing the adoption of [carbon capture and storage] technologies” because the standard
“will create an insurmountable hurdle to obtaining financing and securing public utility commission approval for new coal stations”).
128 A number of consent decrees now require the agency to promulgate additional standards for
GHG pollution from other new sources, such as oil and gas refineries. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement
Between New York et al., and EPA (2010), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2013-09/documents/refineryghgsettlement.pdf (announcing that EPA has agreed to set GHG New
Source Performance Standards for refineries).
129 Electricity generation accounts for 38.6% of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions from energy.
See EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2012 tbl.3-1
(2014), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHGInventory-2014-Chapter-3-Energy.pdf.
130 For example, section 111 New Source Performance Standards generally apply only to
categories of new and “modified” sources. See Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)–(b)
(2012). The CAA’s New Source Review program similarly applies only to new and modified
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compromise, on the theory that older sources were expensive to retrofit and
would in any event retire within a reasonable period of time.131 Yet these
sources have defied congressional expectations and lived much longer than
anticipated, notwithstanding efforts to modernize the fleet.132 If EPA were
to succeed in imposing significant carbon limits on these electricity sector
sources in addition to the emission standards it already set for the transportation sector in 2010 and 2011, it will have brought nearly two-thirds of U.S.
carbon dioxide emissions under a program of control.133 Yet EPA’s effort to
reach these plants under 111(d) is the greatest test to date of its strategy to
adapt the CAA to climate change.
Once EPA sets a standard for new sources of pollution under section
111(b), the states are obligated to set standards for existing sources as well, if
certain conditions are met.134 To avoid duplicative regulation, Congress
required such standards only for pollution other than the six “criteria”
pollutants (for which states already submit implementation plans) and for
pollution not emitted from a source category already regulated as a hazardous
air pollutant.135 Because GHGs are neither criteria pollutants nor hazardous
pollutants, they appear to qualify for regulation under section 111(d).
It is worth noting that the NSPS program is a viable means of addressing
carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants only because of
another crucial legal judgment EPA has made: electing not to treat carbon
dioxide as a “criteria pollutant” and establish a national concentration

sources in attainment zones. See Clean Air Act §§ 165, 169, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7479 (2012); see
also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(c)(5), 7503(a) (2012).
131 That is, unless they modify their equipment in ways that significantly increase emissions,
in which case they trigger “new source review.” See Richard L. Revesz, Op-Ed., Old Power Plants
Need New Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/opinion/oldpower-plants-need-new-rules.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZCH2-6DLU; see also Jonathan
Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and
Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1688 (2007) (describing EPA’s policies
requiring a New Source Review when a modification would cause a large net increase in emissions).
132 The average age of U.S. coal-fired generation plants is forty-three years. See Steven
Mufson, Coal’s Burnout, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2011, at G1.
133 See id.; see also EPA, Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Carbon Dioxide Emissions, http://
www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/co2.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/8L3B-CUQ7.
134 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring states to set performance standards for
existing sources for any air pollutant “for which air quality criteria have not been issued . . . or
emitted from a source category which is regulated under section 7412 of this title but . . . to
which a standard of performance under this section would apply if such existing source were a new
source”).
135 Id.
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limit.136 Although some stakeholders have urged EPA to do so, the agency
has declined because it views the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) program as inappropriate for addressing global pollutants.137
Nevertheless, EPA’s regulation of existing power plants, even using its
preferred regulatory strategy under the NSPS program, poses substantial
legal and political risks. EPA’s longstanding practice under section 111(d),
which courts have approved,138 is to issue “guidelines” under which the
states must set “standards of performance” for existing sources under their
jurisdiction.139 The guidelines serve as minimum goals that state performance standards must meet. EPA’s authority to issue the guidelines (and
thereby set the floor for the stringency of the state standards) stems from
section 111(a). Section 111(a) defines a “standard of performance” as a
“standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of
emission reduction which . . . the Administrator determines has been
adequately demonstrated.”140 On EPA’s reading, the statute plainly tasks the
agency with establishing what is achievable and requires the states to file
plans to meet that goal. State plans under section 111(d) are akin to the
implementation plans they submit under section 110 showing how they will
comply with the six national ambient air quality standards. And as with the
section 110 implementation plans, EPA must approve state plans under
section 111(d) or disapprove them and file a federal implementation plan.141
136 Indeed, there are plausible arguments that by setting a national standard for GHG pollution and requiring states to submit implementation plans, EPA could achieve deep, nationwide
emissions reductions while allowing states to use trading schemes to do so. See, e.g., Steven D.
Cook, Emissions Trading: EPA Can Use Clean Air Act Authority to Establish Carbon Dioxide Program,
39 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 304 (Feb. 15, 2008) (describing former EPA general counsel Donald Elliott’s
proposal that ambient quality standards could be adapted to GHGs if EPA established a
percentage reduction target instead of setting a numerical concentration limit).
137 EPA has said NAAQS are inappropriate because the concentration of global pollutants in
the atmosphere cannot be controlled exclusively by the United States. See Regulating Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,363-44,364 (proposed July 30,
2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R ch. 1). A petition requesting that EPA set a NAAQS for GHGs is still
pending. See Petition from Center for Biological Diversity & 350.org, to EPA (Dec. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/global_warming_litigation/clean
_air_act/pdfs/Petition_GHG_pollution_cap_12-2-2009.pdf (requesting that EPA establish a NAAQS
for carbon dioxide at no greater than 350 ppm).
138 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,879 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 60) (describing EPA guidelines and relevant judicial decisions).
139 Id. at 34,834 (describing requirements for state implementation plans).
140 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012).
141 Section 110 explicitly affords the states considerable flexibility to adopt whatever mix of
measures they deem necessary to achieve the federal ambient air quality standards, and courts have
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The key legal and policy question is how stringent the standards can be,
and the answer turns on the meaning of “performance standard” in this
context. This in turn depends on the definition of “best system of emission
reduction.”142 Typically, air pollution standards for stationary sources are set
as rate-based standards applicable to the individual source (or a small group
of sources treated as if they were under a “bubble”).143 Such standards
generally require that emissions from that source not exceed, for example,
so many pounds of pollution per some measurable unit of output. Traditionally, a source might comply through a variety of strategies, including by
installing “scrubbers” or other equipment upgrades, improving operational
efficiency through process changes, reducing hours of operation, or co-firing
with a cleaner fuel.144
The challenge is that there may be relatively few cost-effective ways for
older electricity-generating units to reduce carbon dioxide emissions at the
source.145 There are, however, many cost-effective ways to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions from the electricity sector as a whole, by looking for
opportunities to do so more broadly, across the system. This is a seemingly
sensible thing to do because the electricity system is interconnected. A
variety of steps that can be taken outside a particular electricity-generating
unit might help to lower demand at that source, thereby reducing its
emissions. So, for example, greater use of natural gas–fired units could
reduce demand for coal-fired generation, while greater energy efficiency
could reduce demand for both, cutting carbon dioxide emissions considerably.
Thus, the difficult legal question facing EPA is whether “best system of
emission reduction” in the definition of performance standard in section
111(a) must be limited to considering what individual units at power plants
can do on-site (within the so-called “fence line”) or whether it authorizes
the agency to take into account the much larger reductions achievable from

said EPA must approve any plan that meets the section 110 criteria. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA,
427 U.S. 246, 256-57 (1976) (holding that EPA has no power to reject a State Implementation Plan
under section 110 based on economic or technological infeasibility).
142 See Clean Air Act § 111(a).
143 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,893-34,894.
144 See, e.g., id. at 34,926.
145 See id. at 34,856 (indicating that adopting best practices at coal-fired steam electric generating units could reduce average carbon dioxide emissions by 1.3 to 6.7%); id. at 34,877 (concluding
that “while heat rate improvements qualify as a system of emission reduction, they are not in
themselves the [best system of emission reduction] as there are additional strategies that can be
utilized in combination with [it] that are technically feasible, can be implemented at reasonable
cost, and result in greater emission reductions than would be achieved through [heat rate
improvement] strategies alone”).
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system-wide measures that could shift from higher to lower emitting
generation and reduce demand for electricity.146
In 2014, EPA proposed its section 111(d) rule, in which it embraced the
broader interpretation of “best system of emission reduction.”147 The
proposed rule sets individualized emission reduction targets for each
state.148 These targets are expressed as carbon intensity goals (i.e., pounds of
carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour), not mass-based emissions caps. If
achieved as projected by EPA, these targets would result by 2030 in a thirty
percent reduction in electricity sector carbon dioxide emissions compared
with 2005 levels. EPA’s methodology for establishing the targets depends on
EPA’s assessment of what can be achieved by each state using some
combination of four main strategies the agency calls “building blocks”:
improving the efficiency of their coal plants by at least six percent; running
existing natural gas plants more, up to seventy percent utilization; using
more “clean” energy, including by relying on new renewable energy sources
and by keeping existing nuclear plants from retiring; and reducing demand
through end-use energy efficiency measures adopted outside the power
plants by at least 1.5% annually.149 The stringency of the targets varies
considerably across the states (ranging from eleven percent to seventy-two
percent),150 depending on each state’s current energy mix and the extent to
which emissions reduction opportunities are projected to be reasonably
available using the four strategies. Generally, heavy-coal states are assigned
a lower burden than states with a cleaner energy mix. The stringency of the
numbers, however, can be misleading: it may be much more difficult for a
coal-dependent state with little renewables potential, no existing nuclear, and
no history of energy efficiency to meet a low target, than for a renewables-rich

146 See Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, Innovative NRDC Plan Featuring FederalState Partnership Saves Americans More than $25 Billion in Climate and Health Costs While
Unleashing Billions in Clean Energy Investments (Dec. 4, 2012), available at http://www.nrdc.org/
media/2012/121204.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/7U7R-F597 (describing a “groundbreaking
proposal to sharply cut carbon pollution from America’s power plants” by “setting system-wide
standards, rather than smokestack-by-smokestack ones”).
147 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,845.
148 Id. at 34,837.
149 Id. at 34,836, 34,851.
150 See Brad Plumer, How the EPA’s New Climate Rule Actually Works—in 8 Steps, VOX,
http://www.vox.com/2014/6/4/5779052/how-to-figure-out-which-states-get-hit-hardest-by-obamasclimate-rule (last updated June 4, 2014, 4:25 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/DUH4-W7HR; see
also EPA, DOCKET ID NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT
(TSD) FOR THE CAA SECTION 111(D) EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS 7
(2014), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/20140602tsdgoal-computation.pdf.
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state highly dependent on hydro power and poised to ramp up a successful
energy efficiency program to meet a much higher target.
EPA’s proposed rule provides considerable compliance flexibility to the
states. They may meet the targets through any combination of the four
pathways used to establish stringency, or through other strategies: by
making equipment upgrades at coal plants or retiring some coal-fired units;
by delaying or cancelling planned nuclear power plant retirements; by
increasing use of existing natural gas units; by implementing renewable
portfolio standards; or by promoting aggressive energy efficiency programs.151
States may also choose to adopt market-based strategies, including cap-andtrade programs.152 They can file multi-state plans and join regional trading
schemes if they wish.153 By offering these flexibilities, the rule is designed to
build on efforts many states have already made to reduce GHGs and to
promote renewable energy and energy efficiency.
There is no question that EPA’s interpretation is novel and far-reaching.
EPA has set performance standards under section 111(d) several times
before, but in very different circumstances,154 and these precedents offer
little guidance on the fundamental interpretive issue, which concerns the
breadth of best system of emission reduction.155 The agency has promulgated
standards under section 111(d) for non-NAAQS pollutants emitted by
sources such as municipal waste combustors, sulfuric acid plants, and
151
152

See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,835-34,837.
Although EPA does not use the term “cap-and-trade,” it certainly suggests in the rule that
mass-based trading systems are an acceptable compliance option: “A state could adopt the ratebased form of the goal established by the EPA or an equivalent mass-based form of the goal.” Id.
at 34,837. “States can tailor their regulatory mechanisms to recognize differences, for example by
creating budgets on a company-wide basis or using market-based mechanisms such as mass-based
trading systems, to ensure that requirements are achievable.” Id. at 34,887. The proposal also
mentions the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a cap-and-trade regime, roughly thirty times.
153 Id. at 34,897 (“The EPA expects this flexibility [to enter into multi-state plans or programs]
to reduce the cost of achieving the state goals and therefore expects it to be attractive to states.”).
154 See KATE KONSCHNIK & ARI PESKOE, HARVARD LAW SCH. ENVTL. LAW PROGRAM,
EFFICIENCY RULES: THE CASE FOR END-USE ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS IN THE
SECTION 111(D) RULE FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS 4-5 (2014), available at http://
blogs.law.harvard.edu/environmentallawprogram/files/2013/03/The-Role-of-Energy-Efficiency-inthe-111d-Rule.pdf (discussing previous section 111(d) regulations).
155 The only two section 111(d) performance standards that have explicitly authorized states
to adopt emissions trading plans for facilities are the Clean Air Mercury Rule, Standards of
Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units,
70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 72, and 75) [hereinafter
CAMR], which was struck down, and the emissions guidelines for large municipal waste combustors, Emission Guidelines for Municipal Waste Combustor Metals, Acid Gases, Organics, and
Nitrogen Oxides, 40 C.F.R. § 60.33b(d) (2012). See Jonas Monast et al., Regulating Greenhouse Gas
Emissions From Existing Sources: Section 111(d) and State Equivalency, 42 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law
Inst.) 10,206, 10,208-09 (2012).
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phosphate fertilizer plants.156 Yet the schemes for these pollutants do not
approach the scope and complexity of EPA’s proposal for existing sources of
GHGs.157 Moreover, there is sparse precedent on the limits of section
111(d). During the George W. Bush administration, EPA promulgated the
Clean Air Mercury Rule, using section 111(d) to create a cap-and-trade
regime for mercury and other pollutants.158 The D.C. Circuit struck down
the rule, however, finding that because Congress listed mercury as a hazardous
air pollutant under section 112, it must be regulated under that provision.159
The court did not reach the question of whether a cap-and-trade approach
would be lawful under section 111(d).160
The Supreme Court, for its part, has offered little guidance on how it
would interpret the word “standard” in this context.161 It thus remains an
open question whether EPA has the discretion to define “standard” under
the NSPS program to include what can be achieved beyond the boundaries
of a regulated unit or discrete source.162
In addition, because of the peculiarities of how section 111(d) was adopted,
EPA faces an even more fundamental, and unusual, problem over its

156 See Legal Memorandum for Proposed Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Electric Utility Generating Units 9-10 (2014), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2014-06/documents/20140602-legal-memorandum.pdf.
157 Monast et al., supra note 155, at 10,215.
158 See CAMR, supra note 155.
159 See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. dismissed, 555 U.S. 1162
(2009), and cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1169 (2009).
160 See id. at 584.
161 The Court has defined the term “standard” to include more than simply numerical emission levels for specific units like engines, extending it in one case to cover state imposed fleet
purchase requirements based on emission characteristics of the engines. But this was in the context
of interpreting the reach of a CAA provision preempting state “standards” for motor vehicle
engine emissions. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 255
(2004) (“A command, accompanied by sanctions, that certain purchasers may buy only vehicles
with particular emission characteristics is as much an ‘attempt to enforce’ a ‘standard’ as a
command, accompanied by sanctions, that a certain percentage of a manufacturer’s sales volume
must consist of such vehicles.”). Writing for the Court in an 8–1 decision, Justice Scalia began by
looking at the dictionary, defining “standard” as “that which ‘is established by authority, custom, or
general consent, as a model or example; criterion; test.’” Id. at 252-53 (quoting WEBSTER’S
SECOND NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2455 (1945)).
162 Depending on the content of the final rule, there are other matters that could invite legal
challenge, such as EPA’s approach to enforcement. EPA has asked for comment on how to hold
third parties (such as end use energy efficiency providers) accountable for fulfilling their
obligations under state plans. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,902-34,903 (proposed June 18,
2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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authority to regulate existing sources under this program.163 Recall that the
text of section 111(d) requires states to set standards for existing sources of
pollutants only if the pollutants are not from sources already subject to
regulation under the air toxics program in section 112. Existing power
plants, however, are now regulated under EPA’s air toxics standard.164 Read
literally, then, the statute appears to foreclose regulating GHG emissions
from these sources.
Yet EPA interprets section 111(d) to preclude it from regulating only
pollutants already listed as hazardous under the air toxics program regardless
of whether the sources of those pollutants are subject to regulation under
that program for emitting other pollutants.165 The legislative history reveals,
in a truly bizarre turn of events, that in the 1990 amendments to the CAA,
the House and Senate each enacted a different amendment to section
111(d)—one that precludes regulation of pollutants subject to section 112 and
another that precludes regulation of sources. In an astonishing glitch that
illustrates the vagaries of the legislative process, the Conference Committee
never resolved the differences between the two amendments and both were
enacted in Public Law 101-549 as parenthetical options.166 The U.S. Code,
163 See generally Adam M. Kushner & Judith E. Coleman, Lessons from Mercury: Ensuring
Legal Certainty for New GHG Performance Standards for Existing Fossil Fuel Plants (Oct. 24,
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
164 In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011), which held that federal
common law nuisance claims for harms caused by GHG pollution are precluded by the CAA, the
Court described EPA’s authority to set standards for existing power plants under section 111(d)
and then specifically described the exception for pollutants regulated under section 112: “There is an
exception: EPA may not employ § 7411(d) if existing stationary sources of the pollutant in
question are regulated under the national ambient air quality standard program, §§ 7408–7410, or
the ‘hazardous air pollutants’ program, § 7412.” 131 S. Ct. at 2537 & n.7. Yet this was in a footnote,
and the question of how to interpret the exception was not before the Court. In addition, the case
was decided before EPA issued its section 112(d) rule setting toxics standards for power plants. See
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric
Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam
Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012).
165 See supra note 156. Indeed, this was the posture adopted by EPA under George W. Bush
when it sought to regulate mercury from existing utility units under section 111(d). See Revision of
December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units and the Removal of Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units from the Section 112(c) List, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994 (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
166 See id. at 16,030 (“The Administrator shall prescribe regulations which shall establish a
procedure similar to that provided by section 7410 of this title under which each State shall submit
to the Administrator a plan which (A) establishes standards of performance for any existing source
for any air pollutant (i) for which air quality criteria have not been issued or which is not included
on a list published under section 7408(a) (or emitted from a source category which is regulated under
section 112) [House amendment,] (or 112(b)) [Senate Amendment,] but (ii) to which a standard of
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however, mysteriously omits the parenthetical reference to the Senate
amendment.167 EPA has concluded that the United States Code does not
control and that the Statutes at Large “constitute the legal evidence of the
laws.”168 The agency has reasoned that the best reconciliation of the two
amendments, in light of the legislative history from both the 1977 and 1990
amendments, is to read the provision as precluding duplicative regulation,
meaning that EPA may not under section 111(d) set standards for pollutants
already regulated under section 112.169
Thus, to succeed in this adaptive effort, EPA must first convince the
D.C. Circuit, and perhaps ultimately the Supreme Court, that the U.S.
Code does not mean what it appears to say on its face about the agency’s
threshold authority.170 It must then prevail in its view that the stringency of
performance standards based on the “best system of emission reduction” for
“any existing source” may be based on emissions reductions that result not
only from equipment upgrades or efficiency improvements at the electric

performance under this section would apply if such existing source were a new source.”) (quoting
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 108(g), § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2467,
2574). “These changes were not discussed in committee hearings, in floor debates, or in conference.
Ultimately, both amendments to Section 111(d) were contained in the legislation signed by the first
President Bush. The House Amendment is located in Section 108 of the Statutes at Large (under
‘Miscellaneous Guidance’); the Senate Amendment is found 107 pages later (under ‘Conforming
Amendments’).” Kate Konschnik, EPA’s 111(d) Authority—Follow Homer and Avoid the Sirens, LEGAL
PLANET (May 28, 2014), http://legal-planet.org/2014/05/28/guest-blogger-kate-konschnik-epas-111dauthority-follow-homer-and-avoid-the-sirens/, archived at http://perma.cc/5W4Y-BLJF.
167 As Konschnik explains, “The conflict presented itself to an obscure shop in Congress
charged with incorporating the Statutes at Large—the law as passed by Congress—into the
topically organized U.S. Code. A scribe encountered the House amendment first, struck “Section
112(b)(1)(A)” and added the House replacement language. The scribe then found it impossible to
incorporate the Senate text. The U.S. Code notes this explicit and irreconcilable conflict.” Id.
168 Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding, 70 Fed. Reg. at 16,030 (“The codifier’s
notes to this section of the Official Committee Print of the executed law state that the Senate
amendment ‘could not be executed’ because of the other amendment to section 111(d) contained in
the same Act. The United States Code does not control here, however. The Statutes at Large
constitute the legal evidence of the laws, where, as here, Title 42 of the United States Code, which
contains the CAA, has not been enacted into positive law.”).
169 Id. at 16,031-16,032 (reconciling the two provisions and reasoning that the purpose of the
House amendment in 1990 was to prevent duplicative regulation).
170 On August 1, 2014, West Virginia and eleven other states filed a suit challenging EPA’s
authority to promulgate carbon rules under section 111(d) of the CAA. See Petition for Review at
1-2, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 14-1146 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 1, 2014); see also Petition for Extraordinary Writ at 5, 29, In re Murray Energy Corp., No. 14-1112 (D.C. Cir. filed June 18, 2014) (asking
the court to prohibit EPA from continuing with its rulemaking, still in the proposal stage, for lack
of authority to regulate existing sources). While such suits usually do not proceed until rules are
finalized, the D.C. Circuit on September 18, 2014, ordered EPA to file a response within thirty
days and will permit Murray Energy to respond within fourteen days, if it so chooses. Order, In re
Murray Energy Corp., No. 14-1112 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 18, 2014).
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generating units or plants themselves but also from actions taken at other
locations by other entities, including end-use efficiency that lowers demand
for electricity.
It is certainly possible that EPA will succeed on both counts.171 Based on
the relevant legislative history and on rules of interpretation the Supreme
Court has traditionally used to resolve such conflicts, EPA appears to have
the stronger argument on the threshold question about whether it possesses
the necessary legal authority.172 EPA’s view that “best system of emission
reduction” allows it to consider reductions beyond the “fence line” of the
unit is also entirely plausible based on the plain meaning of the text, and is a
sensible interpretation in light of the interconnected nature of the electricity
system and the unique characteristics of carbon dioxide emissions. Under a
Chevron analysis, one can imagine this view being upheld as at least
“reasonable.”173
Still, the sheer scope of the rule may give even favorably disposed judges
pause and inevitably will invite questions about whether the agency has
exceeded its traditional authority to regulate air pollution and is now
improperly making energy policy by interfering with the states’ energy
mix.174 A reviewing court might also ask whether there is a limiting principle
to its “system-wide” approach, which in theory could count any measures that
would reduce energy demand (including limits on per capita energy consumption) toward stringency175 and why EPA’s four pathways (including energy
efficiency) are not also relevant to setting new source standards for other
pollutants.176 In addition, it remains unclear how EPA will enforce the new
rule: whether it will hold the states legally responsible for the commitments
in their plans or enforce plan requirements directly against the owners of
171
172

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
See Konschnik, supra note 166, for an explanation of why the industry arguments in this
regard are “weak.”
173 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
174 See Michael B. Gerrard, Legal Challenges to Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan, N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 11, 2014, at 3 (identifying this and other key legal issues).
175 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,885-34,886 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60) (noting that the CAA does not define “system” but suggesting the Oxford dictionary
definition as “[a] set of things working together as parts of a mechanism or interconnecting
network” and then claiming that “anything that reduces the emissions of affected sources may be
considered a ‘system of emission reduction’ for those sources”).
176 The authors thank Richard Lazarus for raising the question about the applicability of this
version of BSER to other pollutants. See E-mail from Richard Lazarus, Howard & Katherine
Aibel Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., to Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor of Law,
Harvard Law Sch., and Kate Konschnik, Policy Director, Envtl. Law Program, Harvard Law Sch.
( June 2, 2014) (on file with author).
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electricity generating units or third parties for their share of the promised
emissions reductions.177 The government may have good answers to all of
these questions,178 but there is a significant possibility that in the wake of
the Supreme Court’s UARG decision, it will face considerable skepticism.179
5. Bad Fit, EPA, and the Courts
The recent history of EPA’s response to the problem of climate change
illustrates the thesis with which we began: during periods of congressional
dysfunction, agencies must adapt aging statutory authority to new problems,
shifting the locus of policymaking first to agencies and then to the courts.
The endangerment finding and the Tailpipe Rule represented EPA’s initial
response to the problem, triggering additional regulation that may ultimately
lead to GHG limits for the transportation, electricity, industrial, and
manufacturing sectors—an economy-wide climate change program that one
might have expected to come more directly from Congress. In executing
this strategy, EPA has behaved strategically, consistent with its mission; it
has carefully calibrated and moderated its approach in light of prevailing
legal, policy, and political considerations. On the one hand, EPA has
adopted an expansive view of its mission by fully embracing GHG regulation.
It has acted boldly in adopting standards for both new and existing power
plants (in the former case, treating carbon capture and storage as “demonstrated” and “achievable,” and in the latter, by relying on an expansive
177 Cf. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,901 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60) (discussing enforcement options).
178 For example, on the question whether EPA is inappropriately regulating the energy supply, the government may argue that because air pollution standards necessarily affect the cost of
supply, they have always influenced choices about the energy mix, including whether to retire or
retrofit units, or switch fuel sources. Thus the distinction between environmental and energy
policy is somewhat artificial. See Jody Freeman, Why I Worry About UARG, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014). EPA might also defend its reliance on energy efficiency in this context
but not others as justified by the absence of readily available, cost-effective technological options
for controlling GHGs at existing plants. And there are no doubt sensible limiting principles that
could constrain the agency’s application of “best system” to an interconnected physical network
like the electricity system.
179 The government will likely rely for support on the Supreme Court’s decision in EPA v.
EME Homer City Generation, L.P., No. 12-1182, slip op. at 29, 32 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2014), in which the
Court upheld EPA’s cross-state air pollution rule in a 6–2 decision. The Court deferred to the
agency’s methodology for allocating emissions reductions among states based largely on cost as
reasonable, noting that the agency “must have leeway in fulfilling its statutory mandate.” Id. at 31.
Yet industry will likely draw heavily on the Court’s decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,
No. 12-1146, slip op. at 29 (U.S. June 23, 2014), discussed supra, at notes 96-108 and in accompanying
text, in which the Court rejected EPA’s interpretation of the CAA’s “prevention of significant
deterioration” program as triggered by GHG emissions.
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interpretation of “best system of emission reduction”). On the other hand,
the agency has in some instances opted for self-restraint and curtailed its
own jurisdiction (targeting only the largest emitters in the PSD program),
declined to use statutory programs it has deemed too risky (the NAAQS
program), set standards on a sliding scale, phased in certain requirements
over time, and allowed for considerable compliance flexibility.
Applying an old statute to this new problem has forced EPA to interpret
statutory terms in ways the enacting Congress may not have anticipated and
perhaps could not have foreseen. In the process, the agency has revisited
interpretations that appeared settled (does the term “any pollutant” mean
all pollutants, or just a subset?), considered some questions for the first time
(can “performance standards” be based on system-wide changes that reduce
demand for fossil fuel–fired generation?), and grappled with how to define
the targets of regulation (can coal-fired plants and natural gas–fired units be
grouped together in the NSPS program?). Of course EPA is doing these
things simultaneously. Because of their novelty, EPA’s answers to these
questions, and others, will continue to flood the courts. And judges, in turn,
will review agency decisions knowing that the chances of congressional
intervention are low. All of the players in this scenario are well aware that
the outcome of litigation—not new legislation—will probably determine the
scope of U.S. climate policy for the foreseeable future.
B. Managing Changing Electricity Markets Under the Federal Power Act
As with EPA, the CAA, and climate change, FERC faces the task of
fitting an old statute (the FPA) to new problems. Electricity markets have
experienced drastic changes over the last twenty years, including a sea of
change in economic thinking about the regulation of network industries,
significant technological advancement, and the need to integrate renewable
generation (wind and solar) and “smart” information technology into the
grid. These developments have spurred a transformation of the industry
from one characterized by vertically integrated investor-owned utilities
(IOUs) providing bundled, monopoly service at regulated prices, to one
characterized by inter-firm bulk power transactions at market prices and
competitive wholesale (and some retail) power markets. In a relatively short
period of time, historically speaking, the business of delivering electricity
has been “unbundled” from the business of selling it, and robust, competitive,
and geographically broad wholesale markets have replaced what were once
mostly local, intra-firm transactions. The rapid growth in the development
of renewable sources of electricity, first wind farms, and, more recently,
solar power, over the last several decades has added another layer of
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complexity for managers of the electric grid, further complicating the
process of developing well-functioning, competitive electricity markets.
While this process began as a cooperative, iterative effort involving both
FERC and Congress, Congress went mostly silent after 1992.180 The Energy
Policy Act of 2005 was Congress’s lone significant intervention in electricity
markets over that time period,181 leaving FERC to manage this transformation mostly on its own, using statutory guidance that dates to 1935.
1. Congressional Participation in the Early Stages of Restructuring
The Federal Power Act of 1935182 charged FERC with (i) regulating the
transmission of electricity in interstate commerce and the sale of electricity
at wholesale in interstate commerce, and (ii) ensuring that the rates charged
for these services were “just and reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory.”183 For
approximately sixty years following the passage of the Federal Power Act,
FERC discharged this responsibility by establishing rates for the provision
of bundled wholesale electric service184 by electric utilities—meaning that
the buyer paid one price for electric service, rather than paying separately
for the electricity and the service of delivering it.
In the late 1970s, municipal utilities and industrial customers began to
challenge IOUs’ monopoly control of the electric grid,185 while economists
began to challenge the traditional model of electric power service that
treated bundled electricity service as a natural monopoly.186 Congress
180 Perhaps not coincidentally, it was about this time that the widening of the ideological
divide in Congress began to accelerate. See Appendix, fig.A-8 (depicting the trend using the Poole
and Rosenthal data through the increasing slope of the “Republicans” line and the decreasing slope
of the “Democrats” line around 1992).
181 Not coincidentally, the 2005 Act was passed during a rare episode of single party control
of the legislative and executive branches, enacted by a Republican-controlled House and Senate,
and signed into law by a Republican president.
182 Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–828c
(2012)).
183 See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)–(b).
184 Following well-established ratemaking principles that predated the Federal Power Act,
FERC set rates at a level that would enable utilities to earn a reasonable return on prudent
investments and recover reasonable costs. The seminal case describing the application of the “just
and reasonable” standard is Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605-06
(1944), in which the Court declined to overturn a ratemaking decision on the grounds that the
commission had underestimated elements of the utility’s costs.
185 These entities wanted to be able to purchase power from other suppliers and to use the
IOUs’ transmission lines. FERC, however, had been loath to order IOUs to “wheel” power for
third parties. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378-79 (1973) (holding that
the regulated industries exemption does not insulate IOUs from all antitrust liability).
186 Economists began to argue that while the management of a network (in the case of electricity, the transmission and distribution “wires” business) was a natural monopoly, the sale of
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nudged unbundling and competition forward by passing the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),187 which encouraged independent
“merchant” generators to enter electricity markets previously unconnected to
electric utilities and granted FERC limited authority to order IOUs to make
their transmission lines available to third parties.188 PURPA stoked demand
among the IOUs’ captive industrial customers for the right to purchase
wholesale power directly from these new, non-utility generators, but did not
change the fact that the IOUs still controlled the transmission system.189 In
the fifteen years following PURPA’s passage, FERC led the way toward
more competitive markets by using the regulatory levers it had, arguably
going beyond what Congress had anticipated. For example, FERC moved
incrementally to promote competition by authorizing individual firms to
charge market-based rates190 and by requiring individual firms to provide
open access to transmission lines as a “voluntary” concession in a series of
adjudicative cases in which utilities sought merger approval or approval of
market-based rates.191
It was not until the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 that
Congress provided FERC with clear authority to order competitive wheeling
energy was not. To the contrary, there could be efficiency gains by unbundling the wires business
from the sale of electricity and introducing competition to the latter part of the business. See, e.g.,
Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform,
92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 597-603 (1979) (“To decide that a firm is a natural monopolist with respect
to one of its products and that it should be regulated does not decide the extent to which classical
regulation should apply to other, related products of the firm.”).
187 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 43
U.S.C. (2012)).
188 PURPA authorized FERC to order wheeling, but only if no “uncompensated economic
loss” or “undue burden” on the transmission owner would result. If ordering wheeling would
jeopardize existing relationships (including, presumably, the loss by the IOU of a valuable
customer), then FERC could not order wheeling. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117, 3138-39, repealed by Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, 2916.
189 Indeed, the federal courts had interpreted PURPA to prohibit FERC from ordering open
access to transmission lines solely to enhance competition. See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v.
FERC, 660 F.2d 668, 676 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981) (holding that FERC “lacks the authority to
require electric utilities to provide wheeling even on a reasonable request”); N.Y. Elec. & Gas
Corp. v. FERC, 638 F.2d 388, 402 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the public interest and enhancement of competition cannot alone compel wheeling).
190 See, e.g., Dartmouth Power Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 53 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,117 (1990) (authorizing a
nonutility generator to charge market-based rates based upon a determination that the generator
did not possess market power in the relevant market).
191 See Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory
Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 794-95 (explaining that
FERC imposed open-access terms as a condition of approval for market-based rates and used its
merger authority to impose these terms on a case-by-case basis).
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(transmission of power over IOU lines for third parties),192 essentially
ratifying FERC’s experiments with limited wheeling orders.193 The 1992 law
added considerable momentum to the restructuring process and paved the
way four years later for FERC Order No. 888,194 which ordered functional
unbundling of wholesale electricity sales from transmission services,
required owners of transmission lines to provide open-access transmission
services on nondiscriminatory terms195 and opened wholesale electricity
markets to competition.196 Although it was not evident at the time, the 1992
law marked the end of Congress’s meaningful participation in the restructuring process. Congress did pass the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which
concerned mostly distributive policy issues,197 such as grants and subsidies
designed to promote various types of energy development.198 But on the
192
193

See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 711, 106 Stat. 2776, 2905-10.
In the Energy Policy of Act 1992, Congress also helped to facilitate competition by
removing some restrictions on the growth of the independent power industry imposed by the
Public Utility Holding Act of 1935. See ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33739, THE
REPEAL OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935 (PUHCA) AND ITS
IMPACT ON ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES 4 (2006) (explaining that the Energy Policy Act of
1992 created an exemption from PUHCA for wholesale electricity generators).
194 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting
Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385). Order 888
required transmission line owners to separate the firm’s transmission functions from its electricity
sales functions. It did not require full legal separation of business units. See id. at 21,552.
195 A companion order to Order No. 888, Order No. 889, specifies the specific terms according
to which transmission line owners must make transmission services available on an open-access,
nondiscriminatory basis. See Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time
Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737, 21,740-41 (May 10, 1996)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37).
196 While buyers on wholesale markets were always free to purchase power from third-party
buyers, Order 888’s requirement that transmission line owners treat transmission as a common
carrier service, open to all on equal terms, led some integrated IOUs to spin off their generation
assets and to acquire more power on wholesale markets from third parties. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow,
Transmission Policy in the United States, 13 UTIL. POL’Y 95, 103 (2005) (describing Orders 888 and
889 as the “primary federal foundation for the obligations imposed on transmission owners to provide
to third parties unbundled transmission service, ancillary network support services, and information
about the availability of these services to support both wholesale and retail competition”).
197 Theodore Lowi has posited that it is easier for Congress to legislate distributive policies,
because they promote logrolling and other forms of coalition building, while regulatory policies,
which involve winners and losers, are inherently more divisive. Theodore J. Lowi, Four Systems of
Policy, Politics, and Choice, 32 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 298, 299-300 (1972).
198 Indeed, both the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007 offered incentives to invest in specific generation technologies and grid innovations.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided incentives for hydroelectric production incentives in
section 242, natural gas production from deep wells in shallow waters of the Gulf of Mexico in
section 344, diesel emissions reductions in section 795, and cellulosic biofuels production in
section 942. See Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
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difficult regulatory questions of the day, Congress remained mostly quiet.
FERC has thus managed the transition to robust, competitive wholesale
power markets since 1992—a monumental shift in policy—in the absence of
congressional guidance.
2. Adapting the “Just and Reasonable” Standard to Market Rates
After Order No. 888, FERC accelerated the process of authorizing
wholesale sellers to sell power at market rates, rather than setting the rates
itself in a traditional ratemaking proceeding. To accomplish this, FERC
interpreted its traditional duty to set “just and reasonable rates” as encompassing the authority to approve market-based rates. There was some precedent
for the notion that market-based rates could be “just and reasonable” under
the FPA. Under the long-standing Mobile–Sierra doctrine, FERC routinely
authorized rates negotiated in long-term bilateral agreements between
sophisticated parties, concluding that such rates satisfied the just and
reasonable standard;199 Mobile–Sierra, however, had never been applied to
sales in the new, fast-moving spot markets for electricity. Thus, authorizing
the broad use of market rates represented a rather momentous shift away
from historical understandings of cost of service regulation, which the
agency undertook without the benefit of congressional amendment to the
FPA.200
FERC executed this strategy as part of a difficult transition from regulated, localized electricity markets to geographically broader, more robust
markets. The California electricity crisis of 2000 and 2001 illustrates the
U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2012)). Title XIII of
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided tax incentives relating to electricity infrastructure,
domestic fossil fuel security, conservation and energy efficiency, and alternative motor vehicles and
fuels. See id. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 provided incentives for research
and development of biofuels and geothermal energy. See Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 17001–17386 (2012)).
199 The Mobile–Sierra doctrine stands for the proposition that freely negotiated rates are
presumed to be just and reasonable under both the FPA and NGA. See Fed. Power Comm’n v.
Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv.
Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1956).
200 Although the 1992 Energy Policy Act ratified FERC’s Open Access Order, it did not go
so far as to authorize market rates explicitly. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486,
§§ 721–722, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915-19 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j–824k (2012)).
FERC’s previous jurisprudence interpreting the “just and reasonable” standard stressed that rates
must reflect “a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests,” but emphasizing the fairness
of the end result rather than any particular formula for the determination of rates. See, e.g., Fed.
Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (reinforcing a focus on the
outcome rather than “various permissible ways in which any rate base on which the return is
computed might be arrived at”).
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challenges FERC has faced trying to ensure that prices for power and
transmission services remain “just and reasonable,” while seeking to promote
efficiency in organized markets. During the crisis, wholesale energy prices
in California skyrocketed to more than fifty times historical norms, driving
one utility into bankruptcy.201 As a result, wholesale buyers flooded FERC
with claims that prices charged by sellers violated the FPA’s just and
reasonable standard, entitling them to refunds.202 In sorting out these
claims, FERC learned that in the dysfunctional California market, sellers
were able to charge exorbitant prices not only because their product was
scarce, but also because sellers took steps to increase its scarcity, such as
withholding generation from the market on high demand days203 or colluding with affiliate companies.204
FERC struggled with how to apply the statutory “just and reasonable”
standard to these transactions. One cannot capture the efficiency of markets
without letting prices fluctuate to signal the relative scarcity of the good,
and high prices in the California market ought to have invited increases in
supply and decreases in demand—at least in the long run. The California
market, however, did not react in these ways because it was broken, a victim
of manipulation made particularly easy by the market’s poor design.205 The
FPA is silent on the question of what “just and reasonable” means in this
context, and Congress has not spoken on the matter. Thus, it was left to the

201
202

See Michael W. Lynch & Adrian Moore, Power Tripped, REASON, June 2001, at 32.
In petitions to FERC after the crisis, buyers on California’s wholesale market claimed to
have been overcharged by more than $9 billion. FERC ultimately decided that the figure was
about half that. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, THE COMMISSION’S RESPONSE TO THE
CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS AND TIMELINE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF REFUNDS 14 (2005),
available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/comm-response.pdf.
203 FERC has made a distinction between “economic withholding” and “physical withholding”
of power on spot markets. Economic withholding refers to a seller’s practice of charging an
exorbitantly high price for a product simply because the seller knows that the product is scarce and
that buyers have no choice but to take it at the offered price; physical withholding refers to a
seller’s practice of withholding from the market generation from one of the seller’s generating
plants to create sufficient scarcity that the seller could demand exorbitant rates for power from its
other plants. See Order Establishing Refund Effective Date and Proposing to Revise Market-Based
Rate Tariffs and Authorizations, 97 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,220 (2010).
204 For examples, see generally FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON
MANIPULATION IN WESTERN MARKETS (2003), available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/
electric/indus-act/wec.asp, which describes how some California market participants manipulated
the market by scheduling phony spot market transactions designed to create congestion in the
system so that they could be compensated for relieving congestion by forgoing those transactions.
205 Of course, retail price caps in California prevented, or at least dampened, the reductions
in demand one would expect to see from high prices. Indeed, during the crisis, retail customers in
most of the state did not experience price increases.
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courts to decide whether broadly applied market-based rates are “just and
reasonable” under the FPA.
In California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC,206 the Ninth Circuit determined
that market-based rates are consistent with the just and reasonable standard,
reasoning that FERC’s regulation of electricity rates under the FPA had
long contemplated (and authorized, in the context of bilateral negotiations)
market-based rates.207 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Lockyer
case208 but took up another challenge arising out of the California crisis in
the case of Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of
Snohomish County.209 Morgan Stanley involved a challenge not to rates
charged in the California spot market, but rather to rates paid by buyers
who entered into long-term wholesale power purchase contracts at the tail
end of the California crisis.210 The buyers argued that (i) manipulation in
the California market artificially increased the negotiated contract rates,
rendering them unjust and unreasonable, and (ii) the Mobile–Sierra doctrine’s
presumption that such rates are just and reasonable is inapplicable to these
contracts because FERC did not have an opportunity to approve the
contract rates, and the contract rates were so high as to violate the public
interest.211 The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, but remanded
the case to FERC on procedural grounds.212 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
went out of its way to stress that the Court was not resolving “the lawfulness
of the market-based-tariff system” under the FPA.213
Thus, the courts have left FERC’s broad authorization of market-based
rates intact. As for the question of how to control abuse of market power in
electricity markets, eventually, the agency determined that sellers ought to
be able to charge scarcity rents, but not to create scarcity where none exists.214
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

383 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1013.
551 U.S. 1140 (2007).
554 U.S. 527 (2008).
Id. at 540.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 530, 553-55.
Id. at 538; see also id. at 548 (“We reiterate that we do not address the lawfulness of
FERC’s market-based-rates scheme . . . . [A]ny needed revision in that scheme is properly
addressed in a challenge to the scheme itself, not through a disfigurement of the venerable Mobile–
Sierra doctrine.”).
214 FERC reasoned that sellers need to be able to charge scarcity rents and that abuse of
market power is best addressed through close monitoring of seller behavior and the revocation of
the authority to charge market rates where market power arises. For a detailed description of how
FERC’s thinking on this issue evolved after the California crisis, see David B. Spence & Robert
Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L.
REV. 131, 159-64 (2012).
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The process by which FERC came to this conclusion reflects the same
kind of strategic behavior EPA used when adapting the CAA to address the
problem of GHG emissions—proposals of bold action followed by more
measured action in the final analysis. FERC tried several approaches, only to
withdraw them in response to public reaction. The agency initially suggested
aggressive “market behavior rules” limiting the ability of sellers to engage in
economic withholding215 and a “standard market design” for all transmission
and wholesale power sales markets,216 but abandoned those proposals after
they met widespread opposition.217 In the end, while Congress did not
address the question of whether broad use of market pricing is consistent
with the FPA, it did eventually address the question of how FERC ought to
manage abuses of market power in wholesale electricity markets. In the only
case in our sample in which Congress intervened to resolve a regulatory
dilemma facing the agency, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed FERC
to adopt an approach to market manipulation borrowed from the securities
laws—one that focuses on the use of fraud or deceit in electricity markets.218
3. Adapting the Transmission Grid to New Market Realities
The rapid growth of competitive wholesale electricity markets has
presented FERC with another problem that is ill-suited to an FPA regulatory
regime from another, bygone era: namely, the problem of helping geographically broader, more active and robust wholesale markets grow and thrive on
an aging, balkanized transmission grid. Increasingly, long-distance transmission of power is both economically desirable and technically efficient.
Wholesale buyers now have the (at least theoretical) option of purchasing
power from a larger universe (both numerically and geographically) of
potential sellers;219 at the same time, engineers have improved the efficiency of
transmitting power over greater distances.220 Consequently, more generating
215 See Order Amending Market-Based Rate Tariffs and Authorizations, 105 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,218
(2003), reh’g denied, 107 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,175 (2004).
216 Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and
Standard Electricity Market Design, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452
(proposed Aug. 29, 2002) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
217 Order Terminating Proceeding, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,140 ( July 26, 2005).
218 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 315, 119 Stat. 594, 691 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 717c-1 (2012)).
219 See, e.g., COMPETE, RTO AND ISO MARKETS ARE ESSENTIAL TO MEETING OUR
NATION’S ECONOMIC, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES 1-2 (2010), available at
http://www.competecoalition.com/files/RTO%20White%20Paper_update%2010.6.10.pdf (describing the
benefits of competitive energy markets, including lower prices for consumers).
220 See Matthew L. Wald, Giving the Grid Some Backbone, SCI. AM. EARTH 3.0, Mar. 2009, at
52, 56 (describing the possibility for a new system of high-voltage lines controlled by state-of-the-
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plants are being built farther and farther from loads. The last two decades
have seen new wind and solar farms,221 almost all of which are located far
from cities and often far from existing transmission lines.222 This has been
spurred by a combination of technological advances,223 public policy incentives like tax credits,224 and state renewable portfolio standards.225 Finally, the
advent of the “smart grid” makes it possible to integrate information
technology into the electricity transmission system,226 enabling grid operators to identify and avoid congestion problems, price power transfers more
efficiently, and allow demand-side resources to participate in energy markets,227 all of which can enhance the value of long-distance power transmission.
The United States cannot capture this value if it cannot resolve to build
interstate transmission lines, but finding that resolve has been difficult.
art transmission centers); see also OFFICE OF ELEC. TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION, U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY, “GRID 2030:” A NATIONAL VISION FOR ELECTRICITY’S SECOND 100 YEARS 11-15
(2003), available at http://www.ferc.gov/eventcalendar/files/20050608125055-grid-2030.pdf (discussing
possible technologies to expand delivery systems).
221 According to the Energy Information Administration, in the decade between 2000 and 2011,
renewable generating capacity grew from about sixteen gigawatts to more than sixty-one gigawatts.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2011 tbl.4.2 B (2013), available at
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/2011/pdf/epa.pdf.
222 The best onshore wind resources are located in the upper Midwest and Great Plains, while
the best solar resources are located in the desert Southwest. See Wind Maps, NAT’L RENEWABLE
ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/gis/wind.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/UC3K-VEWU; Solar Maps, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/
gis/solar.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5VCZ-M2T9.
223 For a summary of the improving competitiveness of renewable resources, see Benjamin
K. Sovacool & Charmaine Watts, Going Completely Renewable: Is it Possible (Let Alone Desirable)?,
ELECTRICITY J., May 2009, at 95, 98-99.
224 See, e.g., Diane Cardwell, Renewed Tax Credit Buoys Wind-Power Projects, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 2013, at B3 (describing an increase in development of wind projects in response to
Congress’s renewal of the production tax credit in January 2013).
225 Generally, renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) require that electricity retailers secure a
specified percentage of electricity they sell from renewable sources. State RPSs differ widely,
specifying different goals and defining qualified “renewable” sources differently. For a good summary
of state standards and their strengths and weaknesses, see Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The
Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339 (2010). See generally DSIRE: Database of State
Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, N.C. STATE UNIV., http://www.dsireusa.org/, archived at
http://perma.cc/D44G-QN6Z (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (providing an unofficial review of state
standards and incentives).
226 The smart grid holds promise for almost every part of the electricity market, including
generation, distribution, and consumption, as well as transmission. For a full description of the
potential benefits of a smarter electric grid, see PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER: CLIMATE
CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES (2010).
227 See generally NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/NETL-2010/1413,
UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS OF THE SMART GRID 3 (2010), available at http://
www.netl.doe.gov/File%20Library/research/energy%20efficiency/smart%20grid/whitepapers/06-182010_Understanding-Smart-Grid-Benefits.pdf (outlining the benefits of the smart grid).
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Most experts estimate that modernizing the grid to meet new electricity
market needs will require investment in tens of thousands of miles of new
transmission lines at costs in the tens of billions of dollars.228 Because the
1935 Congress never conceived of national or regional power markets, the
FPA of 1935 did not grant FERC the power to site interstate transmission
lines in the way that its companion statute, the Natural Gas Act, granted
the agency the power to site interstate natural gas pipelines.229 For these
historical reasons, siting approval for transmission lines has traditionally
rested with the states, and even sometimes with local governments. This is
an artifact of the original configuration of the grid, built by vertically
integrated, state-chartered IOUs to provide monopoly service within their
individual service areas. Consequently, FERC has used its power to set
wholesale power and transmission rates and to authorize the charging of
market-based rates, as leverage to promote the development of an efficient,
reliable transmission grid that serves larger and more robust wholesale
markets. FERC has used that leverage strategically, alternating between
bold action and caution.
As a first step, in 1996, FERC’s Order No. 888 encouraged owners of
transmission lines (mostly IOUs) to create and join regional nonprofit
entities known as Independent System Operators (ISOs)230 (later, Regional

228 See Wald, supra note 220, at 55-57 (explaining several proposed grid investment plans,
involving tens of thousands of miles of new transmission lines costing tens of billions of dollars);
see also RICHARD W. CAPERTON & MATT KASPER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RE-ENERGIZE
REGIONAL ECONOMIES WITH NEW ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION LINES 4 (2011), available at
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/12/pdf/transmission_lines.pdf
(suggesting that the United States needs to invest at least $298 billion dollars to upgrade the grid by
2030); FOX-PENNER, supra note 226, at 89-92 (describing plans for a transmission “superhighway”);
Jeff St. John, Tres Amigas Raises Money for US Grid Super-Hub, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/tres-amigas-raises-money-for-u.s.-grid-super-hub/,
archived at http://perma.cc/LY4Y-AHJX.
229 Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act authorizes FERC to grant certificates of public convenience and necessity to builders and operators of interstate natural gas pipelines. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 717f (2012). With the certificate comes the power of eminent domain. Id. at § 717f(h). The
Supreme Court has determined that the power granted to FERC under the NGA preempts state
and local regulation of pipelines. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988)
(“[W]e conclude that [the state statute] regulates in a field the NGA has occupied to the exclusion
of state law, and that it therefore is pre-empted.”).
230 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,591-21,597 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35
and 385). Transmission owners retain ownership of their lines when they join the ISO, but
relinquish control over their use (including pricing and scheduling of transmission services) to the
ISO. Id.
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Transmission Organizations or RTOs231) to manage the grid, ensure system
reliability, and guard against discrimination and the exercise of market
power in the provision of transmission services.232 The new grid managers
would be independent of any individual utility and would have operational
control of multi-utility transmission networks; they would answer to
FERC.233 Because FERC lacked the explicit authority under the FPA to
mandate participation in such bodies, however, it used the levers it had to
encourage their formation. FERC issued orders establishing “principles” for
ISOs and RTOs and made clear it would strongly prefer all utilities to join
them.234 FERC also conditioned other benefits, such as merger approval
and approval of market-based rates, on utilities’ willingness to participate in
ISOs/RTOs.235 In the end, however, the agency lacked the authority to
force utilities to form or join ISOs/RTOs, and Congress declined to grant
it. Nevertheless, in the Northeast, most of the mid-Atlantic, Midwest,
Texas, and California, wholesale power markets and utilities’ grid assets are
231 FERC’s Order No. 2000 established the parameters for creating RTOs. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 ( Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). RTOs
operate similarly to ISOs. FERC originally hoped that RTOs would be much broader geographically. We now, however, use the terms RTO and ISO interchangeably.
232 The transition to competition has meant that more energy producers are feeding power
into the grid through an ever multiplying number of transactions, creating larger loop-flow
problems than the networks had experienced before.
233 It is FERC’s responsibility to ensure that transmission in power markets operates in ways
that are consistent with the Federal Power Act. In the organized markets managed by RTOs,
however, FERC oversees the RTOs, and the RTOs bear front-line responsibility for ensuring that
wholesale electric markets function properly and provide reliable service. That is, RTOs ensure
that the grid remains in balance and manage investment in the upkeep and expansion of the grid
to meet changing market conditions. RTOs also monitor purchases and sales on the spot market to
ensure that pricing is efficient and that neither buyers nor sellers are exercising market power. In
most (but not all) places where there is not an RTO to manage wholesale markets, IOUs remain
vertically integrated and traditionally regulated such that the volume and geographic reach of
third-party wholesale transactions are smaller; in these settings, IOUs manage reliability
collectively through informal power pools. During the 1990s, a sizable minority of states also opted
to restructure their retail electricity markets, mandating the unbundling of electricity sales from
distribution services, opening up retail sales to competition and authorizing market pricing. As a
consequence of these changes, RTOs now manage organized and robust regional wholesale
electricity markets in the northeastern and midwestern United States, as well as Texas and
California, with FERC oversight.
234 See Promoting Wholesale Competition, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,595 (encouraging utilities to
form “properly structured” ISOs voluntarily and establishing principles to guide their formation);
see also Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 811 (encouraging the formation of
regional bodies and stating that FERC’s “objective is for all transmission-owning entities in the
Nation, including non-public utility entities, to place their transmission facilities under the control
of appropriate RTOs in a timely manner”).
235 See Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in
Electric Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 573-82 (2005).
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now managed by ISOs/RTOs.236 This represents a monumental change in
the industry in these regions, one affected primarily by FERC’s creativity
and persistence with very little assistance from Congress.
FERC faced another obstacle in its efforts to usher the transmission
system into the twenty-first century. ISOs/RTOs can encourage members to
pursue transmission and generation investments that suit modern power
markets, but they cannot force those investments. States and local
governments often have little or no incentive to approve the construction of
transmission lines that cross through their jurisdiction, but provide no
benefits (for example, electricity service or jobs at the generating plant)
within that jurisdiction. Indeed, many state permitting regimes deny the
state public utility commission the authority to approve transmission lines
that do not provide in-state benefits or are not constructed by utilities
providing power service within the state.237
Congress has not been oblivious to this problem, but its lone attempt to
address it was timid and unsuccessful. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 tried
to encourage states to form compacts to manage the process of transmission
planning.238 More directly, section 216 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005
attempted to provide FERC with limited “backstop authority” over siting
transmission lines in regions suffering from severe transmission congestion
problems and designated by the Department of Energy (DOE) as “national
interest electric transmission corridor[s].”239 Specifically, section 216
authorizes FERC to approve a transmission project in such a corridor—
preempting local law—if it concludes that the state (i) lacks the authority to
approve the line or to consider the interstate benefits in rendering its
decision240 or (ii) has “withheld approval for more than [one] year” or
236 See Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FERC,
http://ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated Aug. 26, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/7U93-TRJ3 (showing current ISOs/RTOs).
237 See Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving
Notions of the “Public Interest” in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV.
705, 748-70 (2010) (discussing how recent developments have challenged the definition of “public
interest”); Richard J. Pierce, Environmental Regulation, Energy and Market Entry, 15 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 167 (2005) (discussing three specific contexts—gasoline production, liquefied
natural gas importation, and electricity transmission—where environmental regulation methods
conflict with energy policy goals); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Bringing the Camel into the Tent:
State and Federal Power over Electricity Transmission, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 71, 100-02 (2001)
(making recommendations about federal transmission legislation).
238 See 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i) (2012) (authorizing three or more contiguous states to enter into
an interstate compact that establishes regional siting agencies to carry out those states’ siting
responsibilities).
239 Id. § 824p(a)(2).
240 Id. § 824p(b)(1)(A).
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conditioned its approval so as to reduce substantially the congestion relief
benefits of the line or render the line economically unfeasible.241 While
DOE did designate a few national interest corridors,242 two circuit courts
have overturned the rules FERC promulgated to guide its use of this
authority,243 and FERC has been unable to deploy it. Significantly, the
Fourth Circuit’s reading of the statute permitted any state to avoid the
application of section 216 simply by denying approval to a new transmission
line proposal.244 FERC has interpreted these judicial setbacks as “a significant
constraint on the Commission’s already-limited ability to approve appropriate projects to transmit energy in interstate commerce,”245 and many
observers now consider the statutory provision ineffectual.246
Although the FERC chairman has repeatedly asked Congress to provide
more robust backstop transmission siting authority, Congress has failed to
do so.247 Thus, in this instance, FERC has been unable to find a creative
solution to the problem of state law impediments to transmission line siting.
Unable to use federal siting as a stick to force more investment in transmission, however, FERC has instead tried to induce investment using a carrot
of transmission rate pricing incentives.

241
242

Id. § 824p(b)(1)(C).
See National Electric Transmission Congestion Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,992 (Oct. 5,
2007) (designating two national interest electric transmission corridors).
243 See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011)
(overturning the rules for failure to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act);
Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 319-20 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding multiple
problems with the rules).
244 See Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 310 (“The phrase [withheld approval of a permit application for
more than one year] does not include, as FERC held, the denial of an application.”).
245 Transmission Infrastructure: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Res., 111th
Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of Jon Wellinghoff, Acting Chairman, FERC). The Supreme Court
denied certiorari in the Piedmont case. Edison Elec. Inst. v. Piedmont Envtl. Council, 130 S.Ct.
1138 (2010).
246 See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39
ENVTL. L. 1015, 1037 (2009) (“[S]ome interpret the decision as seriously hobbling FERC’s ability
to implement its backstop authority.”). The Waxman–Markey Bill contained a provision that
would have strengthened FERC’s backstop siting authority, but only in portions of the western
United States. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
§ 151(b) (2009) (stating that the powers only apply to the Western Interconnection). The Obama
administration briefly considered, then abandoned, a plan to continue to try and use section 216
authority. See Lynn Garner, Energy Department Drops Plan to Cede Power to FERC for Siting
Transmission Lines, 42 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2297 (2011).
247 Specifically, Congress failed to pass three bills that would have increased FERC’s backstop authority. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 151
(2009); American Clean Energy Leadership Act, S. 1462, 111th Cong. § 121 (2009); Clean
Renewable Energy and Economic Development Act, S. 539, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009).
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Even if new transmission line projects are able to navigate state approval
processes successfully, they face yet another hurdle stemming from the
original provisions of the FPA. In order to finance new transmission
investment, line owners must be able to recover their investment. The FPA
requires that transmission rates be “just and reasonable” and not “unduly
discriminatory or preferential,”248 and courts have interpreted this language
to require that only ratepayers who benefit from a new transmission line
bear the capital costs of constructing it. This raises the question of who
benefits from new transmission investment: is it only the direct customers
of the new line or also the indirect beneficiaries of the enhanced reliability
and cleaner energy mix provided by the new line? The answer to this
question can determine whether there are enough beneficiaries to justify the
investment in the first place.
FERC has faced the question of how to encourage new transmission
investment in the shadow of this “beneficiary pays” rule, which seems to
have had a chilling effect on investment in new transmission lines, particularly
those designed to bring remote renewable power to the grid.249 Interestingly,
transmission lines are being approved and built in Texas with relative speed
and ease,250 where much of the grid lies beyond the jurisdiction of the FPA
and FERC.251 The Commission has tried to help ISOs/RTOs and other
248
249

See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012).
The Seventh Circuit struck down a recent transmission rate proposal, which would have
spread transmission costs widely, for failing to adhere to this principle. See Ill. Commerce Comm’n
v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009) (“FERC is not authorized to approve a pricing scheme
that requires a group of utilities to pay for facilities from which its members derive no benefits . . . .”). The court, however, offered a qualification to the “beneficiary pays” principle: “We
do not suggest that the Commission has to calculate benefits to the last penny, or for that matter
to the last million or ten million or perhaps hundred million dollars.” Id. at 477; see also K N
Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding FERC cost-spreading
order when “all segments of the industry . . . will nonetheless ultimately benefit from their
resolution”).
250 Investors have poured $6.8 billion into new transmission lines in Texas, which will deliver
double the wind capacity to consumers as new wind farms develop. Texas to Double Wind Capacity,
Deliver to Major Cities, SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (Apr. 1, 2013, 1:31 PM), http://
www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/24725, archived at http://perma.cc/
LX63-PTS5. In 2005, Texas created “competitive renewable energy zones” (“CREZ zones”), areas
suitable for development of wind resources. The state offered financial incentives for investment
in renewable power within the CREZ zones, and decided to “socialize” the costs of building
transmission generators in the CREZ zones eastward to those in San Antonio, Houston, and the
remainder of central and east Texas. The presence of this new transmission, in turn, has sparked
the development of more renewable generation in Texas than in any other state. See Matthew L.
Wald, Wired for Wind, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2014, at B1.
251 The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”) is an RTO that manages a grid
that is functionally separate from the remainder of the American power grid, and comprises most
of the grid within the State of Texas. See Jared M. Fleisher, ERCOT’s Jurisdictional Status: A Legal
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transmission owners navigate this “beneficiary pays” rule by promulgating
Order No. 1000,252 which establishes cost allocation guidelines for new
transmission investments.253 Order No. 1000 incorporates language from a
recent court decision applying the beneficiary pays principle,254 which
reflects FERC’s awareness of the need to remain within judicial views of
FPA boundaries. At the same time, FERC gently pushes those boundaries
by authorizing ISOs/RTOs and other transmission owners to consider
“public policy benefits” among the benefits to which transmission costs can
be allocated.255 Presumably, this means that, when reviewing transmission
cost allocation schemes, FERC will look relatively favorably on the allocation of costs to ratepayers who may not receive electricity over the new line,
but rather receive only environmental and reliability benefits, so long as
those benefits are not trivial.256 Indeed, FERC has already approved a
proposal by the Midwest ISO to allocate the costs associated with a portfolio
of new transmission lines designated as “multi-value projects”—lines that
would, collectively, offer reliability and environmental and other benefits to
the entire RTO system—to ratepayers across the entire RTO region.257 The
Seventh Circuit recently affirmed FERC’s decision to approve Midwest
ISO’s multi-value project portfolio,258 seemingly vindicating FERC’s
approach to the problem. Indeed, during oral argument of the case before
the Seventh Circuit, Judge Wood endorsed a broad view of the “beneficiary
History and Contemporary Appraisal, 3 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 4, 4 (2008) (explaining that
ERCOT is “the network of interconnected utilities that together cover approximately 75 percent
of the land area in the state of Texas”). The reasons for this separation traced back to the desire of
the Texas utilities to remain free from FERC jurisdiction. See id. at 10 (explaining that in response
to the passage of the Federal Power Act in 1935, Texas utilities sought to cut themselves off from
interstate commerce to evade federal jurisdiction).
252 Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
253 Id. at 49,918-49,930.
254 Specifically, FERC borrows from the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Illinois Commerce
Commission v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 477 (7th Cir. 2009), by requiring that each of the costs assigned
to utility ratepayers be “roughly commensurate” with the benefits the line will bring to those
ratepayers. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,922.
255 See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,876 (“The Commission requires public utility transmission providers to amend their OATTs to describe procedures
that provide for the consideration of transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements in
the local and regional transmission planning processes.”).
256 For an interesting analysis of the federalism issues posed by the transmission lines siting
problem, see generally Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges
for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801 (2012).
257 For additional information, see id. at 1851-55. FERC ultimately upheld the multi-value
project. See FERC Upholds MISO’s MVP Transmission Cost Allocation Methodology, RESTRUCTURING
TODAY, Oct. 21, 2011, at 1.
258 See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 777 (7th Cir. 2013).
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pays” principle in language that highlights the poor fit between the statute
and modern bulk power markets:
[E]nergy is a much more tradable commodity than people thought in the
1950s or the 1930s or what have you. There are enormous areas over which
energy can be efficiently transmitted, so to say that [one part of the Midwest
ISO] needs to be carved off as its own area just doesn’t make sense to me.259

On the other hand, this same court recently overturned FERC’s approval
of a cost allocation scheme for another RTO’s new transmission line on the
grounds that FERC did not adequately support its conclusion that benefits
of the line flow beyond the line’s immediate customer base.260
Presumably, the question of how to implement the “beneficiary pays”
principle will continue to hamper FERC’s and the ISOs’/RTOs’ attempts
to implement Order No. 1000. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed
the issue, and Congress has not spoken to it. The D.C. Circuit, however,
recently upheld Order No. 1000,261 endorsing FERC’s use of the FPA’s just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rate mandate to compel transmission
owners to consider public policy benefits262 in allocating the costs of new
transmission lines.263
Given its recent victory in the D.C. Circuit, FERC is likely to continue
to try to adapt Depression-era statutory language to twenty-first century
electricity markets—that is, to use its authority over transmission rates to
push transmission owners to plan new investments and to facilitate financing
by authorizing cost-spreading over as wide a ratepayer base as possible,
consistent with the FPA.
4. Adapting the Federal Power Act to Clean Energy Goals
The proliferation of state and federal public policies promoting the use
of clean energy and conservation has presented FERC with yet another
259 Oral Argument at 16:19, Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013)
(Nos. 11-3421, 11-3430, 11-3584, 11-3585, 11-3586, 11-3620, 11-3787, 11-3795, 11-3806, 12-1027), available
at http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2013/sk.11-3421.11-3421_04_10_2013.mp3.
260 See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, Nos. 13-1674, 13-1676, 13-2052, 13-2262, slip op. at 5
(7th Cir. June 24, 2014) (rejecting FERC’s approval of a plan to allocate some of the costs of a new
line in the eastern part of the PJM RTO territory to utilities in the western part because FERC
failed to make sufficient attempts to quantify the reliability and other benefits of the line to
western utilities).
261 See S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, No. 12-1232, 2014 WL 3973116, at *17-20 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 15, 2014).
262 See id. at 17-24 (holding that FERC is entitled to deference given its “expertise and experience” in finding that “planning and cost allocation practices were unjust or unreasonable”).
263 See id. at 39 (rejecting the challenge to FERC’s authority to adopt cost allocation reforms).
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challenge to which the FPA does not speak clearly. Specifically, the rapid
growth of wind and solar generation, and the development of smart grid
technology enabling electricity consumers to reduce demand or shift it to
off-peak periods, pose their own challenges to operators of newly robust
regional wholesale markets. Since the 1980s, more than half of American
states have adopted some form of renewable energy standard; some have
gone further. California’s AB 32 established a statewide program of GHG
emission regulation, and other states have been active promoters of clean
energy as well.264 Aside from the problem of building transmission lines to
connect these new, often remotely located facilities to the grid, the penetration of wind and other renewable sources in the market presents FERC
with new questions of how these new sources of generation should be
compensated and otherwise accommodated by wholesale electricity markets.
As with other electricity market issues, beyond generalized expressions of
support for clean energy and demand response,265 Congress has declined to
offer guidance on the kind of zero-sum questions at the heart of integrating
renewables into wholesale electricity markets, leaving those divisive questions
for FERC and the courts.
FERC has promoted clean energy by requiring changes to standard
interconnection agreements to facilitate grid interconnection of renewable
energy resources.266 It has also declined to use its enforcement authority
against states setting favorable power purchase rates for renewable energy.267
264 See 2006 Cal. Stat. 3419-3431; see also Memorandum of Understanding Between Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont (Dec. 20, 2005), available at
http://rggi.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf (forming the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), a cooperative effort between states in the northeast to regulate GHGs within their borders
using a marketable permit system). In addition, in 2014, New York published for public comment a
“draft energy plan” that would more aggressively promote clean energy and efficiency in the state’s
power sector. N.Y. STATE ENERGY PLANNING BD., SHAPING THE FUTURE OF ENERGY: 2014
DRAFT NEW YORK STATE ENERGY PLAN (2014), available at http://energyplan.ny.gov/-media/
nysenergyplan/2014stateenergyplan-documents/2014-draft-nysep-vol1.pdf.
265 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized FERC to promote the use of demand response, stating that “[i]t is the policy of the United States that time-based pricing and other forms
of demand response . . . shall be encouraged . . . and unnecessary barriers to demand response
participation . . . shall be eliminated.” Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1252(f ), 119 Stat. 594, 966 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 2642 (2012)). The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 requested that
FERC conduct a “[n]ational [a]ssessment” of demand response potential. Pub. L. No. 110-140,
§ 529, 121 Stat. 1492, 1664 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 8279 (2012)).
266 See Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 68 Fed.
Reg. 49,846 (Aug. 19, 2003) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (requiring changes to pro forma
large generator interconnection agreements to accommodate variable energy resources).
267 See Notice of Intent Not to Act, 134 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,271 (Mar. 31, 2011) (declining to enforce
PURPA requirements against the California Public Utilities Commission); Petition for Enforcement
at 10-14 (FERC Jan. 31, 2010) (No. EL11-19). FERC’s regulations implementing PURPA require
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Of course, most new utility-scale renewable electricity comes from wind
energy, and wind power is intermittent. This poses a problem for grid
operators, who must continuously balance loads. Wind power is dispatched
to the grid whenever it is available because, in the usual case, generation
sources are dispatched to the grid in ascending order of marginal cost.268
Because grid operators cannot count on wind capacity, however, they may
deny wind generation capacity credits available to more reliable sources of
electricity, penalize wind generators financially for failing to provide
forecasted amounts of energy, and charge wind generators for the additional
“ancillary services” (which are compensated changes in supply or demand
necessary to balance loads) necessary to back up wind.269 Wind generators
claim that these practices are unfair and that wind forecasting has improved
greatly, reducing the amount of regulation and reserves needed to supplement wind power.
In response, FERC issued Order No. 764 on the integration of “variable
energy resources” (VERs) in June 2012.270 Order No. 764 requires transmission utilities (including RTOs and ISOs) to schedule transmission in
smaller increments of time (fifteen minutes rather than sixty minutes),
thereby increasing the likelihood that wind power will hit its projected
generation target within the specified increment.271 To promote centralized
wind forecasting, the rule also requires wind generators to provide wind
forecasting data to transmission utilities and transmission utilities to
provide regulation service necessary to support wind.272
FERC has also promoted a cleaner energy mix by pursuing policies that
support the widespread use of demand response,273 reasoning that the
that rates paid for power from PURPA qualifying generators not exceed the cost of alternative
generation. Cf. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6) (2014).
268 The marginal cost of wind generation is effectively zero, so it is dispatched even before
cheap coal power.
269 Joshua Z. Rokach, Bending to the Wind, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2011, at 86, 88.
270 Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,482 ( July 13, 2012) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
271 See id. at 41,491.
272 See id. at 41,508.
273 Some FERC commissioners may see such policies as an extension of their traditional
authority to ensure open access to the grid on fair terms, rather than because they believe FERC’s
mandate includes promoting clean energy. Others, however, may embrace a clean energy agenda
more explicitly. Either way, integrating cleaner energy into the grid can have salutary effects on
both reliability and prices. FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff, named to the commission by
President George W. Bush in 2006 and elevated to chairman by President Barack Obama in 2009,
made no secret of his aims to take more concrete action in this regard:
I have a vision of our energy future . . . . Where energy efficiency, demand response, micro-generation, combined heat and power and other distributed resources
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participation of demand-response resources in electricity markets can help
to mitigate electricity prices by lowering demand at peak times by displacing
other more expensive (and sometimes higher polluting) generation sources
in those markets. Yet these policies have proven controversial. In Order No.
719,274 FERC required ISOs/RTOs to accept bids from demand response
resources for certain “ancillary services” on a basis comparable to other
resources.275 FERC also required ISOs/RTOs to permit an aggregator of
retail customers to bid demand response on behalf of a group of retail
customers directly into the organized wholesale energy market.276 In 2011,
FERC went further, issuing Order No. 745.277 Order No. 745 seeks to
remove barriers to fuller participation of demand response in wholesale
markets by requiring ISOs and RTOs to compensate such resources at the
market price for energy (known as the locational marginal price or “LMP”)
under certain conditions. The D.C. Circuit, however, struck down Order
No. 745, concluding that it tramples on state jurisdiction over retail sales of
electricity by luring retail buyers into wholesale power markets (as providers

are the first source of energy services for most consumers. And those distributed resources are fully supplemented with competitive procurement of large-scale wind,
solar, hydro, geothermal and other renewable resources rounding out a significant
share of our total energy resource mix for North America.
Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman, FERC, Statement at NARUC Summer Meetings: International
Presentation on a Shared Energy Vision for North America: Regulations, Markets, and the Environment
( July 20, 2009), available at https://www.ferc.gov/media/statements-speeches/wellinghoff/2009/07-2009-wellinghoff.pdf.
274 Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100
(Oct. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35), order on reh’g, Wholesale Competition in
Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,776 ( July 29, 2009) (to be codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 35).
275 See id. at 64,103-64,104.
276 The Commission explained:
We find that allowing an [aggregator] to act as an intermediary for many small retail
loads that cannot individually participate in the organized market would reduce a
barrier to demand response. Aggregating small retail customers into larger pools of
resources expands the amount of resources available to the market, increases competition, helps reduce prices to consumers and enhances reliability.
Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100, 64,119
(Oct. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
277 Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg.
16,658 (Mar. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (seeking to balance the strain on the
electric system by giving customers incentives to reduce energy consumption when wholesale
energy prices are high). For an analysis of Order No. 745, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Primer on
Demand Response and a Critique of Order 745, 3 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 102 (2012).

62

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 1

of demand response resources)278 and would overcompensate demand
response providers, resulting in unjust and unreasonable rates.279
For these two policy choices—integrating renewables and demand
response into wholesale markets—FERC has taken an aggressive approach
that leverages its power over wholesale rates to push clean energy goals.
Given the proliferation of renewable generation and demand response
aggregators in electricity markets, FERC did not have the option of ignoring
the issue. The treatment of these resources in wholesale electricity markets
is essentially an economic issue—one that implicates the FPA mandate that
wholesale rates be just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. Absent congressional guidance, FERC has been left to manage these twenty-first century
issues using the regulatory levers it was granted in a 1935 law.
5. Bad Fit, FERC, and the Courts
Over the last two decades FERC faced a new competitive electricity
market, demand for more bulk power transfers and insufficient investment
in new transmission, challenges caused by the integration of more and more
renewable resources, and opportunities posed by smart grid technology.
Realistically, the agency had no choice but to respond to these challenges.
Like EPA, FERC has approached problems of bad fit with a combination of
gusto and caution but always with a strategic sense. And like EPA, FERC
has not “gone for broke.” True, FERC rather boldly embraced the widespread use of market-based rates for wholesale power (before, during, and
after the California energy crisis) despite lacking clear congressional
authorization to do so. Yet to promote competition, FERC forced the
unbundling of electric power generation and transmission in interstate
278
279

Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, No. 11-1486, slip op. at 16 (D.C. Cir. May 23, 2014).
The court concluded that paying LMP for demand-response services improperly allows
demand-response providers to “retain the savings associated with [the provider’s] avoided retail
generation cost,” resulting in unjust and unreasonable rates. Id. at 15 (quoting Demand Response
Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658, 16,680 (Mar. 24,
2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (Moeller, Comm’r, dissenting)). Petitioners claimed that
LMP overcompensates demand-response providers because they incur no real costs in providing
their “resource” to the market, while providers of power earn the LMP minus their costs of
generation. See Brief of Robert L. Borlick, Joseph Bowring, James Bushnell, and 18 Other Leading
Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 18-20, Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, No. 111486 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 25, 2012). In a vigorous dissent, Judge Edwards accepted FERC’s claim of
jurisdiction based on the power to correct “practices affecting” wholesale rates. Indeed, he
characterized that interpretation of the FPA as “straightforward and sensible” and consistent with
precedent, and urged deference to the agency’s “well-reasoned and permissible interpretation
of . . . the statute.” Elec. Power Supply Assoc., No. 11-1486, slip op. at 13-14, 22 (Edwards, J.,
dissenting).
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markets only, stopping short of exerting similar authority over retail
markets traditionally governed by the states. To create incentives for
additional transmission capacity, FERC has bootstrapped its authority over
rates in numerous creative ways yet has eschewed more aggressive mandates
over market design. Under the auspices of its rate-setting authority, FERC
midwifed the birth of new regional institutions capable of managing the
increasingly complex electricity grid, but never required the states to join
them. Finally, FERC has sought to force wholesale markets to be more
welcoming to renewable resources and demand response, taking risks that it
believes will survive judicial scrutiny.
All of these efforts have involved interpretations of eighty-year-old statutory language written by a Congress that could not have imagined most of
the problems FERC now faces. Yet that Congress did give FERC broad
authority to ensure that electricity rates are just and reasonable and
nondiscriminatory. Most of the issues FERC must now confront involve the
scope of that authority in light of new challenges in electricity markets.
Thus the agency must ask: is the general use of market-based rates consistent with this statutory mandate? May the agency specify cost allocation
methods for new transmission investment to ensure that transmission rates
are nondiscriminatory? Does requiring the payment of locational marginal
prices to providers of demand resources yield prices that are just and
reasonable? These are significant policy choices, which one might expect
Congress to make—or at least to shape substantially through periodic
interventions. Instead, at least for the foreseeable future, these judgments
will be made not by Congress but by FERC, under the supervision of the
federal courts.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL DYSFUNCTION
FOR REGULATORY POLICYMAKING
As our examples show, when agencies adopt innovative methods to adapt
an old statutory scheme to new problems, their strategic choices invite
judicial scrutiny. Indeed, given the extent of congressional dysfunction
noted by political scientists, and the aging regulatory statutes in the U.S.
Code, courts are likely to face an increasing number of cases in which they
must decide the legality of agency policy decisions on issues not foreseen by
Congress when it enacted the agency’s enabling legislation. Surely, as courts
encounter these increasingly high-stakes questions of statutory fit, they do
so knowing that Congress will be unable, in all likelihood, to muster a
legislative resolution. This prospect raises the question of how agencies and
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courts can be expected to behave, and how they should behave, in such a
strategic environment.
A. The New Strategic Environment for Agencies
Public choice scholars have conceived of agency policymaking as a
principal–agent problem in which agency independence implies a democratic
deficit: the elected branches, Congress and the President (the principals),
struggle to control an agency (the agent), whose actions may reflect shirking
and moral hazard.280 According to this view, the principals use the statute (a
form of ex ante control) to steer agencies toward favored outcomes, in part
by empowering interest groups to use litigation and the courts toward those
favored ends;281 politicians also use monitoring and oversight (ex post
controls) to keep the agency pointed in the right direction.282 Alternatively,
the Wilsonian view conceives of agency policymaking from the agency’s
point of view, as a kind of constrained optimization problem in which the
expert agency pursues its statutory mission subject to both the boundaries
of the statute (as defined by the courts) and political oversight by Congress
and the President.283 Under both views, agencies are charged with statutory
missions and must make policy decisions subject to (imperfect or limited)
political controls and to statutory boundaries determined ultimately by the
courts. Each of the four governmental participants in this ongoing dynamic
is strategic: that is, each acts with an understanding of the others’ powers
and in anticipation of what the others might do. Thus, the de facto removal
of Congress from this game changes the strategic environment for the other
actors and thus changes their decisions.
The most obvious consequence of congressional dysfunction is that
Congress cannot use legislation to determine or steer agency reactions to
new policy challenges within its jurisdiction. It is also axiomatic that if
280 For a summary of this literature, see George A. Krause, Legislative Delegation of Authority
to Bureaucratic Agencies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 521-544
(Robert F. Durant ed., 2010).
281 This articulation of the political control hypothesis within the public choice literature is
most associated with Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. See generally
Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G.
Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and
the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989).
282 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984) (describing two models of ex post
controls).
283 See Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 201 (1887) (advocating for a “scientific” approach to public administration unfettered by political interference).
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Congress is absent from the contest to influence agency decisions, this will,
all else equal, inure to the benefit of the President in that contest.284 In
addition to directing the executive agencies, whose heads he fires at will, the
President can also influence the policy agenda of independent agencies,
mostly through the power of appointment. While mobilizing agencies can
be costly and time consuming for the President, when the political benefits
of doing so are substantial enough and the legal means are readily available,
it can be done by a motivated White House.285 Our two examples are
illustrative; President Obama has invested significant political capital in
EPA’s implementation of GHG regulation, and his appointments to FERC
have spearheaded that agency’s effort to adapt electricity policy to the rise
of renewable energy, smart grid technology, and geographically broader,
more robust, and more competitive wholesale power markets.
The President clearly chose to take ownership of executive branch policy
on climate change—announcing important rulemakings from the Rose
Garden,286 riding herd on potential inter-agency conflicts,287 and proclaiming
a “climate action plan” instructing EPA to issue certain rules by specific
deadlines.288 Although the President’s sway over FERC’s policy agenda
seems less direct, it may be nearly as effective. During his first term, the
President chose a commission chair with very sympathetic views about clean
energy deployment, and the President supported him both publicly and
privately.289 He raised the profile of a number of issues in FERC’s domain,
284 See Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 1, 15-28 (describing the president’s tools of political influence
over agencies).
285 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2282-2303 (2001)
(describing administrative policy initiatives led by the White House and claimed by President Bill
Clinton as political victories).
286 See Remarks by the President on National Fuel Efficiency Standards, WHITE HOUSE (May 19,
2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/President-Obama-A-New-Consensus-on-Auto-Emissions,
archived at http://perma.cc/7YTC-KK5G.
287 See Memorandum of May 21, 2010: Improving Energy Security, American Competitiveness and Job Creation, and Environmental Protection Through a Transformation of Our Nation’s
Fleet of Cars and Trucks, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,399 (May 26, 2010) (directing EPA and NHTSA to
work together on post-2017 fuel efficiency rules).
288 See Memorandum of June 25, 2013: Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, 78 Fed.
Reg. 39,535 ( July 1, 2013).
289 Chairman Jon B. Wellinghoff had a long history of supporting such policies prior to his
service as a FERC commissioner, and was chosen by the president as chairman in part because of
them. Shortly before his nomination to FERC, Wellinghoff was focused on renewable energy
policy, proposing Nevada’s renewable portfolio standards (RPS) legislation and consulting on RPS
proposals in six other states. See Moeller and Wellinghoff Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Energy & Natural Res., 109th Cong. 10-13 (2006) (statement of Jon Wellinghoff, nominee, FERC
comm’r).
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giving prominent speeches about topics like renewable energy, the Smart
Grid, and energy efficiency.290 The White House also coordinated a number
of inter-agency initiatives, and included FERC, bringing the agency
somewhat “into the fold.”291 This is not to say that the President’s power
over an executive agency like EPA versus an independent agency like
FERC is identical, but it may turn out to be sufficient to allow him to
pursue his goals effectively.
Our two policy examples also highlight the importance of consistency
between the President’s agenda and the agency’s mission in an era of
congressional dysfunction. Where the President’s objectives and the agency’s
mission are in conflict, as in the case of the George W. Bush administration’s
resistance to GHG regulation, the result can be turmoil and struggle.292
Where the two align, the President can be expected to support the kind of
creativity and initiative exhibited by the agencies we have examined here.
Thus, while the Bush administration opposed GHG regulation and justified
inaction in ways that the courts ultimately claimed conflicted with the
CAA,293 the Obama administration’s desire to address climate change was
consistent with EPA’s environmental protection mandate and with Massachusetts v. EPA. Neither the Bush nor the Obama administrations have
seemed at odds with FERC’s mission to promote competition; both appear
to have accepted the transformation of wholesale electricity markets
(although the Obama administration may have been relatively more eager to
promote the integration of renewable sources of electricity into those
markets). In any event, we see no fundamental misalignment between
290 E.g., Barack Obama, President, Remarks on Recovery Act Funding for Smart Grid Technology (Oct. 27, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentrecovery-act-funding-smart-grid-technology.
291 See generally Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012) (exploring coordination between agencies given overlapping and
fragmented delegations of authority).
292 Career staff can resist the direction of political appointees, and appointees may come to
align themselves with the perspective of the agency rather than that of the President. By some
accounts, both of these dynamics were at work during the tenure of Bush EPA Administrator
Christine Todd Whitman and may have hastened her regulation. See, e.g., Christine Todd Whitman:
The End of the Road, ECONOMIST, May 24, 2003, at 48 (discussing Administrator Whitman’s
relationship with President Bush).
293 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (rejecting EPA’s refusal to make a causeor-contribute finding for GHGs). The tension between the Bush White House and EPA produced
several interpretations of the CAA that were overturned by the courts, but are beyond the scope of
this Article. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 565-66 (2007) (rejecting
EPA’s decision that certain repair and maintenance activities are not “modifications” that trigger
emissions limits under the statute); New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding
EPA’s decision to regulate mercury emissions from power plants as a non-toxic pollutant
inconsistent with the statute).
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FERC and the White House on these issues. When agency leadership,
agency staff, the White House, and powerful interest groups are all aligned,
the agency will be in a position to act boldly.
At the same time, there are both internal and external checks on reckless
action. Our examples show that even in the absence of a credible threat that
Congress will override their decisions, agencies still tread carefully. Perhaps
this is because even when Congress is unlikely to legislate, congressional
committees—and even powerful lone members—can conduct oversight
hearings, order investigations, threaten to cut appropriations, and introduce
disapproval resolutions, all of which can distract and drain both the agency
and the White House. Rather than acting with impunity, both EPA and
FERC in our examples looked for opportunities to engage in strategic
moderation, paring back their proposals in anticipation of, or in response to,
strong interest group and congressional reactions. EPA amassed a voluminous scientific record to support its endangerment finding; sought the auto
industry’s buy-in for its Tailpipe Rule; made a de-regulatory move with the
Tailoring Rule; and reconsidered its initial standard for new power plants to
mitigate at least some risk. In designing its rule for existing power plants—
its boldest move yet—EPA did go out on a limb, but took pains to set
standards on a sliding scale in response to state differences. It also tried to
diffuse what could be an explosive fight over federalism by affording states
maximum compliance flexibility. Likewise, FERC’s efforts to manage the
transition to modern electricity markets have stopped short of pushing the
outer boundaries of its authority—abandoning its standard market design
and market behavior rules for electricity markets, declining to require
unbundling of transmission and generation rates in retail markets, and
encouraging but not requiring states to join RTOs.
Nor have these regulatory efforts been stealthy. The agencies have not
sought to avoid detection by Congress, the public, or the courts. To the
contrary, in both policy domains the President or the agency head, or both,
has telegraphed the larger enterprise well in advance, practically begging
Congress to act. And every step of the implementation process has been
highly visible and broadly participatory. EPA and FERC have both proceeded to make policy through notice-and-comment rulemaking and in
some instances have taken extreme efforts to secure input from interest
groups, policy experts, and the public.294
294 For a description of this process, see Carbon Pollution Standards, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/
carbon-pollution-standards/, archived at http://perma.cc/5CQ6-S3CD, which explains EPA’s
proposals to reduce carbon pollution and inviting members of the public to participate in the
regulatory process.
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Furthermore, despite moving into new regulatory ground, both agencies
also appear to have been meaningfully constrained by their own readings of
the enabling statutes and by anticipation of judicial review. Agency political
appointees do not operate in a vacuum but are guided by their general
counsel and by career attorneys with long-term institutional perspective.
Especially for controversial rules, agencies take pains to develop their legal
strategies to ensure they are as robust as possible and likely to withstand
attack. It is not hard to imagine then that agencies sometimes pare back or
abandon initial proposals deemed too risky and that some tempting but
problematic strategies never get off the ground.295 Also, because they are
repeat players, appearing before a limited number of judges over time,
agencies have an incentive to assess their prospects of success carefully and
not to take needless risks that could prove embarrassing, in order to protect
their institutional reputation in the courts.296 Even if an agency chooses to
ignore all of those incentives in a particular case, there is an additional check
on agency zealousness, which has proved remarkably effective and stable
across administrations: mandatory regulatory review by the White House
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). As scholars have
noted, when overseeing agency cost-benefit analyses required by Executive
Order 12,291, OIRA has tended to press agencies to weaken, rather than
strengthen, regulations out of concern about high regulatory costs.297 Thus,
even when political staff in the White House and officials in an administrative agency agree on the direction of policy, specific proposals must still be

295 For example, in contrast to the approach taken by EPA and FERC, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) has been reluctant to deploy the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to
address GHG pollution under section 7, which prohibits federal agencies from engaging in actions
that will “jeopardize” listed species. FWS could have taken the position that this “jeopardy”
prohibition requires federal agencies to grant permits for carbon-intensive projects, such as oil and
gas exploration, only on the condition that applicants mitigate their GHG emissions. Yet the legal
difficulty in adapting the ESA for this purpose was apparently too great. The burden of linking
GHG emissions from, say, a particular oil and gas well to the melting polar ice caps that imperil
the polar bear’s survival—not to mention the need for appropriate mitigation measures—would be
daunting. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, What the Law and Lawyers Can and Cannot Do About Global
Warming, 16 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 33, 42 (2007) (observing that GHG lawsuits brought
under common law theories “involve massive causation problems”).
296 See David S. Tatel, Remarks, The Administrative Process and the Rule of Environmental Law,
34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2010) (providing a judicial perspective on agency rulemaking).
Even if temporary political appointees wish to take significant legal risks, career lawyers in the
government should be expected to push back.
297 See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1269-70 (2006) (describing the asymmetrical OIRA review that prefers
underregulation to overregulation).
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cost-justified, which at least traditionally has served as a meaningful constraint on agency regulatory action.298
In our examples, FERC and EPA seem to have behaved in ways that
reflect an appreciation for the new strategic policymaking environment—
one in which Congress as a body is largely absent and in which there is a
premium on alignment with the President. They have pursued their versions of the “best possible” policy response not recklessly, but keenly aware
of the “gridlock interval” and mindful of the constraints of their enabling
statutes. Yet there is no question that the agencies have at times acted
boldly and have taken significant risks. The courts will be the ultimate
arbiters of these adaptive efforts, which means that judges will determine the
policy course for all intents and purposes during periods of congressional
dysfunction. This raises the question of whether courts should approach
judicial review of agency action differently in this new strategic environment.
B. Judicial Review in an Era of Congressional Dysfunction
It is hard to know what courts think about statutory “obsolescence” and
congressional dysfunction because judges do not typically reflect on it
explicitly in their opinions. Their views on such matters tend to be subsumed
in their approaches to statutory interpretation and their tendencies when
applying the Chevron doctrine.299 Some judges might feel a heightened
burden to scrutinize agency interpretations of outdated laws carefully, on
the assumption that these are precisely the conditions under which agencies

298 See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 34 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325 (2014)
(commenting on the de-regulatory force exerted by OIRA, even during a Democratic administration that has publicly stated its support for environmental protection and public health). Costbenefit analysis may not serve as a constraint on agency action where the social cost of carbon
(SCC) is included in the calculation, though, as in case of regulations targeting GHG emissions.
The SCC, which OIRA requires all federal agencies to use, counts the global benefits of avoided
emissions, not simply domestic benefits. Accordingly, the SCC will systematically overstate the
benefits of a regulation to the U.S. population, skewing decisions in favor of more stringent
regulation. See Ted Gayer & W. Kip Viscusi, Determining the Proper Scope of Climate Change Benefits
8-16, 18 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 14-20, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446522.
299 Of course, the Chevron doctrine specifies that when reviewing agency interpretations of
enabling legislation, courts should engage in a two-step analysis: at step one, determine whether
the enabling statute speaks plainly to the question at issue; if not, at step two, determine whether
the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). All of the agency decisions described in this paper involve EPA interpretations of the CAA or FERC interpretations of the FPA. Therefore, judicial review of those
decisions will invoke the Chevron doctrine.
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will be tempted to scour mouseholes for elephants.300 Other judges might
be inclined to defer to agencies struggling in good faith to adapt obsolete
laws to new conditions, giving them the benefit of the doubt at least where
the statutory language is plausibly ambiguous. In a few recent cases, both
conservative and liberal judges have openly acknowledged problems of bad
fit and appeared to sympathize with the agencies’ plight.301 Still, it is
unclear whether such sentiments affect votes in particular cases.
How should the courts respond to this new strategic environment in
which Congress plays a diminishing role in the process of updating legal
regimes to address new regulatory problems? Should they interpret the
agencies’ authority narrowly to spur a dormant Congress into action? Or
should they acknowledge the limits of Congress’s ability to act—and a
gridlock interval that is wider than at any time in the modern regulatory
era—and grant agencies wide latitude to fashion policy remedies to new
problems from old statutory language? What are the implications of both
approaches for democratic accountability in policymaking? And how do the
applicable standards of judicial review of agency decisions influence the
courts’ choices?
C. Democratic Accountability Concerns
Whether democratic accountability is served by granting agencies more
latitude is a more complicated question than it appears at first blush. One

300 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (noting that Congress does
not “hide elephants in mouseholes”); see also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, 132
S. Ct. 1836, 1842 (2012) (commenting that relying on sparse statutory language to support the
agency’s position was like “hoping that a new batboy will change the outcome of the World
Series”).
301 See, e.g., Oral Argument at 16:19, Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, Nos. 13-1674, 13-1676, 132052, 13-2262 (7th Cir. Apr. 22, 2014), available at http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2013/sk.113421.11-3421_04_10_2013.mp3 (acknowledging the bad fit between the statute and contemporary
energy markets); see also Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, Nos. 13-1674, 13-1676, 13-2052, 13-2262,
slip op. at 22, 28 (7th Cir. June 25, 2014) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (commenting that because of the
challenge FERC faces in approving regional cost allocation schemes to site new transmission lines,
FERC “has my sympathy as well as my respect” and arguing that FERC should be allowed to “be
creative in addressing these unprecedented problems”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, 39,
43, EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., No. 12-1182 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2013) (showing that
Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Kennedy acknowledge the challenge for EPA in addressing interstate
pollution within the terms of the statute and suggesting why deference may be appropriate);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 09-1322) (recording Judge Sentelle’s response to counsel’s claim that
Congress would respond if the court ruled in petitioners’ favor, “[w]ith respect, Counsel, any
sentence that begins . . . by saying that [‘]Congress will surely,[’] whatever the sentence says
after that, it’s not a very convincing sentence”).
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might argue that by cabining an agency’s freedom to devise new policy
solutions from old statutes, a reviewing court engages in laudable “democracyforcing.” In this view, a vote against agency “overreach” allocates more policy
decisions to the elected branches and fewer to unelected bureaucrats. One
might support this position on formal constitutional grounds (because
Congress alone possesses Article I lawmaking power), on standard democratic legitimacy grounds (because members of Congress are elected and
agency officials are not),302 or out of simple pragmatism (because one
believes that even well-intended “adaptation” is likely to create a costly,
ineffective regulatory mess and undermine the agency’s legitimacy in the
process).303
Certainly, agency policymaking does change the policy status quo facing
Congress and, in the long term, can alter expectations, create new entitlements, reallocate burdens and benefits, and shift incentives.304 In this way,
the agency “adaptations” we examined above may prove quite durable,
altering conditions in ways that are hard for Congress to disrupt later. EPA’s
regulatory initiatives to adapt the CAA to climate change are intended, in
part, to support natural gas substitution for coal in the electricity sector,
spurring long-lived investments in new generation that will likely remain
operational for decades. American electric utilities are poised to make two
trillion dollars in infrastructure investments in the near term,305 and these
investments will be influenced by the perception that new coal-fired electric
power generation is increasingly uneconomic, not just for market but also
for regulatory reasons. Similarly, FERC’s attempts to incentivize transmission investment, if successful, will yield changes to the electric grid that will
last for decades, if not centuries. Furthermore, agencies may create new
institutional structures that could prove “sticky” once established. Indeed,
RTOs—nurtured by FERC in its effort to centralize control over transmission planning and to supervise the efficient operation of competitive
wholesale energy markets—represent an important new governance structure in electricity markets, one ushered into existence by FERC rather than
legislation. One might argue that only Congress ought to possess the

302 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761,
764 (2007) (arguing that judicial intervention is needed to ensure accountability when agencies
ignore the wishes of Congress and the public ).
303 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 229-30 (2006) (highlighting
unnecessary complexity).
304 Indeed, this is the essence of the notion of policy drift. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
305 See Cavanagh, supra note 118, at 3.
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capacity to produce such durable change and that courts ought to be skeptical when reviewing agency attempts to fit old statutes to new problems.
That view, however, treats Congress as a permanent but static construct.
In fact, when courts review the consistency of agency policy choices with
the underlying enabling legislation, they must consider two congresses—the
Congress that passed the enabling legislation in question and the current
Congress, which may or may not be moved to pass legislation. It is not
self-evident that shifting more decisions about how to implement old
statutes to the current Congress is more “democratic” than leaving those
decisions with the agency until Congress affirmatively chooses to speak
through bicameralism and presentment.306 To the contrary, as explained in Part
II and the Appendix, the problem of bad fit arises in the first place because
polarization has caused the gridlock interval to grow so wide that changes to
the policy status quo—including changes that would move policy toward the
ideological center—become impossible.307 In any event, the current Congress
has no greater claim to decide how existing statutory language applies to new
problems (indeed, how would it do so?), unless and until it passes legislation,
than does the agency that has been entrusted with the statute by an earlier
Congress. Indeed, because the agency has been designated the statute’s
custodian, the agency’s claim is arguably the democratically superior one.
That is, broad delegations of authority to agencies (and broad constructions of
that authority by the agency subsequently) are consistent with democratic
accountability because they represent a collective decision by the elected
branch to leave certain policy choices to expert agencies.
The question is whether the agency’s best judgment or the status quo
should be the default policy during periods of congressional dysfunction.
Those who favor the latter course sometimes contend that the American
policymaking process is designed for gridlock; indeed, Justice Scalia is
credited with holding this view.308 This is a fairly common refrain,309 perhaps
306 But see EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES 41-42, 151-55 (2008) (arguing
that default rules of statutory construction should favor the preferences of the current Congress—
or at least elicit the preferences of the current Congress).
307 Indeed, assuming the public continues to support the agency’s mission, agencies may be
more likely than Congress to produce outcomes that are consistent with the wishes of the median
voter generally. For an explanation of this logic, see David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism,
Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 420 (2002) (pointing out that “information advantages” and
partial political insulation make agencies more effective agents for the median voter).
308 Bob Cohn, Scalia: Our Political System Is ‘Designed for’ Gridlock, ATLANTIC (Oct. 6, 2011, 10:25
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/10/scalia-our-political-system-is-designed-forgridlock/246257, archived at http://perma.cc/822N-V6RD; Justice Scalia Rejects Dysfunctional Government Talk, REUTERS, Oct. 5, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/us-usa-courtscalia-idUSTRE7946LB20111005.
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because Federalist No. 10 holds such a lofty position in American civics
education. As many scholars have noted, however, this view oversimplifies the
Framers’ intent.310 Yes, the Framers feared the mischiefs of faction, but they
also sought to replace a dysfunctional government under the Articles of
Confederation with a more efficient government. Reflecting this goal, in
Federalist No. 58, James Madison rejects the requirement of a supermajority
to enact legislation (the current de facto rule in the Senate), arguing that
“the fundamental principle of free [g]overnment would be reversed” under
such a system because such a system would empower the minority to “take
advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general
weal.”311 Similarly, in Federalist No. 22, Hamilton denounces supermajority
requirements as likely to “embarrass the administration [and] to destroy the
energy of [g]overnment.”312 Hamilton notes that
[w]hen the concurrence of a large number is required by the Constitution to
the doing of any [n]ational act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe,
because nothing improper will be likely to be done; but we forget how much
good may be prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the power
of hindering the doing what may be necessary and of keeping affairs in the
same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular
periods.313

This does not sound like a celebration of the virtues of legislative gridlock or
a sanctification of the status quo in the face of gridlock.314
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson,315 which held that the FDA lacked the authority to regulate
309 See, e.g., JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY: FOUR-PARTY
POLITICS IN AMERICA 6 (1963) (“[O]ur system was designed for deadlock and inaction.”);
ROBERT SHOGAN, THE FATE OF THE UNION: AMERICA’S ROCKY ROAD TO POLITICAL
STALEMATE 5-8 (1998) (discussing the Framers’ efforts to create a government that was both

robust and constrained).
310 See, e.g., SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK 7-11 (2003) (arguing that the Framers did not favor gridlock); Michael J.
Gerhardt, Why Gridlock Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2110-18 (2013) (describing the
value of gridlock and of overcoming gridlock).
311 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 409 ( James Madison) (Henry B. Dawson ed., 1864).
312 THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawson ed., 1864).
313 Id. at 144-45 (second emphasis added); see also Charles O. Jones, A Way of Life and Law,
AM. POL. SCI. REV., Mar. 1995, at 1, 3 (“[T]he point was not solely to stop the bad from
happening; it was to permit the good, or even the middling, to occur as well.”).
314 John Rohr has made a careful and persuasive argument that administrative agencies now
serve the deliberative function that the Framers envisioned for the Senate. JOHN A. ROHR, TO
RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 32-39 (1986). That
is, agencies may do a better job than a polarized Congress of producing policy decisions that
correspond to the preferences of a fully informed median voter.
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tobacco under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).316 The agency’s
view—that the definition of “drug” in the FDCA encompasses nicotine and
that the phrase “drug delivery device” encompasses tobacco—was struck
down by the Court as precluded by the statute, notwithstanding the literal
breadth of the definitional terms.317 The Court inferred an intent on the
part of the enacting Congress and subsequent congresses to exclude nicotine
and tobacco from the statutory definitions because those congresses were
aware of tobacco and its unhealthy properties and addressed those issues in
a series of other statutory enactments over time.318 The Court inferred from
Congress’s behavior a statutory meaning that contradicted the FDA’s reading
of the statute. By contrast, the Massachusetts v. EPA court distinguished Brown
& Williamson, noting that no comparable legislative record precluded GHG
regulation by EPA.319
The Court’s decision in Brown & Williamson has been described as
“democracy-forcing” because it embraces the view that Congress should
speak clearly if it wishes to grant regulatory authority to agencies over
matters of great social and economic importance.320 Indeed, one might
argue that this presumption was vindicated by events: democracy was in fact
forced. Nine years after the Court’s decision, Congress passed a law expressly
granting the agency authority to regulate nicotine321 and authorizing a
315
316

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
Id. at 131-33 (finding that the scope of the FDCA is not ambiguous and that the FDA had
exceeded clear limits on its statutory authority).
317 Id. at 127, 160-61.
318 Id. at 143-56 (arguing that Congress “effectively ratified the FDA’s previous position that
it lacks jurisdiction to regulate tobacco” by passing numerous pieces of tobacco legislation that did
not grant the FDA explicit authority to regulate tobacco products).
319 549 U.S. 497, 530-31 (2007).
320 In other cases, the Court has opined similarly that Congress does not “hide elephants in
mouseholes,” requiring much clearer statements from Congress. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); see also, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299 (2001) (“Congress
must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory directives . . . .”); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v.
AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (“It is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the
determination . . . to agency discretion . . . through such a subtle device . . . .”); cf. John F.
Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 227 (2001)
(arguing that the Brown & Williamson court read the statute narrowly to avoid a nondelegation
problem); Sunstein, supra note 303, at 245 (arguing that “those who are enthusiastic about the
nondelegation doctrine” will favor the decision “because it requires Congress, rather than agencies,
to decide critical questions of policy”).
321 See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C. (2012)). Moreover, it would
be misleading to assume from the tobacco example that Congress would have acted eventually had
the agency exhibited more patience. The FDA’s concerted effort to respond to changed conditions
profoundly altered the terms of the public debate. Had the FDA not conducted an investigation of
the industry, exposing its manipulation of nicotine levels; had it not supported its jurisdictional
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regulatory program similar to the one the FDA originally proposed. Yet that
congressional response is the exception that proves the rule in the era of
ever widening gridlock intervals. If in the usual case there is little prospect
of congressional action as a result of extreme polarization, there is no
democracy to force in the Brown & Williamson sense, and either the agency’s
preferred view, or the courts’, sets policy in the interim.322 In other words,
the normative commitment to democracy-forcing is based on a flawed
empirical assumption about the probability of congressional action. The
logic of gridlock intervals simply belies the idea that by rejecting an agency’s
interpretation, a court will “force” Congress to act. At the same time, the
logic of gridlock intervals suggests that agencies will not stray too far from
the ideological center, for if they do, Congress is more likely respond.323
Returning to our examples, the Supreme Court may ultimately deem
unlawful steps EPA has taken to implement the CAA to address climate
change or invalidate important measures FERC has adopted to modernize
electricity policy under the FPA, on the theory that doing so will force
democracy. But the data on polarization suggest there is little prospect of
congressional action in the reasonably foreseeable term (and of course the
agencies have already been waiting for Congress to speak on these matters
for, in some cases, decades). Meanwhile, the forgone social and economic
benefits of waiting for Congress—what might be called the temporal costs of
democracy-forcing—could be substantial. This is just to say that invalidating
an agency’s adaptive plan and leaving matters to Congress is not neutral; it
restores a status quo that over time might prove very costly to society.
Moreover, our examples suggest that the agencies in question are anything
but “out of control.” Perhaps because the stakes are so high, agencies in
argument with compelling new science showing nicotine is addictive; and had the agency not
forced the issue by promulgating regulations itself, Congress might never have been moved to act.
The same may be true of EPA’s implementation of the CAA to address climate change, and
FERC’s commitment to modernizing electricity policy; even if important aspects of these
programs are ultimately struck down, they may lay the necessary foundation for future congressional action.
322 Moreover, because the Supreme Court grants review in so few cases, it also means that
the circuit courts, and in particular the D.C. Circuit, have the final say on federal policy across a
number of domains. See Adam Liptak, Justices Opt for Fewer Cases, and Professors and Lawyers Ponder
Why, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at A18 (explaining that the Supreme Court hears around eighty
cases each term).
323 Polarized parties cannot come together to support changes to the status quo that move
policy away from the preferences of everyone in one party and toward those of everyone in the
other party: if the majority party is opposed, it will use agenda control to prevent consideration of
such changes; if the minority is opposed, it will filibuster. But if the agency produces a policy
status quo that is outside the gridlock interval (so far from the middle that critical masses of both
parties would prefer to see it changed), then Congress will be moved to action.
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these situations do not necessarily seek to maximize their regulatory reach.
Instead, they demonstrate acute sensitivity to countervailing pressures and
heightened responsiveness to legal and political risk. They do subtle and
nimble things to maintain credibility and preserve their institutional
reputations.324 Wary of the courts, mindful of the White House, and conscious of the damage even a dysfunctional Congress can do, agencies calibrate,
accommodate, and moderate their policies. All of which suggests that perhaps
courts should resist the temptation to equate consequential policy choices
with choices that ought to be thrust back at Congress, even when Congress
shows little appetite for policymaking. Indeed, it may be more “democratic”
to defer during fallow legislative periods to the agencies, rather than revert
to a judicially imposed and indefinite extension of the status quo.
More concretely, the decision facing reviewing courts is whether, under
Chevron, an agency’s increasingly innovative interpretations of the relevant
statutory terms are consistent with the statute’s plain meaning or are
reasonable. Chevron is grounded at least in part in the Wilsonian view of
agency policymaking, which recognizes that agencies have the best information about how enabling statutes should be interpreted325 and may even
have the best information about the political and policy context in which
those statutes were enacted.326 The Chevron decision counsels deference to
agency decisions not only when the statute is ambiguous on the question at
issue, but also when it is silent on the matter;327 the Court has noted that
delegation “necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of
rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”328 The case for
deference seems especially strong when agencies seek to address problems
unforeseen by the enacting Congress.
This is exactly what EPA and FERC have tried to do with the CAA and
FPA, respectively. EPA’s decisions were made pursuant to its authority
under the CAA, a relatively detailed enacting statute. The agency had to
interpret numerous specific terms from different parts of the statute, such as
“pollutant,” “source,” and “standard.”329 FERC’s authority comes, by
contrast, from a relatively simple statute containing a broad grant of authority
324
325

See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 4.
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 7; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative
Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1060 (1998) (arguing that interpretation of
regulatory statutes is properly “an administrative task, not a judicial one”).
326 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 209 (2006).
327 Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
328 Id. (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
329 See supra Section II.A.
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to ensure that the price and terms at which electricity is transmitted and sold
at wholesale are “just and reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory.”330 Yet both
regulatory regimes offer the agency room to adapt the statutory provisions
to new circumstances, and both sets of agency decisions seem to represent
sincere attempts to fashion a solution to new problems from aging statutory
authority. And as we have shown, both EPA and FERC interpreted their
enabling statutes strategically but transparently—conducting broad outreach,
crafting initial proposals with significant industry and interest group input,
and adjusting their proposals in light of comments. The Court has recognized
that when agencies make interpretive decisions using formal, transparent
processes, as EPA and FERC have done in our examples, the decisions are
entitled to greater deference.331
Thus far, courts have tended to be fairly deferential to these two agencies
as they adapt their statutes to the problems we described, with a few
important exceptions.332 With respect to all of the remaining pending
reviews, the agencies can easily make straight-faced arguments that their
policy choices fall within the boundaries of enabling legislation, despite the
fit problems that arise when applying old statutes to new problems. That is,
EPA’s and FERC’s policy choices seem to have been sincere attempts to use
existing legislation to fashion solutions to problems within the agencies’
jurisdiction.

330
331

See supra Section II.B.
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (“It is fair to assume generally
that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that
should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic
Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory
Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 555 (2006) (supporting this distinction between levels of
deference for formal and informal actions on the grounds that agencies devote more resources to
reaching the correct decision when using formal, transparent decision processes).
332 The major exception was the Supreme Court’s decision overturning the Tailoring Rule,
although, as we explained, the loss was limited and the Court did at least defer to EPA on the
most important issue for the agency, which was whether sources triggered into the program
anyway because of conventional pollution had to control their GHGs as well. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text. Significant setbacks for FERC include the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Piedmont, overturning FERC’s interpretation of its backstop transmission line siting authority
under FPA section 216, see Piedmont Environmental Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 319-20 (4th
Cir. 2009), and the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Electric Power Supply Ass’n, overturning FERC’s
demand response rule, see Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, No. 11-1486, slip op. at 16 (D.C. Cir.
May 23, 2014).
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Nonetheless, as others have noted,333 Chevron offers reviewing courts
ample opportunity to use both of Chevron’s steps instrumentally to achieve
preferred policy outcomes or to vindicate a judge’s notion of the proper role
of the bureaucracy in the constitutional order. One might imagine a leftleaning judge reacting skeptically to the notion that the FPA’s just and
reasonable standard implies the broad use of market-based wholesale power
rates and basing his or her decision on the inferred intent of the 1935
Congress. Alternatively, one might imagine a conservative judge reacting
skeptically to the notion that EPA can compel the use of carbon capture at
coal-fired power plants as an “adequately demonstrated” technology, or that
it can set emission standards for existing sources based on what other actors,
not just the sources themselves, could do. To a conservative jurist, both
might seem unreasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory language.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in UARG split along such ideological lines,
between the conservative majority, which rejected EPA’s Tailoring Rule, and
a liberal minority that would have upheld it.334
These ideological differences in the way judges apply Chevron deference
now have higher stakes than ever, because courts cannot count on Congress
to sort out the effects of overturning agency policy decisions. Moreover, if
polarization trends continue, courts can expect to see more and more cases
reviewing agency adaptations of old statutes to new problems. For some of
the pending issues in our sample, reversal of the agency decision would
invite more litigation because of the ways in which the statute links different parts of the regulatory regime.335 This is particularly true of EPA’s
interrelated efforts to address climate change; any loss, even a narrow one, is
likely to invite litigation challenging other aspects of EPA’s climate change
program.336
333 See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 842-51 (2006) (suggesting a correlation
between judges’ ideology and their applications of Chevron to agency decisions).
334 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, No. 12-1146 (U.S. June 24, 2014). The Chief Justice,
Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas joined in Justice Scalia’s opinion that GHGs
were not “any air pollutant” for purposes of triggering the program. Justice Breyer, writing for
himself, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Kagan, and Justice Sotomayor, would have deferred to the
agency’s view by reading an implicit exception into the phrase “any source with the potential to
emit 250 tons per year,” excluding smaller sources for which regulation at that threshold would be
absurd. See id. at slip op. 7 (Breyer J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
335 For a discussion of these links, see supra Section III.A.
336 Losing even on a single narrow issue is still losing: a rebuke from the Court would surely
be seen as a political setback as the agency prepares to roll out the rest of its GHG program. In
recent years, EPA has suffered some notable losses in the High Court, including the rejection of its
use of unreviewable compliance orders under the Clean Water Act in Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367,
1374 (2012), which allowed an Administrative Procedure Act challenge to an EPA compliance order.
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It is hard to predict the trajectory of cases that might fall within the
“bad fit” category. Although we have focused here on examples from the
energy and environmental law domains, as we noted at the outset, many
regulatory agencies are similarly struggling to keep pace with new trends
and must find a way to respond to the demands of modern policymaking in
spite of aging statutes. In the wake of Brown & Williamson,337 recent years
have brought us MCI v. AT&T, in which the Supreme Court invalidated
the FCC’s effort to promote competition in the increasingly fragmented
telecommunication industry because the FCC’s interpretation of the word
“modify” went too far.338 Similarly, in Verizon v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit
struck down the FCC’s “net neutrality” rules (compelling broadband
providers to adhere to open network management practices) because
although the FCC has general authority to regulate in the area, it lacks the
specific authority to adopt its chosen strategy.339 At the same time, the
Supreme Court in City of Arlington v. FCC clarified that agency interpretations of their own jurisdiction are subject to Chevron review, reaffirming the
notion that agencies (not courts) are best-suited to decide what their
enabling legislation means in the face of gaps and ambiguities.340 All of
these cases appear to have been decided ad hoc, with little concern for the
challenges agencies confront in the strategic environment we have
described. Yet in this new environment, the case for deferring to the
agencies as they struggle to adapt statutes is stronger than ever. As courts
are well aware, their decisions are likely to determine policy outcomes for
the foreseeable future, with Congress absent from the policymaking process.
CONCLUSION
It is axiomatic that Congress cannot anticipate all of the ways in which
an agency must apply its statutory mandate,341 and Congress sometimes
chooses not to address particular applications of the mandate in the enabling
legislation.342 Consequently, the agency’s implementation of the mandate
may eventually deviate from either the enacting Congress’s wishes or from
337 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); see also supra note 315
and accompanying text.
338 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994).
339 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
340 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874-75 (2013).
341 This is inherent in the task of writing a rule. Even the wisest legislator cannot anticipate
every situation to which legislation will eventually apply.
342 That is, it may be possible to maintain a legislative majority in support of the legislation
only if the legislation omits provisions addressing particular policy issues. Consequently, the only
way to secure passage of legislation is by delegating those decisions to agencies.
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the wishes of subsequent congresses. We are concerned here with both
forms of divergence. The first poses problems of statutory interpretation; the
second implicates the politics of the policy process and the question of
whether the current Congress will overturn the agency.
As to the second form of divergence, for most of the modern regulatory
era, as conditions diverged more and more from those anticipated by the
drafters of the legislation, Congress could be moved to update the law, as
Congress did when it amended the CAA several times between 1970 and
1990, or when it revised the FPA in 1978 and 1992. This is no longer true,
for reasons we have explained. Today, we face environmental and energy
problems that are at least as pressing as those of the 1970s. Pressure to
address at least some of these problems may be building.343 But the starkest
difference between the 1970s and now is that the partisan political environment is far less conducive to legislation. The problem is not simply one of
unified or divided partisan control of the branches of government, but
rather one of ideological polarization between the parties. The unprecedentedly wide and widening gridlock interval makes bipartisan action to
address important problems ever more difficult.
Still, change continues apace in the environmental and energy fields,
and while Congress absents itself from policymaking, the need to make
policy choices continues. Since the mid-1990s, evidence about how our
energy use produces carbon pollution that contributes to climate change has
coalesced into a scientific consensus. At the same time, electricity markets
have seen the rise of competitive, robust wholesale power markets, technological advances, and the penetration of renewable technologies. As the agencies charged with primary responsibility for managing these challenges,
EPA and FERC have tried to discharge their statutory responsibilities with
very little help from Congress.344
Their efforts have yielded a suite of new policies, all fashioned from old
statutory provisions that were not drafted with these new problems in mind.
The policies reflect an appreciation for the new strategic environment of

343 See Frederick Mayer et al., Americans Think the Climate Is Changing and Support Some
Actions fig.2 (Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Duke Univ., Policy Brief 13-01, 2013), available
at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_pb_13-01_0.pdf (presenting poll
data showing that sixty-four percent of Americans strongly or somewhat favor regulating GHGs);
see also Tracking Public Attitudes—Latest Polls, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK,
http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/hot-topics/climate-polling (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/NWD2-BCR8 (collecting climate change polls).
344 Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that over the last twenty years, Congress has
been losing the ability to react legislatively to these changed circumstances or the policy choices
EPA and FERC are making, riven by growing ideological and partisan polarization.
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agency policymaking; they belie the public choice conception of agency
policymaking as anti-democratic and of agencies as shirkers to be reined in
by the courts. Unlike Judge Calabresi, we are not nearly as dismissive of the
capacity of administrative agencies to adapt obsolete statutes responsibly to
new circumstances. Indeed, we think they are in a far better position than
courts to do so. There are many positives to agency statutory adaptation
over time. Although the regulatory process may at times be glacial, agencies
can move more quickly than Congress, and they face fewer obstacles or
veto-gates to action. Moreover, agencies are subject-matter specialists
organized around a specified mission, and they are equipped with relevant
expertise, enabling them to adjust to changed circumstances more nimbly
than Congress. At least in our examples, the agencies have applied scientific,
economic, and technical expertise to emerging problems, and they are
experimenting with different regulatory approaches. Entrusting statutes to
agencies for certain periods of time could produce valuable learning about
which policies tend to succeed, which tend to fail, and why.
In terms of accountability, agencies are anything but out of control.
Courts check them more than adequately (the threat of judicial review alone
performs a disciplinary function) and presidents direct them in response to
demands from a national constituency. In addition, agencies can still be
expected to be at least somewhat responsive to congressional oversight even
when it is well-known that Congress is unlikely to pass legislation. Our
examples bear this out. Even if courts do not relish reviewing increasing
numbers of agency decisions that fit enabling legislation awkwardly or
poorly, judicial review of those decisions ought to be deferential not only in
recognition of Chevron but also in light of the new strategic environment in
which agencies operate.
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APPENDIX: GRIDLOCK AND POLARIZATION
In this appendix we explain in more detail: (1) the logic behind the
claims that ideological polarization in Congress increases the probability of
gridlock and decreases the capacity of Congress to take legislative action in
response to changing circumstances; and (2) the evidence of increasing
ideological polarization (and corresponding increasing probability of
gridlock) in Congress in recent decades.
Models of Gridlock
Two competing explanations of congressional (in)action offer different
explanations for gridlock, though each ties the problem to increasing
ideological polarization among members of Congress and the electorate at
large. The pivotal politics theory (associated with Keith Krehbiel and
others) focuses on the importance of supermajoritarian institutions in
Congress (like the Senate requirement of sixty votes to invoke cloture and
stop filibusters or the requirement of a two-thirds vote of Congress to
override a presidential veto) and the power those institutions give to certain
pivotal members of Congress.345 By contrast, the party cartel theory346
(associated with Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins) credits the role of
parties, particularly as agenda setters, with driving legislative voting behavior—including gridlock. Each of these theories can be illustrated simply
using spatial models, or abstracted visual depictions used to convey the
theory’s central insights.347
Pivotal Politics
We can use spatial models to illustrate the pivotal politics theory in
steps. We begin with Figure A-1, which depicts the preferences, or ideal
points, of legislators (in an eleven-member legislative body) over alternatives

345 See generally KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING
20-48 (1998).
346 See generally GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2005).
347 Some people find these kinds of abstractions useful, as they distill a complex situation to
its essence. Others find these models less useful, precisely because they omit the complicating
forces and variables at work in the real world. We use spatial models here to depict these two
competing explanations of gridlock, in part because the proponents of the two theories use spatial
models and in part because they provide a visual illustration of the central concepts in a way some
might find helpful.
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along a policy dimension.348 In this legislature, simple majority votes
determine outcomes, there are no political parties, and each legislator votes
for or against policy proposals depending upon whether those proposals
would move policy closer to, or farther from, her ideal point. If all decisions
in this legislature are made by simple majority vote, the pivotal voter should
be the median voter, denoted mv in the figure. In the absence of presidential
vetoes or the possibility of a filibuster, the preferences of the median voter
ought to drive the policy choices of this legislature.349 If the status quo in
any particular policy lies to the left or right of the median voter’s ideal
point, any proposal to move policy toward the median voter’s preferences ought to
garner a majority of the votes in the legislature, and thereby prevail. In Figure
A-1, the legislators’ preferences are not particularly polarized, but rather are
relatively evenly distributed across the ideological spectrum; under these
assumptions, however, the median voter’s preferences would control outcomes even if preferences were polarized.
Figure A-1: Single-Issue Majority Voting,
No Supermajoritarian Institutions,
No Parties, and No Gridlock

Now assume that this legislature has adopted the filibuster rule and that
the filibuster can only be overcome by a vote of sixty percent of the legislature (seven members), akin to the process of invoking cloture in the U.S.
Senate. For any status quo policy that lies to the left or the right of the
median voter, but no farther away than the ideal point of the immediately
adjacent legislator on each side of mv, we can expect a filibuster to successfully
348 This approach assumes that legislators’ preferences can be depicted as points distributed
along a single dimension—e.g., liberal versus conservative or more stringent versus less stringent
regulation of GHG emissions. These spatial models further assume the existence of a utility
distribution around each legislator’s ideal point that reaches its peak at the ideal point; stated
differently, they assume that the legislator’s utility over policy options declines as the distance
between the ideal point in the policy option grows. In the parlance of spatial modeling, this
depiction assumes that individual preferences are “single peaked.” In these models, voters seek
policy outcomes at, or as close as possible to, their ideal points.
349 This is true assuming single-issue voting. If the legislature were to face a vote on a proposal that implicates several issue dimensions at once, the possibility of vote trading across issues
means that any single issue outcome could diverge from the preferences of the median voter on
that issue dimension.
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block any new proposal to move the policy toward mv. To see why this is,
consider Figure A-2. For any status quo policy that lies between mv and fL,
all six of the legislators to the right of the status quo policy will support a
proposal to move the policy to the right, and five will oppose it. If one of
the opposing legislators filibusters the proposal, the legislature will be
unable to muster the seven votes needed to invoke cloture to stop the
filibuster. A mirror image phenomenon will arise for status quo policies that
lie to the right of mv, such that no proposal to move policy toward the
preferences of the median voter can be enacted when the status quo lies
between fL and fR , the so-called “gridlock interval.”350
Figure A-2: Pivotal Politics
The Gridlock Intervals with Strong Middle, No Parties, But Filibuster

Thus, the legislators at fL and fR become the filibuster pivots. The ideological polarization of Congress over the last several decades has been widely
documented,351 and as depicted in Figure A-3, it is easy to see how the size
of the gridlock interval (the set of status quo policies that cannot be
changed) grows when preferences within the legislature (the legislators’
ideal points) become more widely dispersed. As members of the legislature
become more ideologically polarized, the status quo policy can persist even
as the median voter’s preferences stray farther and farther from that status
quo. As long as the status quo policy remains within the widening gap
between the two pivotal legislators, fL and fR, the legislature will remain
powerless to change it. In this configuration, the gridlock interval expands
not because of political parties or party discipline, but simply because of the
increasing ideological heterogeneity in Congress.352
350
351

See KREHBIEL, supra note 345, at 34-39.
For a full discussion of this phenomenon and the literature explaining it, see supra notes
45-49 and accompanying text.
352 Of course, ideology is a key determinant of partisan affiliation. We have already noted the
ideological divergence between, and increasing ideological homogeneity within, American political
parties. See POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 45, at 312-20. Indeed, parties may exacerbate these
trends. See Geoffrey C. Layman et al., Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics,
AM. POL. SCI. REV., May 2010, at 324, 324-27 (describing how party activists play a leading role
in moving party rank-and-file away from the ideological middle and toward the poles—a process
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Figure A-3: Pivotal Politics
The Gridlock Interval with Dispersed Preferences and No Parties

From this simple insight, it is easy to see how divided government and
the possibility of a presidential veto can further increase the size of the
gridlock interval. In Figure A-4, assume that for a new policy to become
law, it must be signed by the President and that a presidential veto can be
overridden only by a two-thirds vote of the legislature (eight legislators).
Note that the President’s ideal point, PL, lies farther from mv than the
relevant filibuster pivot, in this case fR. This means that for any status quo
policy between mv and vo, any proposal to move policy toward mv will be
vetoed by the President, and the legislature will be unable to muster the
eight votes necessary to override that veto. Since vo’s ideal point is even
farther from mv than that of fR, the prospect of a veto further widens the
gridlock interval. In this case, the gridlock interval expands to the right; of
course, if the President’s preferences were sufficiently far to the left, it
would expand in that direction.
Figure A-4: Pivotal Politics
The Gridlock Interval with Dispersed Preferences, No Parties, and Vetoes

Thus, more generally, with ideological polarization in the legislature, the
possibility of a filibuster and a presidential veto insulates a larger set of
status quo policies from legislative change, even as the median voter’s
preferences stray farther and farther from the status quo. If we assume that
legislators’ ideal points reflect the preferences of their constituents, this

the authors call “conflict extension”). In any case, the following Section depicts the potential
influence of parties as causes of gridlock.
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implies that policy lags behind voter preferences when the gridlock interval
is wide.353
Party Politics
The introduction of parties into the model shows how party discipline
can exacerbate the gridlock problem. Figure A-5 is identical to Figure A-2
in that it depicts a legislature with relatively evenly distributed preferences
(a strong middle), but differs from Figure A-2 in that the legislature is now
divided into two (relatively) ideologically heterogeneous parties, a majority
right party (with six members) and a minority left party (with five members).
Let us first assume that the parties can (at least, sometimes) exert discipline
over their members’ decisions, including decisions about whether to override
a filibuster, such that the preferences of the median member of each party
(depicted as points mL and mR in Figure A-5) will drive the behavior of all
of the members of the party. This moves the filibuster pivots farther away
from mv, expanding the gridlock interval. Now the gridlock interval covers
the area from mL, the median left party voter, and mR, the median right
party voter (depicted here as the midpoint between the third and fourth
member of the right party354), an area significantly larger than the gridlock
interval that existed without party discipline. These two points, mL and mR,
represent the new filibuster pivot points when parties exert discipline over
voting by their members.
Figure A-5: Party Politics
Gridlock Interval with Strong Middle, Filibuster, and Party Discipline

We generally do not think of American political parties, however, as
disciplined in this way; to the contrary, compared with parties in parliamen353 Of course, this raises a series of normative questions about the proper purpose—or
performance—of the legislative policymaking process, questions that go to the Framers’ design of
that process. One set of questions goes to theories of representation. Should the legislator’s ideal
points reflect the current preferences of his or her median constituent? Or the median informed
and interested constituent? Or should the legislator’s ideal point reflect what the median
constituent would want if that constituent was fully informed about the issue? For discussion of
these issues in the context of spatial modeling, see Spence & Cross, supra note 34, at 106-12.
354 This assumes that the members of the right party will negotiate policy preferences that
lie between the preferences of the third and fourth members of the six-member party.
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tary systems, we think of them as relatively weak, exerting relatively little
party discipline over voting behavior.355 Party leaders, however, do exert
voting discipline on rare occasions, and according to some commentators,
somewhat more frequently in the current era of ideological polarization.356
Nevertheless, perhaps a more common way in which parties exacerbate
gridlock is when the leadership of the majority party exerts control over the
agenda. Agenda control can also expand the gridlock interval, even in the
absence of party voting discipline. Both houses of Congress delegate agenda
setting powers to committees; the chambers only consider bills reported to
the floor by committee. Moreover, the House of Representatives delegates
important agenda setting powers to its Rules Committee, which specifies
the rules governing debate and amendment for bills that reach the floor in
that chamber. According to the party cartel theory, the leaders and committee
members holding these agenda setting powers act as fiduciaries of the party,
such that they will “not use their official powers to push legislation that
would pass on the floor against the wishes of most in their party.”357 One
way to conceptualize this duty is to posit that it makes the median member
of the majority party (but not the median minority party member) pivotal.
This is because party members controlling the agenda will prevent the
chamber from voting on proposals that would move policy away from the
preferences of the median majority party member. Figure A-6 depicts this
situation.358 This sort of logic produces a gridlock interval that is wider than
in the absence of parties (Figure A-2), but not as wide as that depicted in
Figure A-5 (where both parties exert voting discipline).359

355 This argument is usually made in comparisons of American parties and European parties,
or parties in Westminster systems. See, e.g., COX & MCCUBBINS, supra note 346, at 29-31
(ascribing discipline to institutions); Keith Krehbiel, Where’s the Party?, 23 BRITISH J. POL. SCI.
235, 260 (1993) (ascribing the relatively greater party discipline in parliamentary systems to
greater ideological homogeneity of parties).
356 The so-called “Hastert Rule,” named after former House Speaker Dennis Hastert, is that
the majority should only bring to a vote bills supported by a majority of the majority party. In
2013, Speaker John Boehner pledged to follow the Hastert Rule in managing the House of
Representatives’s consideration of immigration reform bills. Molly K. Hooper, Boehner: I’m Not for
a Comprehensive Solution, HILL, June 19, 2013, at 1.
357 COX & MCCUBBINS, supra note 346, at 9.
358 In this instance, the left boundary of the gridlock interval is marked by the left-side
filibuster pivot, and the right boundary is marked by the median voter in the (majority) right
party.
359 This depiction of the gridlock interval assumes that members continue to vote sincerely
in response to motions to invoke cloture, rather than in response to party instructions.
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Figure A-6: Party Politics
Gridlock Interval with Strong Middle, Filibuster, and Agenda Control

Naturally, if the parties become more ideologically polarized (and preferences within each party more homogenous), the gridlock interval attributable
to party agenda control widens even more, as depicted in Figure A-7.
Figure A-7 is identical to Figure A-3 except that party agenda control has
moved the right-side pivot even farther to the right. If we assume once
again that the majority party controls the agenda, and that it does so in
ways that comport with the preferences of the median member of the
majority party, the legislature will not be able to enact any proposals to
move policy toward the middle as long as the status quo lies anywhere
within this larger gridlock interval.
Figure A-7: Party Politics
Gridlock Interval with Dispersed Preferences and Agenda Control

Thus, we can think of gridlock intervals as affecting the particular mix of
conditions necessary to enact a law: when the gridlock interval is wider,
fewer policy proposals will be able to navigate the process successfully, all
else equal. Stated differently, legislation is more likely when the ideological
environment within Congress is less polarized, all else equal.
Polarization in Congress
As already noted,360 the political science literature documents the
increasing polarization of Congress (and, some argue, the electorate) over
time in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, implying that the
gridlock interval has grown substantially over that time. Using the so-called
DW-NOMINATE data compiled and developed by Keith Poole and
360

See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
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Howard Rosenthal,361 it is possible to show how increased ideological
homogeneity within the two major political parties (and a corresponding
polarization between parties) has served to widen the gridlock interval.
The Poole and Rosenthal data use congressional voting behavior to position each member of each Congress in American history at a point along an
ideological dimension—one which Poole and Rosenthal described as
corresponding to the “liberal-conservative” dimension, particularly with
respect to issues relating to government regulation of economic activity.362
Each member of each Congress is assigned an ideological score ranging
between -1 (most liberal) and 1 (most conservative).363 Using these ideology
“scores,” one can examine over time the relative liberalism or conservatism
of each party, the ideological distance between the parties, the percentage of
moderates364 within Congress, and the percentage of ideological overlap
between Democrats and Republicans.365
Figures A-8 and A-9 illustrate the increasing polarization of Congress
since the fertile environmental and energy legislative environment of the
1970s. Figure A-8 shows the ideological positions of the mean Democrat and
mean Republican in the House of Representatives over time. The widening
ideological gap between the parties is evident.366 As already noted, there are
several competing (and complementary) explanations for this trend,367 but it
certainly supports the notion of a widening gridlock interval. These figures
also illustrate that the lion’s share of that divergence can be ascribed to
movement within the Republican Party toward greater conservatism. In any
361 See POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 45; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text. The
figures presented here were developed using data from Keith Poole & Howard Rosenthal,
VOTEVIEW, http://www.voteview.com/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/RFM6THDL.
362 Poole and Rosenthal actually position members of Congress along two dimensions, but it
is this first dimension, left–right ideology, that they use to measure economic policy.
363 For a full description of the methods used to develop these ideological positions, see
Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis, 29 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 357 (1985), and Keith T. Poole, NOMINATE: A Short Intellectual History, VOTEVIEW,
http://voteview.com/nominate/nominate.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/V3YH-SVNC. For critical
analyses of the Poole and Rosenthal typology, see, for example, SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY
POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 17 n.8 (2008), which highlights potential problems with crossCongress comparisons.
364 Poole and Rosenthal define moderates as those with ideological scores lying between 0.25 and 0.25.
365 We can measure “overlap” by looking at the percentage of Democrats whose ideological
position falls to the right of at least one Republican, and the percentage of Republicans whose
ideological position falls to the left of at least one Democrat.
366 The Senate scores are not depicted here, but see Figure A-9, infra, for a measure of ideological divergence in the Senate over time.
367 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
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case, the growing ideological gap supports the notion that the pivotal
members of each party are likely to be farther apart now than they were in
the 1970s. If ideology drives filibuster decisions, veto override decisions, and
majority party agenda control decisions in the ways that spatial models
suggest, the greater ideological polarization depicted here indicates that
recent congresses ought to be less capable of responding to policy problems
legislatively.
Figure A-8: Mean Scores (Liberal–Conservative Dimension),
House of Representatives, 1970–2011368
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Figure A-9 illustrates this same point a different way, by graphing the
ideological distance between the parties (distance between the mean
Democrat and the mean Republican) in both chambers over time. On this
scale, the maximum possible ideological distance between the parties is two
points (representing perfect polarization). In fact, the ideological distance
between the party means in Congress has grown from about a half a point
in 1970 to more than a point in the House and more than eight-tenths of a
point in the Senate four decades later. The rate of divergence begins to
increase more sharply in the early 1990s, just after passage of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990369 and the Energy Policy Act of 1992.370

368 Once again, the Poole and Rosenthal data position members of Congress on a left–right
scale ranging from -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative).
369 Cf. supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
370 Cf. supra notes 193-198 and accompanying text.
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Figure A-9: Ideological Distance Between the Parties, 1970–2011
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Of course, the diverging ideology scores of the mean Democrat and the
mean Republican are only one possible indicator of a widening gridlock
interval. We might hypothesize that the presence of centrists can help
overcome polarization between the parties because centrists can help bridge
ideological divides and build legislative coalitions. Thus, legislation ought to
be more likely when there are plenty of moderates in Congress—members
of opposing parties who are nevertheless like-minded, willing to “reach
across the aisle” to hammer out legislative bargains and “sell” the resulting
bargain to members of their own party.371 Figures A-10 and A-11, though,
document the disappearance of these cross-party potential bridge builders
in Congress in recent decades. Figure A-10 depicts the percentage of
moderates (those whose ideology scores fall between -0.25 and 0.25) in the
Senate over the last four decades, showing a precipitous drop, particularly
since the late 1970s.372

371 At course, we might surmise that even when moderates are present, the sale of legislative
bargains within the party becomes more difficult as the distance between the mean party members
increases.
372 The House of Representatives figures are not depicted here but show a similar
phenomenon.
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Figure A-10: Percentage of Moderates in the Senate, 1970–2011
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Figure A-11 looks for the presence of centrists in a different way by
focusing on members of each party whose ideology overlaps with that of the
opposing party. More specifically, Figure A-11 combines data from both
chambers of Congress, adds the number of Democrats whose ideology scores
lie to the right of at least one Republican to the number of Republicans whose
ideology scores lie to the left of at least one Democrat, and expresses that
total as a percentage of the total number of members. As is evident from the
figure, a majority of the House and a near majority of the Senate fit this
definition in the late 1970s. Since then, the percentage of overlapping
members has fallen drastically.
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Figure A-11: Percentage of Overlapping Members in Congress,
1970–2011373

Percentage of Overlapping Members

0.7
0.6
House

Senate

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

Conclusion
Over the last four decades, the parties have grown further apart ideologically in a number of ways. According to these data, the parties have grown
more ideologically homogeneous; the average Republican is much more
conservative, and the average Democrat slightly more liberal, than four
decades ago. There are fewer moderates and overlapping members of
Congress, suggesting that there are fewer members willing and able to build
legislative coalitions across party lines. In spatial modeling terms, it appears
that political polarization has made the gridlock interval much wider than it
was in the heyday of environmental and energy legislation of the 1970s. All
of this suggests that the political environment in Congress is less conducive
to the enactment of legislation addressing problems of public concern now
than at any time since 1970.

373

Data drawn from Poole and Rosenthal’s Voteview.com, supra note 361.

